V. DYMARSKY: Hello, this is another program from the series “The Price of Victory” and I am its host Vitaly Dymarsky. My colleague Dmitry Zakharov, unfortunately, was ill, so today I am alone among the presenters. As usual, we have a guest and I am glad to introduce him. Anatoly Koshkin, Doctor of Historical Sciences, orientalist. Hello, Anatoly Arkadyevich.

A. KOSHKIN: Hello.

V. DYMARSKY: Hello, hello. What are we going to talk about? We will talk about some pages of that geographical part of the war, which, in fact, is very poorly known, in my opinion, and such, terra incognito, I would say.

A. KOSHKIN: Well, not very bad, not very good.

V. DYMARSKY: Not very good. Well, let's be diplomats. Let's be diplomats and talk about Japan. Well, Anatoly Arkadyevich is a well-known specialist in Japan, an orientalist. And when we announced our topic “Japan in World War II” - this is a completely vast topic, it’s big. We won’t be able to cover everything, we will take such key moments of this story. Well, we’ll probably still mainly focus on August-September 1945, of course. Moreover, for the first time, if anyone doesn’t know, then know that for the first time this year the end of the Second World War is being celebrated officially.

V. DYMARSKY: Day of the end of World War II, September 2. Although, somehow we got used to it for 65 years that, that’s it, May 9th. Well, in Europe it's May 8th. So, apparently, in the history of the Second World War they decided to move away from such Eurocentrism and, nevertheless, to pay attention to, I wanted to say, the Eastern Front, but this has a completely different meaning. Because when we say “Eastern Front,” we mean precisely the Soviet front in relation to Germany. But in relation to the Soviet Union, the Eastern Front is precisely the Far East, Southeast Asia is everything in the east of our country.

This is the topic we stated. +7 985 970-45-45 – this is the number for your SMS, you know. And, of course, I must warn you and tell you that on the website of the Ekho Moskvy radio station, as usual, a webcast is already running, and you can see our guest. So we have everything ready for the program.

Anatoly Koshkin, our guest today, as I just found out before the broadcast, has literally just returned from Sakhalin. Yes, Anatoly Arkadyevich? That's right, right?

A. KOSHKIN: From Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

V. DYMARSKY: From Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, where, by the way, for the first time, again, there were official celebrations of the end of World War II, namely September 2, 1945, plus 65, which means, respectively, 65 years since the end of World War II war. Well, I won’t ask you, probably, how these celebrations took place, but here’s your general attitude towards this. That's the right decision? This to some extent fills that gap, if you like, a 65-year-old in fact, in relation to... Well, again I say “Eastern Front”, but it’s clear what we’re talking about.

A. KOSHKIN: Well, firstly, I am glad, Vitaly Naumovich, to talk with you once again, especially since our previous topics, in my opinion, were very informative and aroused some interest among radio listeners. Not only do I think this is appropriate and timely. The presidential decree on introducing this date into the register of military glory days and memorable days of Russia is an urgent need. And above all, this is the restoration of historical justice.

You are not entirely right that we have not had this holiday for 65 years. This holiday was officially approved.

V. DYMARSKY: What are you talking about?

A. KOSHKIN: The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, September 3 was declared Victory Day over Japan. And this day after the war was a holiday.

V. DYMARSKY: What are you saying? I didn't know that. And what's next? Then it stopped?

A. KOSHKIN: Then gradually, with the arrival of Nikita Sergeevich, somehow it all became... First they canceled the day off, and then they began to celebrate less and less.

V. DYMARSKY: No, it wasn’t under Stalin.

A. KOSHKIN: Yes? Well, it will be necessary to clarify.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, okay, that’s a different story. Come on, let's go East.

A. KOSHKIN: In my memory it has always been.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, in our memory, of course.

A. KOSHKIN: But I must tell you that in the Far East this date has always been celebrated. Even when it was no longer considered an official holiday. In Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka there were parades and fireworks, usually on this day. And, in general, and especially on Sakhalin - there, by decision of the Sakhalin Duma several years ago, they introduced a holiday, well, on a regional, so to speak, scale. They did not introduce, but restored September 3 as Victory Day over militaristic Japan. Therefore, this year, it seems to me, it is absolutely right, in the year of the 65th anniversary of the end of the war, to restore historical justice. And, you see, this, among other things, we paid tribute, our country, to those people who died. After all, you know, this is a very touching moment for me, I write a lot on this topic and I once received a letter from one woman, an old woman already. And she writes: “Anatoly Arkadyevich, excuse me, but my husband was a lieutenant, he went through the entire war with Nazi Germany. And then we were already going to meet him. He was sent to the war with Japan and died there. Was it really necessary for the Soviet Union to participate in the war?” Well, she can be forgiven for that. But, in reality, this is a very serious question.

V. DYMARSKY: This is a serious question, because we really don’t know this story very well. By the way, you brought up this issue very well, to what extent it was necessary. In order to understand whether there was this need or not, you probably need at least a brief history of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan, right? After all, in 1941, as far as we know, a neutrality treaty was signed, right?

A. KOSHKIN: Neutrality Pact.

V. DYMARSKY: Neutrality Pact, Soviet-Japanese. And strangely enough, although in history we have always studied the Berlin-Tokyo and Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, the Anti-Comintern Pact and so on. That is, Japan has always looked like an enemy of the Soviet Union. And at the same time, it suddenly emerged - well, “suddenly” for those who have not studied history carefully enough, right? - that, in general, throughout the entire Great Patriotic War, that is, since 1941, we were in a state of neutral relations with Japan. Why did this even happen? Is there such a contradiction between the enemy and neutrality?

A. KOSHKIN: Well, we don’t have much time, so it’s point by point.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, at least yes, schematically.

A. KOSHKIN: Firstly, I want to draw attention to the fact that Japan, after the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1925, was a headache for us, it was the main source of military danger. Well, you know, Hitler came only in 1933, and even before 1933 we had events on the border - the White Guard units, supported by the Japanese, constantly carried out raids in the Far East, then the Chinese militarists also, so to speak, to a certain extent carried out the will of the Japanese, committed provocations. And then 1931, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, by the way, excuse me, I’ll interrupt you, but many, especially orientalists - well, naturally, they have a special passion for the East - believe that this is almost the beginning of the Second World War. Which is by no means 1939.

A. KOSHKIN: You know, these are not only our orientalists. In China, many people think so. And they have good reason for this. Because, here, I have to tell you that we believe that World War II officially began on September 1, 1939, with the attack of Nazi Germany on Poland. But by this time, the Japanese massacre in China had been going on for about 10 years. During this time, about 20 million Chinese were killed! How are they? They were part of the troops that took part in the Second World War.

V. DYMARSKY: Was this taken into account among the victims of World War II, right?

A. KOSHKIN: Yes. Therefore, this is a very multifaceted issue. And in China, for example, they can be understood - they believe that the war began precisely in 1931, or at least in 1937, when Japan’s full-scale war against China began. So, returning to our relations with Japan. It would seem that the Japanese have captured Manchuria. Well, the situation has fundamentally changed for us, we have become a neighboring state with aggressive militaristic Japan, you understand? It was one thing when she was on her islands. It was another matter when they began to create bases and place their divisions on our borders. From here Khasan, from here Khalkhin Gol and so on and so forth. Well, you say that we have concluded a pact. Well, firstly, we first concluded a pact with Germany, as you know, in 1939, on August 23. The purpose of concluding a pact with Japan was the same as when concluding a pact with Germany. That is, here, at least for a while, delay the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Second World War both in the West and in the East.

