At the intersection of the road from Kakhovka to Crimea with the Perekopsky shaft, a rather original monument was erected, dedicated to the three assaults on Perekop. The first assault took place back in 1920 - the Reds attack, the Whites defend, then there will be the Great Patriotic War, there will be the Red Army against the Germans and Romanians, even later there will be a labor assault, but today we are talking about the beginning of the last century.

November 8, 2010 will mark the 90th anniversary of the first assault on Perekop. Of course, there were much more than three assaults in the history of the Turkish Wall. We are, of course, talking about those assaults that the Soviet state cared about perpetuating the memory of.

The civil war caused by Russian Empire well-known events of 1917, in 1920 it was nearing completion. The storming of the Perekop fortifications ends the last stage of the struggle on the Wrangel Front, the last major front of the Civil War. Ukraine had powerful grain reserves. But the presence of Wrangel’s troops in Ukraine and the widespread insurgency in the Ukrainian countryside eliminated “Ukrainian bread” from the food reserves of the Soviet country. The proximity of Wrangel to the industrial Donetsk-Krivoy Rog region paralyzed the work of this only coal and metallurgical base at that time.

It is worth noting that already in August 1920, Wrangel’s government was officially recognized by France. In September, there were already missions of all the most important capitalist states in Crimea, including distant Japan and the USA.

The organizer of the expulsion of the troops of General P.N. Wrangel from Crimea was the Bolshevik M.V. Frunze, commander of the Southern Front at that time. Frunze fought against the Wrangelites together with the Insurgent Army of Father Makhno (N.I. Makhno), with whom in October 1920 he signed an agreement on unity of action against the white troops and established good personal relations.

Since the ideas of Bolshevism, both declarative and propaganda, and actual, are well known, let us dwell a little on the ideas of their Crimean opponent.
July 5, 1920 in the newspaper “ Great Russia» an interview was published with newspaper correspondent N.N. Chebyshev with General P.N. Wrangel.

“What are we fighting for?”

To this question, said General Wrangel, there can only be one answer: we are fighting for freedom. On the other side of our front, in the north, arbitrariness, oppression, and slavery reign. You can hold a wide variety of views on the desirability of a particular political system, you can be an extreme republican, a socialist and even a Marxist, and still recognize the so-called Soviet republic an example of the most unprecedented sinister despotism, under the yoke of which Russia is perishing, and even its new, supposedly dominant, class of the proletariat, crushed to the ground, like the rest of the population. Now this is no secret in Europe either. The veil has been lifted over Soviet Russia. Nest of reaction in Moscow. There are enslavers sitting there, treating the people as a herd. Only blindness and dishonesty can consider us reactionaries. We are fighting for the emancipation of the people from a yoke such as they have not seen in the darkest times of their history.

For a long time in Europe they did not understand, but now, apparently, they are beginning to understand what we clearly understand: the entire global significance of our domestic feud. If our sacrifices go in vain, then European society, European democracy will have to stand up in armed defense of its cultural and political gains against the enemy of civilization, inspired by success.

I long for an end to the civil war with all my soul. Every drop of Russian blood shed resonates with pain in my heart. But the struggle is inevitable until consciousness clears up, until people understand that they are fighting against themselves, against their rights to self-determination, until a real state power, based on the principles of legality, security of personal and property rights, on the principles of respect for international obligations; there will never be any lasting peace or improvement in economic conditions in Europe. It will be impossible to conclude any more or less durable international agreement and agree on nothing properly. The cause of the Russian Army in Crimea is a great liberation movement. This holy war for freedom and right.

Baron Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel (08/15/1878 - 04/25/1928) - Russian, general, Knight of St. George, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in Crimea (1920) - advocated a federal structure future Russia. He was inclined to recognize the political independence of Ukraine. He developed a number of legislative acts on agrarian reform, including the “Land Law,” adopted by the government on May 25, 1920. He recognized the legal seizure of landowners’ lands by peasants in the first years of the revolution (albeit for a certain contribution to the state). Spent a series administrative reforms in Crimea, as well as local government reform. Promulgated a number of decrees on regional autonomy of Cossack lands.