At that time, it was also important for the Japanese to prevent the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union until a moment that the Japanese would consider favorable for themselves. This is the essence of the so-called ripe persimmon strategy. That is, they always wanted to attack the Soviet Union, but were afraid. And they needed a situation when the Soviet Union would be involved in a war in the West, weaken, and withdraw its main forces in order to save the situation in the European part of their country. And this will allow the Japanese, with little loss of life, as they said, to grab everything that they were aiming for in 1918, when they intervened. That is, at least until Baikal.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, okay, then look, then this is what happens. Then the logic you just laid out actually worked. And, in general, Germany attacked the Soviet Union and a clash occurred. So here’s a seemingly convenient opportunity for you: all forces are diverted, mainly, to that front, to the European one. And why did the Japanese never attack the Soviet Union?

A. KOSHKIN: A very good and logical question. So, I can tell you that the General Staff documents have been published.

V. DYMARSKY: Japanese General Staff?

A. KOSHKIN: Yes, of course. On July 2, 1941, an imperial meeting was held at which the question of what to do next in the context of the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union was decided? Strike to the North, help Germany and manage to capture what was planned, that is, the Far East and Eastern Siberia? Or go to the South, because the Americans, as you know, declared an embargo and the Japanese faced the prospect of an oil famine. The fleet advocated that it was necessary to go to the South, because without oil it would be difficult for Japan to continue the war. The army, traditionally aimed at the Soviet Union, argued that this was a one in a thousand chance, as they called it. A chance to take advantage of the Soviet-German war in order to achieve their goals against the Soviet Union. Why couldn't they? Everything was already prepared. The Kwantung Army, which was located on the border with the Soviet Union, was strengthened and increased to 750 thousand. And a schedule for waging the war was drawn up, a date was set - August 29, 1941, Japan was supposed to treacherously stab in the back, so to speak, the Soviet Union.

Why didn't this happen? The Japanese themselves admit this. 2 factors. Yes! Why was August 29th the deadline? Because then autumn, thaw. They had experience in fighting in winter, which ended very unfavorably for Japan. First, Hitler did not fulfill his promise to carry out the Blitzkrieg and capture Moscow in 2-3 months, as planned. That is, the persimmon is not ripe. And the second thing - this is the main thing - is that Stalin, after all, showed restraint and did not reduce troops in the Far East and Siberia as much as the Japanese wanted. The Japanese planned for him to cut by 2/3. He cut it by about half, and this did not allow the Japanese, who remembered the lessons of Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, to stab the Soviet Union in the back from the East. 2 main factors.

V. DYMARSKY: And what you said was something that the Americans distracted?

A. KOSHKIN: The Americans did not distract anyone.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, they were distracted not because they did it intentionally. But it was simply a choice that the Japanese made such a choice.

A. KOSHKIN: Japanese documents - take advantage of the winter of 1941-42 to resolve the issue in the South, obtaining sources of oil. And in the spring we will return to the issue of an attack on the Soviet Union. These are Japanese documents.

V. DYMARSKY: And yet, they did not return. On the other hand, please explain whether there was pressure on the Japanese from their allies, that is, from the Third Reich?

A. KOSHKIN: Of course. When Matsuoko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Berlin in April 1941 (this was before the war), Hitler believed that he could easily cope with the Soviet Union and would not need help from the Japanese. He sent the Japanese south, to Singapore, to Malaya. For what? In order to pin down the forces of the Americans and the British there so that they would not use these forces in Europe.

V. DYMARSKY: But at the same time, look what happened. The Japanese attack on America provoked Washington into declaring war on Germany, right?

A. KOSHKIN: Of course. Yes, but they declared war on Germany, but they waged this war in western Europe, right?

V. DYMARSKY: Well, yes, definitely.

A. KOSHKIN: Although, of course, they helped Great Britain, then they helped us under Lend-Lease. But there was no second front. And by the way, the Japanese’s involvement in the war in the Pacific Ocean, of course, restrained them to a certain extent. They couldn't decide either.

V. DYMARSKY: If we sum it all up, I understand that we don’t have much time to cover all aspects. But in short, here is your conclusion: wasn’t there such a fatal, I would say, tactical mistake on both sides? I mean on both sides of the axis, I mean both Berlin and Tokyo?

A. KOSHKIN: Well, you see, many of us who have not seen Japanese documents, have not read the secret transcripts of meetings of the high command, often call the Japanese adventurers, that this attack on Pearl Harbor is an adventure. In fact, everything was calculated very carefully. And Yamamoto, the commander of the strike group that struck Pearl Harbor, he said that “in a year and a half we will win victories. Then I can’t guarantee anything.” Do you understand? That is, what we are talking about here is that... Of course, there was an element of adventurism. But now, the Japanese - they claim that “you see, we found ourselves in a situation where, in order to save our nation... That is, we were surrounded - America, Great Britain, Holland - they cut off our access to oil, froze our assets and, more importantly, , stopped supplying scrap metal.” And without scrap metal, the Japanese could not create new types of weapons, and so on, and so on, to build a fleet.

V. DYMARSKY: We will now pause for a few minutes, take a short break. And after that we will continue the conversation with Anatoly Koshkin.

V. DYMARSKY: Once again, I greet our audience. Let me remind you that this is the “Price of Victory” program, and I am its host Vitaly Dymarsky. Our guest is Doctor of Historical Sciences, orientalist Anatoly Koshkin. We continue our conversation about Soviet-Japanese relations during the war. And Anatoly Arkadyevich, here’s a question for you. Well, okay, so to speak, we more or less tried to determine why the Japanese did not attack the Soviet Union.

A. KOSHKIN: They wanted to, but they couldn’t.

V. DYMARSKY: But they couldn’t. Now the question is the opposite. Why then did the Soviet Union, despite the neutrality pact, nevertheless attack Japan? 1945, February, Yalta Conference, and there the Soviet Union promises, after all, to violate the neutrality pact and attack. It was a promise to the allies, right, right?

A. KOSHKIN: Everything is correct except for the word “attack”.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, you can’t defend yourself.

A. KOSHKIN: Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, Japan attacked Russia in 1904. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor under cover of darkness. And we entered the war with militaristic Japan at the urgent requests of our ally the USA and Great Britain.

V. DYMARSKY: We promised, in my opinion, 2-3 months after the end of the war in Europe, right?

A. KOSHKIN: So, there were facts before this.

V. DYMARSKY: Enter the war.

A. KOSHKIN: The day after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt turned to Stalin with a request for help in the war with Japan. But you understand, at this time...

V. DYMARSKY: Back then?

A. KOSHKIN: Yes, in 1941.

V. DYMARSKY: So for America the second front was there, it turns out?

A. KOSHKIN: From our side.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, from our side, yes. Roosevelt asked Stalin to open a second front.

A. KOSHKIN: They asked to open a second front in the Far East and provide assistance. Well, naturally, Stalin could not then. He very politely explained that, after all, our main enemy is Germany. And he made it clear that let’s first defeat Germany, and then return to this issue. And, indeed, they returned. In 1943, Stalin promised in Tehran, he promised, after the victory over Germany, to enter the war against Japan. And this greatly inspired the Americans. By the way, they stopped planning serious ground operations, expecting that this role would be fulfilled by the Soviet Union.

But then the situation began to change when the Americans felt that they were about to have an atomic bomb. If Roosevelt was completely and asked Stalin repeatedly, using all sorts of diplomatic, political, and some personal contacts.

V. DYMARSKY: Relationships.

A. KOSHKIN: Yes. Then Truman, who came to power, was naturally more anti-Soviet. You know that he came up with the famous phrase after Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, that “let them kill each other as much as possible, both Germany and the Soviet Union.”

V. DYMARSKY: In my opinion, everyone was busy with this - so that everyone would kill each other there.

A. KOSHKIN: Well, in any case, this is the Truman who became president in 1941 after Roosevelt’s death. And he too, he found himself in a very serious situation. On the one hand, the entry of the Soviet Union was already unprofitable for him for political reasons, because it gave Stalin the right to vote in the settlement in East Asia - not only in Japan. This is China, huge China and the countries of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the military, although they counted on the effect of the atomic bomb, were not sure that the Japanese would surrender. And so it happened.