Negotiations with the Bolsheviks, which the British government, which supported the Whites, insisted on, were absolutely unacceptable and even insulting to the White command. It was decided to continue the fight to the end. Wrangel's successes in the summer of 1920 alarmed the Bolsheviks. The Soviet press sounded the alarm, calling for the destruction of the “baron entrenched in the Crimea” and to drive him into the “Crimean bottle.”

In September 1920, the Wrangelites were defeated by the Reds near Kakhovka. On the night of September 8, the Red Army launched a general offensive, the goal of which was to capture Perekop and Chongar and break through to Crimea.

Attack of Perekop positions.

The battle began on November 8 at dawn on the approaches to the Lithuanian Peninsula. Having crossed the Sivash at night, the vanguards of the 52nd and 15th rifle divisions approached unnoticed 1 km to the Lithuanian Peninsula. Here they were already discovered by the enemy and got involved in a battle for the northern exits of this peninsula. By 7 o'clock the Red Army soldiers had overcome the resistance of the Kuban White Brigade and occupied the entire northern part of the peninsula. At about 8 o'clock the Reds occupied the entire Lithuanian peninsula.

By 10 o'clock, the Whites brought the nearest reserves into battle and launched a counterattack with the Drozdovskaya brigade from Karadzhanai, and with units of the II Corps from Karpova Balka to the southern exits from the peninsula. The counterattack was initially successful, parts of the Reds were pushed back, but then the Reds restored the position. The Turkish Wall, which was the basis of the line of fortifications, found itself under a decisive threat from the rear.

In the morning, due to thick fog, the artillery could not begin artillery preparation. Only at 9 o'clock the artillery preparation began. By 13:00, units of the 51st Infantry Division tried to advance to the wire barriers, but the White fire system was unbroken. Artillery preparation was extended by an hour. Meanwhile, by 1 p.m. the artillery began to feel a shortage of shells. The firing calculation was made before 12 o'clock, but it took much longer to shoot, and it turned out to be impossible to transport shells due to the completely open rear. Units of the 15th and 52nd Infantry Divisions were pushed back by a white counterattack, and in their rear areas the rising waters in Sivash became apparent (they crossed the Sivash at low tide).

At 1 p.m. 25 min. units of the 51st Division were ordered to "simultaneously and immediately attack the Turkish Wall." At 1 p.m. 35 min. parts of the division went on the offensive, but were repulsed by destructive machine-gun and artillery fire.

Around 10 p.m. The attackers managed to overcome the wire fences and get to the ditch, but here, in front of the wire running along the outer slope of the ditch, the attack again floundered, despite the exceptional heroism of the Red Army soldiers. Some regiments suffered up to 60% losses.

The Red Command gathered at dawn on November 9 to resume the attack along the entire front. All orders for this decision have been made. But the enemy assessed the situation differently: on the night of November 8-9, he hastily retreated to his Ishun positions. His departure was discovered by the Red units only on the morning of November 9. The Turkish rampart was taken, but the enemy still left, although broken, but not defeated.

Before the battles for the isthmuses of the Crimean peninsula, the number of whites, according to the intelligence data of the reds (subsequently confirmed by battles), was 9850 bayonets, 7220 sabers.

The number of Reds (according to V. Trandafilov’s “Perekop Operation of the Red Army”) was 26,500 bayonets and sabers on the Perekop Isthmus. The Whites on the isthmus had 467 machine guns against the Reds' 487 machine guns and 128 guns against the Reds' 91 guns.

However, ideas do not become true or false depending on the equipment military equipment and military successes.

In the course of a brilliant operation, she broke through the defenses of Wrangel’s White Guards on Perekop, broke into the Crimea and defeated the enemy. The defeat of Wrangel is traditionally considered the end of the Civil War in Russia.