After the bombing of Hiroshima, Japan had no intention of capitulating. Although, both American scientists and many in Japan say...

A. KOSHKIN: August 6, yes. The general idea is this. So, the Americans used atomic bombs and Japan surrendered. That's not how it was.

V. DYMARSKY: Okay. Then here's the question. To what extent... Here, in my opinion, or rather, my idea did not fall from the ceiling, so to speak, right? Now, our generation has always studied this piece of military history in the following way. On the one hand, this is war and fighting between the Soviet army and the so-called Kwantung Army. On the other hand, there was America's bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two known facts. But they always seemed to exist separately from each other, right? Now, there is America, which dropped an atomic bomb on civilians, and the Soviet Union, which literally won the war in a few days - well, this is a separate question about the Kwantung Army. What, if you like, is the political relationship, and also the military one, between these two events? And is there such a connection?

A. KOSHKIN: Both the military and political ties are the closest. The tightest.

V. DYMARSKY: What is this? Is it helping each other? Or is it competition with each other?

A. KOSHKIN: No, you understand, one of my articles... I recently wrote that the Cold War began with Hiroshima, on August 6th.

V. DYMARSKY: Question on the way. Hiroshima is so correct in Japanese, right?

A. KOSHKIN: In Japanese, yes.

V. DYMARSKY: Otherwise, we are used to Hiroshima. Fine.

A. KOSHKIN: Well, I already do...

V. DYMARSKY: No, no, well, you know Japanese.

A. KOSHKIN: Yes. In Japan it is called Hiroshima. Our enemies accuse Stalin of the fact that after the bombing... He, naturally, did not know anything.

V. DYMARSKY: By the way, yes, there is a question. In general, was this agreed upon with Stalin?

A. KOSHKIN: Absolutely not, absolutely not. No, in Potsdam Truman, outside, so to speak, the framework of the conference, somewhere during a coffee break, in agreement with Churchill, approached Stalin and said that “we have created a bomb of enormous power.” Stalin, to his surprise, did not react at all. And they even thought with Churchill that he did not understand what was being said, although Stalin understood everything perfectly.

V. DYMARSKY: Yes, this is known.

A. KOSHKIN: This is a well-known fact. So here it is. But, naturally, Stalin did not know the date. And then maybe he had this information.

V. DYMARSKY: Then, excuse me, just to make it clear. Reverse question. Did the Americans know about the date of entry, as you say, of the Soviet army into the war against Japan?

A. KOSHKIN: In mid-May 1945, Truman specifically sent his assistant, and at one time his close ally and assistant Hopkins, and instructed Ambassador Harriman to find out this issue. And Stalin openly said: “By August 8 we will be ready to take action in Manchuria.” That is, they accuse us that Stalin, knowing, so to speak, that the Americans had already used the atomic bomb, tried to enter the war in time. But I believe that, on the contrary, the Americans, knowing when Stalin is going to enter...

V. DYMARSKY: How did they know, after all?

A. KOSHKIN: Stalin told the Americans.

V. DYMARSKY: But not in May yet.

A. KOSHKIN: He said it in May.

A. KOSHKIN: Stalin said: “August 8.” Why? Because in Yalta he promised 2-3 months after the defeat of Germany.

V. DYMARSKY: 2-3 months is enough, after all...

A. KOSHKIN: No, no. Well, 2-3 months. Look, Germany capitulated on May 8th. Exactly 3 months later, on August 8, Stalin entered the war. But what is the main political task here? No matter how much the Americans now explain the use of the atomic bomb by the desire to save the lives of their guys, all this, of course, happened. But the main thing was to intimidate the Soviet Union, show the whole world what weapons America had and dictate the terms. There are documents where Truman’s inner circle declares that the atomic bomb will allow us to dictate the conditions of the post-war world and become the dominant nation in the post-war world.

V. DYMARSKY: Anatoly Arkadyevich, one more question, which I, in fact, already started asking, but put it off a little. This is, after all, about the Kwantung Army. This means, again, in all the textbooks that we studied, the million-strong Kwantung Army appears everywhere. The million-strong Kwantung Army, something like 1.5 thousand aircraft, 6 thousand... That is, a fairly large force. And very quickly she capitulated. What's this? Was there some kind of exaggeration of this power? Why so fast? The Japanese are not the worst warriors, right? Why did this notorious Kwantung Army capitulate so quickly and, in fact, end the war so quickly?

A. KOSHKIN: Yes. Well, first of all, I must tell you that the Kwantung Army, of course, was powerful. But when our politicians, and then historians after them, began to use the term “million-strong Kwantung Army,” we need to figure it out a little, in general. The fact is that, in fact, the Kwantung Army plus 250 thousand military personnel of the puppet regime of Manchukuo, created on the territory of occupied Manchuria, plus several tens of thousands of troops of the Mongolian prince De Wang, and plus the group in Korea is quite strong. Well, if you combine all this. Yes, by the way, plus troops on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands - all this gave an army of millions. But! When the Japanese tell me that by 1945 the army was weakened, that many of them had already been withdrawn to the south, I tell them: “Well, let’s not argue with arithmetic. The Soviet Union took 640 thousand prisoners of war alone.” This already indicates how powerful the group was.

Why did you win? In a nutshell. This, so to speak, operation was the highest manifestation of operational art and strategy that was accumulated during the war with Nazi Germany. And here we must pay tribute to our command, Marshal Vasilevsky, who carried out this operation brilliantly. The Japanese simply did not have time to do anything. That is, it is lightning fast. This was our real Soviet Blitzkrieg.

V. DYMARSKY: One more question. Here, in fact, several similar questions have already come. I will not name all the authors, I apologize to them, well, the main thing for us is to understand the essence. Apparently, based on the same terminology, this question arises among many of our people. Look, is this a violation of the neutrality pact on the part of Germany towards the Soviet Union?

A. KOSHKIN: Germany includes a non-aggression pact.

V. DYMARSKY: About non-aggression.

A. KOSHKIN: These are different things.

V. DYMARSKY: Yes. And a neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan. Is it possible to equate these two violations, so to speak, with non-compliance with the agreements that were signed?

A. KOSHKIN: Formally, it is possible, which is what the Japanese do. They accuse us of committing an act of aggression - even now, on the 65th anniversary, one right-wing Japanese newspaper openly writes an editorial about this. But here we must keep the following in mind. Firstly, this pact was concluded before the start of the war, in fact. During the war years, America and Great Britain became our allies, Japan fought a war with them. And then I have to tell you that Japan was not such a black sheep during all these years of the Great Patriotic War.

Just one fact. In agreement with Hitler, they shackled our troops throughout the war, which I told you about. Up to 28% of the Soviet Armed Forces, including tanks, aircraft, and artillery, were forced to remain in the Far East. Just imagine if in 1941 they were all used in the war with Hitler.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, some Siberian divisions were transported to the West.

A. KOSHKIN: But not all! Partially. What if everything?

V. DYMARSKY: That is, they were forced to keep it there after all?

A. KOSHKIN: I call this Japan’s indirect participation in the war. Although it was indirect, it was very effective. Both Hitler and Ribbentrop constantly thanked Japan for pinning down Soviet troops in the Far East.

V. DYMARSKY: Sergei writes to us: “The USSR did not attack Japan. Our troops entered China."

A. KOSHKIN: That’s also correct. By the way! So, when I was working in Japan, on that day around the embassy on all the telegraph poles there were right-wing leaflets, where there was a Soviet soldier in a huge helmet with a star...