In the Civil War, which engulfed the territory of the former Russian Empire, it was not enough for military leaders to master all the subtleties of the art of war. It was no less, and perhaps more important, to win over the local population and convince the troops of the fidelity of the defended political ideals. That is why in the Red Army, for example, L. D. Trotsky comes to the fore - a man who, it would seem, by his origin and education is far from military affairs. However, his one speech before the troops could give them more than the wisest orders of the generals. During the war, military leaders whose main merits were the suppression of rebellions and real predatory raids are also promoted. Glorified by many historians, Tukhachevsky fought, for example, with the peasants in the Tambov province, Kotovsky was truly the “Bessarabian Robin Hood,” etc. But among the Red commanders there were real experts in military affairs, whose operations are still considered exemplary. Naturally, this talent had to be combined with extensive propaganda work. This was Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze. The capture of Perekop and the defeat of Wrangel's forces in the Crimea are first-class military operations.

* * *

By the spring of 1920, the Red Army had already achieved significant results in the fight against the Whites. On April 4, 1920, the remnants of the White Guards concentrated in the Crimea were led by General Wrangel, who replaced Denikin as commander-in-chief. Wrangel's troops, reorganized into the so-called “Russian Army,” were consolidated into four corps, with a total number of over 30 thousand people. These were well-trained, armed and disciplined troops with a significant layer of officers. They were supported by Entente warships. Wrangel's army, according to Lenin's definition, was better armed than all the previously defeated White Guard groups. On the Soviet side, Wrangel was opposed by the 13th Army, which by the beginning of May 1920 had only 12,500 soldiers and was much worse armed.

When planning an offensive, the White Guards sought first of all to destroy the 13th Army operating against them in Northern Tavria, replenish their units here at the expense of the local peasantry and deploy fighting in Donbass, Don and Kuban. Wrangel proceeded from the fact that the main forces of the Soviets were concentrated on the Polish front, so he did not expect serious resistance in Northern Tavria.

The White Guard offensive began on June 6, 1920 with a landing under the command of General Slashchev near the village. Kirillovka on the shore of the Azov Sea. On June 9, Wrangel's troops occupied Melitopol. At the same time, an offensive was underway from the area of ​​Perekop and Chongar. The Red Army units were retreating. Wrangel was stopped on the line Kherson - Nikopol - Velikiy Tokmak - Berdyansk. To help the 13th Army, the Soviet command sent the 2nd Cavalry Army, created on July 16, 1920. The 51st Infantry Division under the command of V. Blucher and other units were redeployed from Siberia.

In August 1920, Wrangel agreed to negotiations with the UPR government, whose troops were fighting in Western Ukraine. (Russians from the central provinces made up only 20% of Wrangel’s army. Half were from Ukraine, 30% were Cossacks.) The White Guards tried to enlist the support of the Makhnovists by sending a delegation to them with a proposal for joint action in the fight against the Red Army. However, Makhno resolutely refused any negotiations and even ordered the execution of parliamentarian Captain Mikhailov.

Makhno’s relationship with the Red Army was different. At the end of September, an agreement was concluded between the government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Makhnovists on joint actions against Wrangel. Makhno put forward political demands: to grant autonomy to the Gulyai-Polye region after the defeat of Wrangel, to allow the free propagation of anarchist ideas, to release anarchists and Makhnovists from Soviet prisons, to provide assistance to the rebels with ammunition and equipment. Ukrainian leaders promised to discuss all this with Moscow. As a result of the agreement, the Southern Front had a well-trained combat unit at its disposal. In addition, troops who had previously been distracted by the fight against the rebels were sent to fight Wrangel.

Counteroffensive Soviet troops began on the night of August 7. The 15th, 52nd and Latvian divisions crossed the Dnieper and secured a bridgehead in the Kakhovka area on the left bank. Thus, the Red Army created a threat to the flank and rear of the Whites in Northern Taurida. On September 21, the Southern Front was created, which was headed by M.V. Frunze, who showed himself excellently in the fight against Kolchak, in Turkestan, etc. The Southern Front included the 6th Army (commander - Kor k), 13th ( Army commander - Uborevich) and the 2nd Cavalry Mironova. At the end of October, the newly created 4th Army (commander Lazarevich) and the 1st Budyonny Cavalry, which arrived from the Polish front, were included in it. The front had 99.5 thousand bayonets, 33.6 thousand sabers, 527 guns. By this time there were 44 thousand Wrangel soldiers, they had a great advantage in military equipment. In mid-September, as a result of a new offensive by the White Guard, they managed to capture Aleksandrovsk, Sinelnikovo, and Mariupol. However, this offensive was soon stopped; the Whites failed to liquidate the Kakhovka bridgehead of the Reds, nor did they gain a foothold on the Right Bank. By mid-October, the Wrangel troops went on the defensive along the entire front, and on the 29th the offensive Soviet troops from the Kakhovka bridgehead. The losses of the Whites were great, but the remnants of their troops broke through to the Crimea through Chongar. Units of the 4th, 13th and 2nd Cavalry Armies did not have time to promptly support the Budennovites, who were called upon to prevent this breakthrough. The White Guards broke through the battle formations of the 14th and 4th cavalry divisions and retreated across the isthmuses on the night of November 2. M. V. Frunze reported to Moscow: “... with all the significance of the defeat inflicted on the enemy, most of his cavalry and a certain part of the infantry in the person of the main divisions managed to escape partly through the Chongar Peninsula and partly through the Arabat Spit, where, due to the unforgivable negligence of Budyonny’s cavalry, the bridge across the Henichesk Strait was blown up."

Behind the first-class Perekop and Chongar fortifications, erected with the help of French and English engineers, the Wrangelites hoped to spend the winter and continue the fight in the spring of 1921. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), believing that another season of war could lead to the collapse of the young regime, gave the military command a directive to take Crimea at any cost before the onset of winter.

* * *

On the eve of the assault, Wrangel had 25–28 thousand soldiers, and the number of the Red Army on the Southern Front was already about 100 thousand people. The Perekop and Chongar isthmuses and the southern bank of the Sivash connecting them were a common network of fortified positions built in advance, reinforced by natural and artificial obstacles.” The Turkish rampart on Perekop reached a length of 11 km and a height of 10 m. In front of the rampart there was a ditch 10 m deep. The Wrangel forces strengthened the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus with new ones fortifications, for which they used stone and wooden parts of the buildings of the city of Perekop, which was heavily destroyed during the German offensive in 1918 and in the battles with Denikin’s troops in 1919. These fortifications were followed by the fortified Ishun positions. Hundreds of machine guns, dozens of guns, and tanks blocked the path of the Red troops. In front of the rampart there were four rows of mined wire barriers. It was necessary to advance through open terrain, which was covered by fire for several kilometers. It was impossible to break through such a defense. No wonder Wrangel, who examined the positions, said that a new Verdun would take place here.

At first, given that the Perekop and Chongar isthmuses were strongly fortified, it was planned to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 4th Army from the Salkovo area while simultaneously bypassing the enemy defenses with a task force consisting of the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 9th Infantry Division through the Arabat Strelka. This made it possible to withdraw troops deep into the Crimean Peninsula and use the Azov military flotilla. In the future, by introducing a cavalry (mobile) group of the front into the battle, it was planned to develop success in the Chongar direction. This plan took into account a similar maneuver, successfully carried out back in 1737 by Russian troops led by Field Marshal Lassi. However, to ensure this maneuver it was necessary to defeat the White Guard fleet, which was supported by American, British and French warships. Enemy ships had the opportunity to approach the Arabat Spit and conduct flanking fire on Soviet troops. Therefore, two days before the start of the operation, the main blow was transferred to the Perekop direction.

The idea of ​​the Perekop-Chongar operation was to simultaneously strike the main forces of the 6th Army through Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula in cooperation with the frontal attack of the 51st Division on the Turkish Wall to break through the first line of enemy defense in the Perekop direction. An auxiliary attack was planned in the Chongar direction by the forces of the 4th Army. Subsequently, it was planned to immediately defeat the enemy piece by piece at the Ishun positions, which formed the second line of enemy defense. Subsequently, by introducing into the breakthrough the mobile groups of the front (1st and 2nd Cavalry Armies, Makhnovist detachment of Karetnikov) and the 4th Army (3rd Cavalry Corps) to pursue the retreating enemy in the directions of Evpatoria, Simferopol, Sevastopol, Feodosia, not allowing his evacuation from Crimea. Crimean partisans under the command of Mokrousov were given the task of assisting the troops advancing from the front: striking in the rear, disrupting communications and control, capturing and holding the enemy’s most important communications nodes.