A. KOSHKIN: August.

V. DYMARSKY: Ah, August! Attack.

A. KOSHKIN: The entry of the Soviet Union into the war. This means that with a terrible grin, with a machine gun, he is trampling Japanese territory, the Japanese islands. And I must tell you that Soviet and Russian soldiers never entered the territory of Japan with weapons. No plane has ever bombed Japan.

V. DYMARSKY: Immediately the question is: why?

A. KOSHKIN: Because...

V. DYMARSKY: Was there no military need?

A. KOSHKIN: No, there was an agreed upon program for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war.

V. DYMARSKY: Coordinated position with the allies.

A. KOSHKIN: Yes, with allies.

V. DYMARSKY: And with China?

A. KOSHKIN: Well, with China - naturally, they were also informed about this. But not so much, so to speak, in detail, because there are documents, even in Yalta, Stalin, so to speak, hinted to Roosevelt during their face-to-face conversation that the Chinese had to be informed at the last moment, because there could be a leak. But in any case, this is a very important remark that the Soviet Union did not fight in Japan, did not kill the Japanese on their territory, but it liberated them. Although, the Japanese do not like this word “liberated”. Liberated China, the northeastern provinces of China and Korea from Japanese invaders. And this is a historical fact that no one can object to.

V. DYMARSKY: Here is a question from Berkut97 from Rostov: “What, in your opinion, could the number of losses of the Red Army have been in the event of its landing on Japanese territory, if the Americans had not thrown 2 atomic bombs on the cities of Japan?” Well, it's hard to guess, right?

A. KOSHKIN: No, we can assume. But, you see, if there had been no bombing and if there had not been a defeat of the Kwantung Army, the strategic situation would have been fundamentally different. And, naturally... I can tell you that if we had not defeated the Kwantung Army, and the Americans had not thrown bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese were going to fight until the last Japanese.

V. DYMARSKY: Here’s another question. True, this applies more to the relationship between Japan and America. Alexander Ramtsev, entrepreneur from Veliky Novgorod: “It’s interesting to hear your opinion. Did Japan have a real chance of making a separate peace with the United States? And if so, when? Perhaps May 1942? Perhaps to the Coral Sea and before Midway? Or right after? Yamamoto was right: Japan had enough for six months. If the successes of Kido Butai had not turned the heads of the Japanese, would they have had a chance to bring the United States to the negotiating table after the first successes?

A. KOSHKIN: You see, everything here cannot be reduced to relations between the USA and Japan. The main thing is China. After all, the Hell Note, which was used by the Japanese to attack, in this case an attack on the United States, it provided for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. Therefore, there were no attempts by Japan to establish contacts in terms of a truce with the United States until 1945. But, in 1945, they did everything to convince Stalin to act as a mediator in negotiations between Japan and the United States for capitulation... No, not for capitulation - I was wrong. To end the war on terms acceptable to Japan. But Stalin did not agree to this either; he warned the Americans that there were such attempts on the part of Japan. But the Americans, having broken the Japanese codes, knew this from the correspondence of the Japanese government with embassies in other countries.

V. DYMARSKY: This is a question, quite tough and strict. Did the Soviet Union have the moral right to exploit Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia?

A. KOSHKIN: This is a very significant question. What does “moral right to exploit” mean?

V. DYMARSKY: Is the winner always right?

A. KOSHKIN: You know, the Japanese - they don’t recognize prisoners of war as prisoners of war at all, they call them internees. Why? Because they say so.

V. DYMARSKY: It's just a foreign word. No?

A. KOSHKIN: No. They believe that these Japanese did not capitulate, but carried out the emperor's orders. Do you understand? Second question. Few people know - and Japanese scientists should know - that the idea of ​​​​using prisoners of war to restore the Soviet economy was not born in the Kremlin, not in Moscow. This was part of the list of conditions for concessions to Japan in negotiations with Moscow in order to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the war. It was proposed to give up South Sakhalin and return the Kuril Islands, and it was also allowed to use military personnel, including the Kwantung Army, as labor.

V. DYMARSKY: So this is like compensation?

A. KOSHKIN: Reparations, do you understand?

V. DYMARSKY: That is, labor force as reparations.

A. KOSHKIN: And therefore there is no need to blame all the dogs on Stalin. Naturally, Stalin knew through intelligence that the Japanese had such plans. And he took advantage of it.

V. DYMARSKY: Here Alexey writes: “My father remembers how our government congratulated the Americans on the successful bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was also reported with triumph on Soviet radio.”

A. KOSHKIN: I don’t know about triumph.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, this is an assessment, yes.

A. KOSHKIN: As for congratulations on the incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I also have not seen such documents.

V. DYMARSKY: There was no official congratulations in August 1945?

A. KOSHKIN: I think not.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, let's see - we need to double-check.

A. KOSHKIN: That is, if this is the case, congratulations on the successful use of the atomic bomb...

V. DYMARSKY: Well, with a successful bombing, let’s say so.

A. KOSHKIN: No, no, no, I’ve never heard that. I haven’t heard from the Japanese or the Americans. Well, even more so from ours.

V. DYMARSKY: Yes. Well, here questions naturally arose about Richard Sorge. But I immediately want to warn our audience that now we probably won’t touch on this issue today. We, Anatoly Koshkin and maybe some other specialists, will hold a separate program dedicated to this legendary personality.

A. KOSHKIN: Yes. This is a big question.

V. DYMARSKY: This is a big question about personality alone. So. What else? Here’s a good question, Kamenev2010, a reserve officer from Novosibirsk: “To what extent did history, memories or memory of Khalkhin Gol influence, well, if you like?”

A. KOSHKIN: A very serious question.

V. DYMARSKY: Yes?

A. KOSHKIN: Yes. Because, in general, after Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese realized that they could not fight the Soviet Union alone. So they waited until the last minute. In general, the plan was to hit the Soviet Union in the rear from the east after the fall of Moscow. And it was precisely the memories of Khalkhin Gol that kept the Japanese generals from attacking the Soviet Union until the last moment.

V. DYMARSKY: But here’s a rather interesting question, also Alexey from Moscow, I don’t know whether it’s the same Alexey or another: “The international legal situation of Japan after the end of World War II. Can it be equated or is it equivalent to the international legal situation in which Germany finds itself?”

A. KOSHKIN: You understand, this is also a very difficult question. It takes time. Very briefly. There are people who believe that Japan after the surrender is a completely different state. But I don’t entirely agree with this, because the emperor was retained on Japanese territory, albeit under the leadership of the occupation command. The affairs of, so to speak, the administration of the country were handled by the Japanese government. Therefore, there are a lot of subtleties that need to be taken into account. And then, I must tell you that the Japanese, for example, do not believe that the surrender was unconditional. Although, we call it unconditional. And, in fact, they signed an act on the battleship Missouri of unconditional surrender. But they believe that since the emperor... And he was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Generalissimo.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, as the head of state.

A. KOSHKIN: Since it was preserved, then this cannot be considered an unconditional surrender - that’s the logic.

V. DYMARSKY: That is, there are a lot of different things...

A. KOSHKIN: There are a lot of nuances. Weight! And why did MacArthur do this?

V. DYMARSKY: And yet, although this is also a separate topic, there was still a separate, well, in quotes, of course, the Nuremberg trial, that is, the Tokyo trial of Japanese war criminals.

A. KOSHKIN: However, the emperor was not brought to justice.

V. DYMARSKY: Unlike the Third Reich.

A. KOSHKIN: Although China, the Soviet Union and many Asian countries demanded this.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, there Hitler simply, since he committed suicide, did not go to court. But of course he would have gotten there, absolutely.