From the villages of Stroganovka and Ivanovka to the Lithuanian Peninsula, the width of Sivash is 8–9 km. Local guides were invited to reconnoiter the fords - solar worker Olenchuk from Stroganovka and shepherd Petrenko from Ivanovka.

The Perekop-Chongar operation began on the third anniversary of the October Revolution - November 7, 1920. The wind drove the water into the Sea of ​​​​Azov. The units allocated to the strike group of the 6th Army began to prepare for the night crossing of the gulf. At 22:00 on November 7, in a 12-degree frost, the 45th Brigade of the 15th Inzen Division from Stroganovka entered Sivash and disappeared into the fog.

At the same time, a column of the 44th brigade left the village of Ivanovka. To the right, two hours later the 52nd Infantry Division began crossing. Significant fires were lit on the shore, but after a kilometer they were hidden by fog. The guns got stuck, people helped the horses. At times I had to walk chest-deep in ice water. When about 6 km were left behind, the wind suddenly changed direction, the water, driven to the Sea of ​​Azov, returned back. At 2 a.m. on November 8, the advanced detachments reached the shore of the Lithuanian Peninsula. The enemy, who did not expect the advance of Soviet troops through Sivash, regrouped troops that night. Soon both brigades of the 15th Division entered the battle on the peninsula. When units of the 52nd Division began to emerge from Sivash to the right, the whites were seized by panic. Unable to withstand the blow, they retreated to the previously prepared Ishun positions. Fostikova's 2nd Kuban Cavalry Brigade, defending in the first echelon, almost completely surrendered. The Drozdovsky division brought into the counterattack suffered the same fate.

Having learned about the crossing of the strike group of the 6th Army, Wrangel urgently transferred the 34th Infantry Division and his closest reserve, the 15th Infantry Division, to this direction, reinforcing them with armored vehicles. However, they were unable to restrain the offensive impulse of the strike group of the 6th Army, which rushed to the Ishun positions, to the rear of the enemy’s Perekop group.

The Makhnovist detachments, united in the seven-thousandth Crimean group, also played an important role. At a critical moment, they also crossed the Sivash and, together with the red units, broke into the Crimea.

At the same time, on the morning of November 8, the 51st Division was sent to storm the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus. After a 4-hour artillery barrage, units of the 51st Division, supported by armored vehicles, began an assault on the Turkish Wall. However, fog prevented field artillery from suppressing enemy batteries. Units rose to attack three times, but, having suffered heavy losses, lay down in front of the ditch. The advance of the 9th Infantry Division along the Arabat Spit was thwarted by artillery fire from enemy ships. The water in Sivash continued to rise. At midnight on November 8, Frunze called Blucher to the phone and said: “Sivash is flooding with water. Our units on the Lithuanian Peninsula may be cut off. Capture the rampart at all costs." The fourth assault on the Turkish Wall was successful.

The White Guard's defenses were finally breached on November 9. The Red Army suffered significant losses during the assault on Perekop positions (in some units they reached 85%). The Wrangel troops tried to stop the enemy’s advance on the Ishun positions, but on the night of November 10-11, the 30th Infantry Division stormed through the stubborn enemy defenses on Chongar and outflanked the Ishun positions. During the assault on the enemy's fortified positions, the aviation of the Southern Front covered and supported the advancing troops in the Perekop and Chongar directions.

A group of aircraft under the command of the chief of the air fleet of the 4th Army, A.V. Vasiliev, forced the 8 enemy armored trains concentrated here to move away from the Taganash station with bomb attacks and thereby ensured the success of their troops.

On the morning of November 11, after a fierce night battle, the 30th Infantry Division, in cooperation with the 6th Cavalry, broke through the fortified positions of the Wrangel troops and began to advance on Dzhankoy, and the 9th Infantry Division crossed the strait in the Genichesk area. At the same time, amphibious assault on boats was landed in the Sudak area, which, together with the Crimean partisans, launched military operations behind enemy lines.