A. KOSHKIN: Well, that was America’s policy. They needed him in order to facilitate the occupation regime (the emperor). Because they understood that if they executed the emperor, the Japanese would never forgive this and Japan would hardly become a close ally of the United States, as it is now.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, okay. Thank you, Anatoly Arkadyevich. Anatoly Koshkin, Doctor of Historical Sciences, orientalist. We talked about Soviet-Japanese relations during the war and not only about them. And now, as always, we have Tikhon Dzyadko with his portrait. And I say goodbye to you for a week. All the best.

A. KOSHKIN: Thank you. Goodbye.

T. DZYADKO: This is one of the rare cases. General of the Soviet army who died at the front. In February 1945, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky was seriously wounded by artillery shell fragments in what was then East Prussia, and now Poland. At that time, he had already become the youngest general in the history of the Red Army. He received this title at 38. Marshal Vasilevsky, who after the death of Chernyakhovsky was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, wrote about him as an exceptionally talented and energetic commander. “Good knowledge of the troops, diverse and complex military equipment, skillful use of the experience of others, deep theoretical knowledge,” is what Vasilevsky writes about Chernyakhovsky. Or, for example, Rokossovsky’s memoirs: “A young, cultured, cheerful, amazing person. It was clear that the army loved him very much. This is immediately noticeable."

Due to the peculiarities of the time, and, perhaps, due to his early death, the life of General Chernyakhovsky was not connected with anything other than the army. In 1924, at the age of 18, he was a volunteer in the Red Army, then a cadet at the Odessa School and the Kyiv Artillery School, and so on. He entered the Great Patriotic War as commander of the 28th Tank Division. Ivan Chernyakhovsky is from the breed of middle peasants who don’t grab stars from the sky, but they are the ones who make perhaps the most significant contribution to the outcome of the war. In many ways, his name is associated with the liberation of Voronezh and dozens of different operations, from the spring of 1944 already at the head of the 3rd Belorussian Front, one of the leading fronts.

Ivan Chernyakhovsky is perhaps an atypical general for the Soviet army with a completely typical fate, but a very untypical death - not in the dungeons and not on his laurels much after the war. And quite, which is also not typical, unambiguous memories of him, more and more with a plus sign and compliments to his character and merits.

And finally, one more memory of Chernyakhovsky’s driver, who went through the whole war with him. Here is what he writes about Chernyakhovsky: “It’s all about military talents, but, besides everything else, there was a soul, there was a man. If you heard how he sang with the Bolshoi Theater soloist Dormidont Mikhailov. The artists, of whom there were at least 20 among us, turned into guests and listened.”

@ Anatoly Koshkin
Among the comments on one of my articles, I read the opinion of a female student: “Of course, there is no need to give up the Kuril Islands. I think they will be useful to us too. But since the Japanese so persistently demand the island, they probably have some reason for this. They say they refer to the fact that Moscow, they say, has no legal rights to own the islands.” I believe that clarification of this issue now, when the Japanese side is again exaggerating the so-called “territorial issue,” is especially appropriate.

The reader can learn about how the Kuril Islands, which belonged to the Russian Empire since 1786, passed from hand to hand from the relevant historical literature. Therefore, let's start from 1945.

In the 8th paragraph of the Potsdam Declaration of the Allied Powers on the conditions for the unconditional surrender of militaristic Japan it is written: “The conditions of the Cairo Declaration must be fulfilled, Japanese sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and smaller islands that we indicate.”

During the period of heated discussion within the top leadership of militaristic Japan about developing an attitude towards the Potsdam Declaration, namely, disputes about whether to capitulate on its basis or not, this point was practically not discussed. The Japanese “war party,” which did not want to lay down its arms, was concerned not about the territory of the defeated country, but about its own fate. The generals agreed to capitulate only on the condition that the existing political system was preserved, the Japanese themselves punished war criminals, independently disarmaed, and prevented the occupation of Japan by the Allies.

As for territorial possessions, they were considered as a subject of bargaining when trying to get out of the war, avoiding capitulation. Sacrifice something, bargain something. At the same time, a special role in diplomatic maneuvers belonged to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, torn away by Japan from Russia. These lands were supposed to be ceded to the USSR in exchange for its refusal to enter the war against Japan on the side of the United States and Great Britain. Moreover, in the summer of 1945, information was brought to the attention of the Soviet leadership about the possibility of a “voluntary” transfer to the Soviet Union of one of the main islands of the Japanese archipelago - Hokkaido, which, unlike South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, Moscow never claimed. This was allowed in the expectation that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, instead of declaring war, would act as a mediator between the warring parties in armistice negotiations on terms favorable to Japan.

However, history decreed differently. As a result of the USSR's entry into the war and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese elite had no choice but unconditional surrender with the adoption of all points of the Potsdam Declaration, which the Japanese government pledged to strictly observe.

In paragraph 6 of the Japanese Surrender Act of September 2, 1945, it is written: “We hereby pledge that the Japanese government and its successors will honestly implement the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, give those orders and take those actions that, in order to implement this declaration, require Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers or any other representative designated by the Allied Powers." Having accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese government also agreed with the point indicated in it about the future borders of their country.

In the “General Order No. 1” of the command of the Allied forces on the surrender of the Japanese armed forces, approved by US President Harry Truman, it was determined: “Include All(emphasis added by the author) Kuril Islands to an area that must capitulate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East." Fulfilling this provision of the order, Soviet troops occupied the islands of the Kuril chain all the way to Hokkaido. In this regard, it is difficult to agree with the statement of the Japanese government that the Soviet command allegedly intended to occupy the Kuril Islands only up to the island of Urup, and occupied the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai only after “learning of the absence (of) American troops.” The geographical innovation invented after the war about the “non-inclusion” of these four islands into the Kuril ridge (Japanese name - Chishima retto) is refuted by Japanese documents and maps of the pre-war and war periods.

Of fundamental importance is the directive of the commander of the occupation forces in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur No. 677/1 of January 29, 1946, in which, in pursuance of the 8th paragraph of the Potsdam Declaration, the allied command determined the islands that were withdrawn from Japanese sovereignty. Along with other territories, Japan lost all the islands north of Hokkaido. The directive clearly stated that the Chishima Islands (Kuril Islands), as well as the Habomai group of islands (Sushio, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu, Taraku) and the island of Shikotan were excluded from the jurisdiction of the state or administrative authorities of Japan. The Japanese government did not object, because this was in accordance with the terms of surrender.

Following the publication of a directive in pursuance of the Yalta Agreement on the return of Southern Sakhalin and the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the USSR, on February 2, 1946, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Yuzhno-Sakhalin Region was formed in these territories and included it in the Khabarovsk Territory of the RSFSR.

The agreement of the Japanese government with the decision of the allied powers to withdraw all the Kuril Islands from the Japanese state is contained in the text of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Clause c) of Article 2 of the treaty states: “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.”

Then the Japanese government proceeded from the fact that the Kuril Islands (Chishima Islands) ceased to be Japanese territory. This was clearly demonstrated during the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the Japanese Parliament. The head of the treaty department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Kumao Nishimura, made the following statement in the House of Representatives on October 6, 1951: “Since Japan had to renounce sovereignty over the Chishima Islands, it has lost the right to vote on the final decision on the issue of their ownership. Since Japan, by the peace treaty, agreed to renounce sovereignty over these territories, this issue, to the extent that it relates to her, is resolved.” Nishimura’s statement in parliament on October 19, 1951 is also known that “the territorial limits of the Chishima Archipelago, which is referred to in the treaty, include both Northern Chishima and Southern Chishima.” Thus, when ratifying the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the highest legislative body of the Japanese state stated the fact that Japan had renounced all the islands of the Kuril chain.

After the ratification of the San Francisco Treaty, there was a consensus in the Japanese political world that in the course of a peace settlement with the USSR, territorial claims should be limited only to the islands close to Hokkaido, namely, to seek the return of only the Lesser Kuril ridge of Habomai and the island of Shikotan. This was recorded in a unanimous parliamentary resolution of all political parties in Japan dated July 31, 1952. This effectively recognized the USSR's ownership of the remaining Kuril Islands, including Kunashir and Iturup.