On the same day, Frunze on the radio suggested that Wrangel lay down his arms, but the “black baron” remained silent. Wrangel ordered Barbovich’s cavalry and the Don troops to overturn the Red units emerging from the Perekop Isthmus with a blow to the flank. But the cavalry group itself was attacked by large forces of the red cavalry from the north in the Voinka area, where the battered units gathered, which were soon also defeated by the 2nd Cavalry on the move. Wrangel was finally convinced that the days of his army were numbered. On November 12, he ordered an urgent evacuation.

Pursued by formations of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry armies, Wrangel's troops hastily retreated to the ports of Crimea. On November 13, soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Army and the 51st Division took Simferopol, on November 15 Sevastopol and Feodosia were captured, and on the 16th Kerch, Alushta and Yalta. This day is considered by many historians to be the date of the end of the Civil War. Wrangel's army was completely destroyed; some of the White Guards managed to board ships and sail to Turkey.

But the fighting with individual anti-Soviet formations continued for a long time. It was the turn of the Makhnovists. The operation to destroy them was being prepared in earnest high level. Back on November 20, two commanders of the Crimean group - Karetnikov and Gavrilenko - were summoned to Frunze in Melitopol, arrested and shot. On November 27, the Crimean group in the Evpatoria region was surrounded by Soviet divisions. The Makhnovists made their way through the ring, broke through Perekop and Sivash, reached the mainland, but near Tomashovka they encountered the Reds. After a short battle, out of 3,500 Makhnovist cavalrymen and 1,500 famous Makhnovist carts with machine guns, several hundred horsemen and 25 carts remained. Before this, on November 26, units of the Red Army surrounded Gulyai-Polye, where Makhno himself was with 3 thousand soldiers. The rebels managed to escape the encirclement, unite with the remnants of the Crimean group and again turn into a formidable force. After a fierce struggle that lasted throughout the first half of 1921, Makhno crossed the Soviet-Romanian border in September with a small group of supporters.

During the fighting against Wrangel (from October 28 to November 16, 1920), the troops of the Southern Front captured 52.1 thousand soldiers and the enemy, captured 276 guns, 7 armored trains, 15 armored cars, 10 locomotives and 84 ships different types. The divisions that distinguished themselves during the assault on the Crimean fortifications were given honorary names: 15th - Sivash, 30th Infantry and 6th Cavalry - Chongar, 51st - Perekop. For courage during the Perekop operation, all military personnel of the Southern Front were awarded a month's salary. Many soldiers and commanders were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Frunze's authority rose to unprecedented heights.

Before the general offensive of the Red Army, the 4th and 6th Soviet armies were created and the Southern Front was formed, headed by M.V. Frunze. Frunze's offensive plan was to encircle and destroy the Russian Army in Northern Tavria, preventing it from leaving for the Crimea through the Perekopsky and Chongarsky isthmuses. The following took part in the general offensive on Crimea: the 6th, 13th and 4th armies, the 1st cavalry army of Budyonny, the 2nd cavalry army of Guy and Makhno’s gangs.

The commander of the 6th Army, Comrade Kork (1887-1937), an Estonian by birth, graduated from the Chuguev Infantry School in 1908, and from the General Staff Academy in 1914 and held the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Imperial Army. After the occupation of Crimea, Comrade Kork was the commander of the 15th Infantry Division and subsequently the head of the Frunze Academy of the General Staff. In gratitude for his exploits for the glory of the dictatorship of the world proletariat, he was shot by Stalin, after whose death he was rehabilitated.

To attack Perekop, the already known Blucher 51st Infantry Division is assigned, which for this purpose is reinforced by a strike and fire brigade, a separate cavalry brigade, cavalry regiments of the 15th and Latvian divisions and an armored vehicle group.

October 26/November 7. Frunze ordered to take the Perekop shaft. For this purpose, Blucher, who united the entire strike group at Perekop, divides it: 1) the shock-fire brigade and the 152nd rifle brigade to storm the Turkish Wall; 2) He allocates the 153rd rifle and two cavalry brigades as a strike group for an attack through Sivashi on the Lithuanian Peninsula and to reach the rear of the Perekop fortifications.

To prepare for the assault on Perekop, 55 guns and 8 escort guns were fired. The operation begins on November 7 at 22:00.