Although at the Japanese-Soviet negotiations to end the state of war and conclude a peace treaty, the Japanese delegation initially put forward claims to all the Kuril Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin, in reality the task was to return only the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. Plenipotentiary representative of the Japanese government at the Soviet-Japanese negotiations 1955−1956. Shun'ichi Matsumoto admitted that when he first heard the Soviet side's offer of readiness to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty, he “at first did not believe my ears,” but “was very happy in my heart.” After such a serious concession, Matsumoto himself was confident in the end of the negotiations and the speedy signing of a peace treaty. However, the Americans rudely blocked this opportunity.

Recently, the Japanese media and scientific research have begun to recognize the fact of an arbitrary demand for the “return of the northern territories” - the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai ridge under pressure from those uninterested in the Soviet-Japanese normalization of the United States and the anti-Soviet part of the Japanese establishment. It was they who came up with the previously non-existent propaganda slogan of “the fight for the northern territories” in March 1956. This was done in order to avoid the name Chishima (Kuril Islands) in slogans, which, as stated above, Japan has officially abandoned. By the way, it is important to realize that in addition to the requirement of the four southern islands of the Kuril chain, in Japan there is also a broad interpretation of the invented concept of “northern territories”, namely, the inclusion of the entire Kuril chain, up to Kamchatka, as well as Karafuto, that is, Sakhalin.

The legal basis for bilateral relations was created by the signing on October 19, 1956, and then the ratification of the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan, which ended the state of war and restored diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries. As a gesture of goodwill, the then Soviet government agreed to include the following provision in the text of the declaration: “...The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and the island of Sikotan (Shikotan), however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will take place after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.” By signing and ratifying this document, the Japanese government legally recognized the ownership of South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands by the Soviet Union, since the latter could only “transfer” its territory to another state.

As representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry have repeatedly pointed out, the position taken by the Japanese government indicates its open non-recognition of the results of World War II and the demand for their revision.

Let us note that the claims of the Japanese government to the territories, the ownership of which is enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, fall under the concept of “revanchism”. As is known, in the political lexicon, revanchism (French revanchisme, from revanche - “vengeance”) means “the desire to revise the results of defeats in the past, to return territories lost in the war.” Attempts to accuse the Russian Federation of allegedly “illegal occupation and retention of the Kuril Islands,” in our opinion, create a situation where the Russian government, if such allegations continue at the official level, has the right to raise this issue with the international community at the UN, as well as file a claim with the International court in The Hague.

Let us recall that Japan has “territorial problems” with all neighboring states. Thus, the government of the Republic of Korea strongly protests against the inclusion of Japanese claims to the Seoul-administered Dokdo Islands in government White Papers on foreign policy and defense, as well as in school textbooks. The tense situation also continues in the area of ​​the Japanese-held Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, which the PRC claims, citing historical documents and facts. Needless to say, building up excitement around territorial claims to neighboring states does not unite, but divides peoples, sows discord between them, and is even fraught with confrontation, including military confrontation.

Deputy Director of the Department of Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Russian Foreign Ministry Vladislav Antonyuk made a statement that the process of destroying chemical weapons left in China by the Japanese Kwantung Army during World War II is proceeding slowly, and this poses a threat to Russia’s ecology. “We are constantly monitoring the situation; there is a threat to the Far East, since many ammunition was buried in river beds, which, in general, are transboundary,” the diplomat said at a meeting of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security.

At the request of the PRC, Japan is also participating in the elimination of Japanese chemical weapons remaining on Chinese territory. However, since “detonation technology, which does not imply high rates,” is used to destroy deadly toxic substances, the elimination, according to Antonyuk, “could drag on for many decades.” If the Japanese side claims that more than 700 thousand chemical shells are subject to disposal, then, according to Chinese data, there are over two million of them.

There is information that during the post-war period, about 2 thousand Chinese died from Japanese chemical weapons. For example, there is a known case in 2003 when construction workers from the Chinese city of Qiqihar, Heilongjiang Province, discovered five metal barrels with chemical weapons in the ground and, when trying to open them, were severely poisoned, as a result of which 36 people were hospitalized for a long time.

In the reference literature we find information that in 1933 Japan secretly purchased equipment for the production of mustard gas from Germany (this became possible after the Nazis came to power) and began producing it in Hiroshima Prefecture. Subsequently, military chemical plants appeared in other cities of Japan, and then in the occupied territory of China. The activities of military chemical laboratories were carried out in close contact with the institute for the development of bacteriological weapons - “detachment No. 731”, which was called “the devil’s kitchen”. Military research institutes of prohibited bacteriological and chemical weapons were created by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Armed Forces, Emperor Hirohito, and were part of the Main Directorate of Armaments of the Japanese Army, subordinate directly to the Minister of War. The most famous chemical weapons research institute was “detachment No. 516”.

Combat agents were tested in China on prisoners of war of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, as well as on Russian emigrants and simply Chinese peasants, whom the gendarmerie caught for these purposes. For field testing, we went to a training ground: there people were tied to wooden poles and chemical munitions were exploded.

One of the publications regarding the inhumane experiments of Japanese monsters in white coats reports: “The experiments were carried out in two - small and large, specially designed - chambers connected into one system. Mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide or carbon monoxide was pumped into a large chamber intended to regulate the concentration of the toxic substance. Air with a certain concentration of gas was supplied through pipes equipped with a valve into a small chamber where the experimental subject was placed. Almost the entire small chamber, with the exception of the back wall and ceiling, was made of bulletproof glass, through which observations and recording of experiments were carried out on film.

A Shimadzu device was installed in a large chamber to determine the gas concentration in the air. With its help, the relationship between the gas concentration and the time of death of the experimental subject was determined. For the same purpose, animals were placed in a small chamber along with people. According to a former employee of Detachment No. 516, experiments showed that “the endurance of a person is approximately equal to the endurance of a pigeon: in conditions in which the pigeon died, the experimental person also died.”

As a rule, experiments were carried out on prisoners who had already been subjected in “detachment No. 731” to experiments on obtaining blood serum or frostbite. Sometimes they were put on gas masks and military uniforms, or, conversely, they were completely naked, leaving only loincloths.

One prisoner was used for each experiment, and on average 4-5 people were sent to the “gas chamber” per day. Usually the experiments lasted the whole day, from morning to evening, and in total more than 50 of them were carried out in “detachment No. 731.” “Experiments with poisonous gases were carried out in “detachment No. 731” at the level of the latest achievements of science,” testified a former employee of the detachment from among senior officers. “It took only 5-7 minutes to kill a test subject in a gas chamber.”

In many large cities of China, the Japanese army built military chemical plants and warehouses for storing chemical agents. One of the large factories was located in Qiqihar; it specialized in equipping aerial bombs, artillery shells and mines with mustard gas. The central warehouse of the Kwantung Army with chemical shells was located in the city of Changchun, and its branches were in Harbin, Jirin and other cities. In addition, numerous warehouses with chemical agents were located in the areas of Hulin, Mudanjiang and others. Formations and units of the Kwantung Army had battalions and separate companies for infesting the area, and chemical detachments had mortar batteries that could be used to use toxic substances.

During the war, the Japanese army had the following poisonous gases at its disposal: “yellow” No. 1 (mustard gas), “yellow” No. 2 (lewisite), “tea” (hydrogen cyanide), “blue” (phosgenoxine), “red” (diphenylcyanarsine ). Approximately 25% of the Japanese Army's artillery and 30% of its aviation ammunition were chemically charged.

Japanese army documents show that chemical weapons were widely used in the war in China from 1937 to 1945. About 400 cases of combat use of this weapon are known for certain. However, there is also information that this figure actually ranges from 530 to 2000. It is believed that more than 60 thousand people became victims of Japanese chemical weapons, although their real number may be much higher. In some battles, the losses of Chinese troops from toxic substances amounted to up to 10%. The reason for this was the lack of chemical protection equipment and poor chemical training among the Chinese - there were no gas masks, very few chemical instructors were trained, and most bomb shelters did not have chemical protection.

The most massive use of chemical weapons was in the summer of 1938 during one of the largest operations of the Japanese army in the area of ​​​​the Chinese city of Wuhan. The purpose of the operation was to victoriously end the war in China and focus on preparations for the war against the USSR. During this operation, 40 thousand canisters and ammunition containing diphenylcyanarcine gas were used, which led to the death of a large number of people, including civilians.

Here is evidence from researchers of Japanese “chemical warfare”: “During the “Battle of Wuhan” (Wuhan city in Hubei province) from August 20 to November 12, 1938, the 2nd and 11th Japanese armies used chemical weapons at least 375 times (consumed 48 thousand chemical shells). More than 9,000 chemical mortars and 43,000 chemical agent cylinders were used in the chemical attacks.

On October 1, 1938, during the Battle of Dingxiang (Shanxi Province), the Japanese fired 2,500 chemical shells into an area of ​​2,700 square meters.

In March 1939, chemical weapons were used against Kuomintang troops stationed in Nanchang. The full staff of the two divisions - about 20,000 thousand people - died as a result of poisoning. Since August 1940, the Japanese have used chemical weapons along railway lines in northern China 11 times, resulting in the deaths of over 10,000 Chinese troops. In August 1941, 5 thousand military personnel and civilians died as a result of a chemical attack on an anti-Japanese base. The mustard gas attack in Yichang, Hubei province killed 600 Chinese troops and injured another 1,000.

In October 1941, Japanese aircraft carried out one of the massive raids on Wuhan (60 aircraft were involved) using chemical bombs. As a result, thousands of civilians died. On May 28, 1942, during a punitive operation in the village of Beitang, Dingxian County, Hebei Province, over 1,000 peasants and militias hiding in the catacombs were killed with asphyxiating gases” (See “Beitang Tragedy”).

Chemical weapons, like bacteriological weapons, were planned to be used during the war against the Soviet Union. Such plans were maintained in the Japanese army until its surrender. These misanthropic plans were thwarted as a result of the entry into the war against militaristic Japan by the Soviet Union, which saved the peoples from the horrors of bacteriological and chemical destruction. The commander of the Kwantung Army, General Otozo Yamada, admitted at the trial: “The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan and the rapid advance of Soviet troops deep into Manchuria deprived us of the opportunity to use bacteriological weapons against the USSR and other countries.”

The accumulation of huge quantities of bacteriological and chemical weapons and plans to use them in the war with the Soviet Union indicate that militaristic Japan, like Nazi Germany, sought to wage a total war against the USSR and its people with the goal of mass extermination of Soviet people.

In April 2016, on the eve of negotiations between the Russian and Japanese Foreign Ministers Sergei Lavrov and Fumio Kishida, the right-wing nationalist Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun demanded that the Russian government “return” the Kuril Islands, apologize for their “illegal abduction” and admit “Moscow’s violation of the pact on neutrality," which Tokyo supposedly implemented steadily and honestly.
"Rodina" wrote in detail about the results of the Yalta Conference and the diplomatic conflicts that dotted the i's on the issue of the islands ("The Kuril issue was resolved. In 1945", No. 12 for 2015). The 70th anniversary of the start of the Tokyo Tribunal is a good occasion to recall how “honestly and conscientiously” Japan fulfilled the terms of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

Verdict of the International Tribunal

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East - the trial "of persons accused individually, or as members of organizations, or as both, of committing any offenses constituting crimes against peace" - was held in Tokyo from May 3, 1946 to November 12, 1948. The verdict stated: “The Tribunal considers that an aggressive war against the USSR was envisaged and planned by Japan during the period under review, that it was one of the main elements of Japanese national policy and that its goal was the seizure of USSR territory in the Far East.”

Another quote: “It is obvious that Japan was not sincere when concluding a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union (April 1941 - Author) and, considering its agreements with Germany more profitable, signed a neutrality pact in order to facilitate the implementation of its plans attacks on the USSR..."

And finally, one more: “The evidence presented to the Tribunal indicates that Japan, far from being neutral, as it should have been in accordance with the pact concluded with the USSR, provided significant assistance to Germany.”

Let's dwell on this in more detail.

"Blitzkrieg" in the Kremlin

On April 13, 1941, at a banquet in the Kremlin on the occasion of the signing of the Neutrality Pact (Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka called it a “diplomatic blitzkrieg”), an atmosphere of satisfaction reigned. According to eyewitnesses, Joseph Stalin, trying to emphasize his cordiality, personally moved plates of food to the guests and poured wine. Raising his glass, Matsuoka said, "The agreement is signed. I am not lying. If I lie, my head will be yours. If you lie, I will come for your head."

Stalin winced, and then said with all seriousness: “My head is important for my country. Just like yours is for your country. Let's make sure that our heads remain on our shoulders.” And, having already said goodbye to the Japanese minister in the Kremlin, he unexpectedly appeared at the Yaroslavl station to personally see off Matsuoka. One of a kind case! With this gesture, the Soviet leader considered it necessary to emphasize the importance of the Soviet-Japanese agreement. And to emphasize this to both the Japanese and the Germans.

Knowing that von Schulenburg was among those seeing off the German ambassador in Moscow, Stalin defiantly hugged the Japanese minister on the platform: “You are an Asian and I am an Asian... If we are together, all the problems of Asia can be solved.” Matsuoka echoed him: “The problems of the whole world can be solved.”

But Japanese military circles, unlike politicians, did not attach much importance to the Neutrality Pact. In the same hours, on April 14, 1941, in the “Secret War Diary” of the Japanese General Staff, an entry was made: “The significance of this treaty is not to ensure an armed offensive in the south. The treaty is not a means to avoid war with the United States. It only provides additional time to make an independent decision to start a war against the Soviets." In the same April 1941, War Minister Hideki Tojo spoke out even more clearly: “Despite the pact, we will actively carry out military preparations against the USSR.”

The same is evidenced by the statement made on April 26 by the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army located near the borders of the USSR, General Kimura, at a meeting of formation commanders: “It is necessary, on the one hand, to increasingly strengthen and expand preparations for a war with the USSR, and on the other, to maintain friendly relations with the USSR , striving to maintain armed peace, and at the same time prepare for operations against the Soviet Union, which at the decisive moment will bring certain victory to Japan."

Soviet intelligence, including its resident Richard Sorge, promptly and objectively informed Moscow about these sentiments. Stalin understood that the Japanese would not weaken their combat readiness on the borders with the USSR. But he believed that non-aggression pacts with Germany and neutrality with Japan would help buy time. However, these hopes were not realized.

August 29, day "X"

Already on June 22, 1941, the above-mentioned Foreign Minister Matsuoka, urgently arriving at Emperor Hirohito, insistently suggested that he immediately attack the Soviet Union: “We need to start from the north and then go south. Without entering the tiger’s cave, you cannot pull out the tiger cub. We need to decide."

The issue of an attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941 was discussed in detail at a secret meeting held on July 2 in the presence of the emperor. The Chairman of the Privy Council (an advisory body to the Emperor), Kado Hara, said bluntly: “I believe all of you will agree that a war between Germany and the Soviet Union is indeed Japan’s historic opportunity. Since the Soviet Union is encouraging the spread of communism in the world, we will be forced to sooner or later it is too late to attack him. But since the empire is still occupied with the Chinese incident, we are not free to decide to attack the Soviet Union as we would like. However, I believe that we should attack the Soviet Union at an opportune moment. .. I wish that we would attack the Soviet Union... Some may say that due to the Japanese Neutrality Pact, it would be unethical to attack the Soviet Union... If we attack it, no one will consider it a betrayal "I look forward to the opportunity to strike at the Soviet Union. I ask the army and government to do this as soon as possible. The Soviet Union must be destroyed."

As a result of the meeting, the National Policy Program of the Empire was adopted: “Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact (Japan, Germany and Italy). However, for now we will not interfere in this conflict. We will secretly strengthen our military preparations against the Soviet Union, adhering to an independent position... If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to the empire, we will resolve the northern problem by resorting to armed force..."

The decision to attack the USSR - at the moment when it weakened in the fight against Nazi Germany - was called the “ripe persimmon strategy” in Japan.

Help for Hitler from the East

Today, Japanese propagandists and some of their supporters in our country claim that the attack did not take place because Japan honestly fulfilled the terms of the neutrality pact. In fact, the reason was the failure of the German “blitzkrieg” plan. And even official Japanese historiographers are forced to admit: “The Soviet Union, while waging a defensive war against Germany, did not weaken its forces in the East, maintaining a group equal to the Kwantung Army. Thus, the Soviet Union managed to achieve the goal of defense in the East, avoiding war... The main factor was that the Soviet Union, possessing a vast territory and a large population, during the years of the pre-war five-year plans had become a powerful economic and military power.

As for the war plan against the USSR, it had the encrypted name “Kantogun tokushu enshu”, abbreviated as “Kantokuen” (“Special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army”). And all attempts to present it as “defensive” do not stand up to criticism and are refuted by the same pro-government historians of the Land of the Rising Sun. Thus, the authors of the “Official History of the War in Greater East Asia” (Ministry of Defense Publishing House “Asagumo”) admit: “The basis of relations between Japan and Germany was a common goal - to crush the Soviet Union... The Ministry of War believed that Japan should contribute to the war successes of the German army... Loyalty to the Tripartite Pact was understood as the desire not to yield to England and the United States, to curb their forces in East Asia, to pin down Soviet troops in the Far East and, taking advantage of the opportunity, to defeat it.”

Another documentary confirmation of this: the report of the German Ambassador to Japan Eugen Ott to his boss, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop: “I have the pleasure of declaring that Japan is preparing for all sorts of contingencies in relation to the USSR in order to join forces with Germany... I I think that there is hardly any need to add that the Japanese government always has in mind the expansion of military preparations, along with other measures, to achieve this goal, as well as in order to tie up the forces of Soviet Russia in the Far East, which it could use in war with Germany..."

The task of pinning down Soviet troops was carried out by Japan throughout the Great Patriotic War. And this was highly appreciated by the German leadership: “Russia must keep troops in Eastern Siberia in anticipation of a Russian-Japanese clash,” Ribbentrop instructed the Japanese government in a telegram dated May 15, 1942. The instructions were followed strictly.

Along the meridian of Omsk

Back on January 18, 1942, anticipating a joint victory, the German, Italian and Japanese imperialists “divided” the territory of the Soviet Union among themselves. The preamble to the top secret agreement stated bluntly: “In the spirit of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940, and in connection with the agreement of December 11, 1941, the armed forces of Germany and Italy, as well as the army and navy of Japan, enter into a military agreement to ensure cooperation in operations and crushing the military power of opponents as quickly as possible." The part of the Asian continent east of 70 degrees east longitude was declared a war zone for the Japanese armed forces. In other words, vast areas of Western Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East were subject to capture by the Japanese army.

The dividing line between the German and Japanese occupation zones was supposed to run along the meridian of Omsk. And the “Program of Total War of the First Period. Construction of East Asia” had already been developed, in which Japan identified the areas to be captured and the natural resources explored there:

Primorsky region:

a) Vladivostok, Marinsk, Nikolaev, Petropavlovsk and other areas;

b) strategic raw materials: Tetyukhe (iron ores), Okha and Ekhabi (oil), Sovetskaya Gavan, Artem, Tavrichanka, Voroshilov (coal).

Khabarovsk region:

a) Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Rukhlovo and other areas;

b) strategic raw materials: Umarita (molybdenum ores), Kivda, Raichikhinsk, Sakhalin (coal).

Chita region:

a) Chita, Karymskaya, Rukhlovo and other areas;

b) strategic raw materials: Khalekinsk (iron ores), Darasun (lead and zinc ores), Gutai (molybdenum ores), Bukachach, Ternovsky, Tarboga, Arbagar (coal).

Buryat-Mongolian region:

a) Ulan-Ude and other strategic points.

The “program” provided for “the resettlement of Japanese, Koreans and Manchus to the occupied areas, carrying out the forced eviction of local residents to the north.”

It is not surprising that with such plans the Japanese ignored - we choose the mildest definition - the Neutrality Pact.

Undeclared war on land and sea

During the war, the number of armed attacks on Soviet territory increased markedly. Units and formations of the Kwantung Army violated our land border 779 times, and Japanese Air Force aircraft violated our air border 433 times. Soviet territory was shelled, spies and armed gangs were dropped into it. And this was not an improvisation: the “neutrals” acted in strict accordance with the agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy of January 18, 1942. This was confirmed at the Tokyo Trial by the Japanese Ambassador to Germany Oshima. He also admitted that during his stay in Berlin he systematically discussed with Himmler measures to carry out subversive activities against the USSR and its leaders.

Japanese military intelligence actively obtained espionage information for the German army. And this was also confirmed at the Tokyo Trial, where Major General Matsumura (from October 1941 to August 1943, head of the Russian department of the intelligence department of the Japanese General Staff) admitted: “I systematically transmitted to Colonel Kretschmer (military attache of the German embassy in Tokyo. - Author. ) information about the forces of the Red Army, about the deployment of its units in the Far East, about the military potential of the USSR.For Kretschmer, I conveyed information about the withdrawal of Soviet divisions from the Far East to the west, about the movement of Red Army units within the country, about the deployment of evacuated Soviet military industry. All this information was compiled on the basis of reports received by the Japanese General Staff from the Japanese military attaché in Moscow and from other sources."

One can only add to this exhaustive testimony that after the war, representatives of the German command admitted: data from Japan was widely used by them in military operations against the Soviet Union.

And finally, the Japanese openly torpedoed the Neutrality Pact by launching an undeclared war against the Soviet Union at sea. The illegal detention of Soviet merchant and fishing vessels, their sinking, capture and detention of crews continued until the end of the war. According to official data presented by the Soviet side to the Tokyo Tribunal, from June 1941 to 1945, the Japanese navy detained 178 and sank 18 Soviet merchant ships. Japanese submarines torpedoed and sunk such large Soviet ships as Angarstroy, Kola, Ilmen, Perekop, and Maikop. Unable to refute the fact of the death of these ships, some Japanese authors today make absurd statements that the ships were allegedly sunk by... planes and submarines of the USSR allied US Navy (?!).

Conclusion

Announcing the denunciation of the Neutrality Pact on April 5, 1945, the Soviet government had sufficient grounds to declare: “... Since that time, the situation has changed radically. Germany attacked the USSR, and Japan, an ally of Germany, is helping the latter in its war against the USSR. In addition, Japan is at war with the USA and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union. In this situation, the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR lost its meaning, and the extension of this Pact became impossible..."

It only remains to add that the vast majority of the above documents were published in Japan back in the 1960s. Alas, not all of them were made public in our country. This publication in Rodina, I hope, will give impetus to historians, politicians, and all Russians to take a deeper interest in not so distant history, which today is becoming the object of a fierce struggle for the minds and hearts of people.

"Rodina" cordially congratulates Anatoly Arkadyevich Koshkin, our regular author, on his 70th birthday and looks forward to new bright articles!