October 27/November 8. In the morning, the enemy spent three hours making real preparations for the assault on the rampart using twenty batteries of various calibers. Our old trenches not only have not been improved, but have already partially collapsed or have now been destroyed by the Reds. The line of trenches ran along the very crest of the rampart, and the shelters were on our slope, so the enemy’s shells hit the slope of the rampart facing it or flew over the rampart and exploded behind the rampart, which saved us. But there was trouble with the supply - dozens of horses were torn to shreds. From ten o'clock, as far as the eye could see, twelve chains of red infantry covered the entire field in front of us - the assault began.

The temporary commander of the division, General Peshnya, arrived at the site and gave the order not to shoot until the Reds approached the ditch. The Perekop fortifications consisted of a huge, massive old Turkish rampart and a deep ditch in front of it, once filled with water from the bay, but now dry, fortified with wire fences along both of its slopes and located north of the rampart, that is, towards the enemy. With the approach of the Red infantry, their artillery transfers the full force of its fire to our rear. Using this, the shock troops fill the trenches along the crest of the shaft and bring ammunition. The Reds, apparently, were confident in the strength of their artillery fire and quickly rolled towards us. Their obvious enormous superiority in strength and our retreat inspired them. Perhaps our deathly silence created in them the illusion that we had already been killed, and therefore they “perlied” cheerfully, with warlike cries. I even saw with a simple eye that the first chains were in zipuns, pulled up and, as those remaining on our wire later said, this was some kind of best division named after Comrade Frunze. The first chain was already at a distance of 300 steps from us, the machine gunners’ hands were already itching, but there was no order to shoot. The Reds became completely bolder, and some ran up to the ditch. Although we were confident in ourselves, our nerves were still very tense and the first to break our silence was the division chief himself, General Peshnya, who knew the machine gun very well and took it himself. The effect of fire from at least 60 machine guns and four battalions, this only in the sector of the 2nd regiment, was amazing: the slain fell, the rear chains pressed and thereby encouraged the remnants of the forward chains, which in some places reached the ditch. Our advantage, despite our small numbers, was that the Red artillery could not hit us due to the proximity of their riflemen to us, and the enemy machine guns could have hit us perfectly, but for some reason they only pulled them and did not shoot over their heads. Maybe they had no experience in this kind of use of their weapons? We were also lucky in that as the Reds approached closer to the ditch and rampart, they clearly imagined the full significance for them of such an obstacle, which, as they were convinced, even their numerous artillery could not destroy. After a quarter of an hour, the entire attacking mass mixed up and lay down. It was impossible to imagine a worse situation for the Reds on purpose: for us, from the height of the rampart, they presented excellent targets, without the opportunity to hide anywhere, and it was here that they suffered the greatest losses. Our artillery also hit them, but not in the same way as always. It turns out that, in addition to damage from enemy artillery fire, it was partially withdrawn to the right, to the sector of the Drozdovskaya division, where the Reds broke through the estuary. Until the evening, this entire mass did not move under our fire, filling the air with the cries of the wounded. I happened to read in a history of the civil war published in the USSR a description of the attacks on Crimea, where it was reported that their losses at that time were up to 25 thousand people and that they stormed the Perekop Wall and destroyed our brother with bombs in reinforced concrete shelters, which we did not have there , but we had simple dugouts, covered with boards with earth. But despite this, the entire field was covered with dead and wounded in the name of the international proletarian revolution Lenin and Trotsky, but our situation kept getting worse.

The book “Blücher” describes this offensive as follows:

“On November 6 of the new style, on the eve of the celebration of the third anniversary of the great proletarian revolution, we were ready for the assault. The 15th and 52nd rifle divisions were moving towards the battlefield. Together with the 153rd Infantry Brigade and a separate cavalry brigade of the Perekop group, they were planned to strike through Sivash on the Lithuanian Peninsula, on the flank and rear of the Perekop position. The 152nd Rifle and Fire Shock Brigades were preparing for a frontal attack on the Turkish Wall. M.V. Frunze arrived at the headquarters of the 51st Infantry Division, located in Chaplinka, to personally supervise the operation. Wrangel concentrated his best units on the defense of Perekop. On the night of November 8, when the country celebrated the third anniversary of October, the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions and the 153rd and separate brigade of the 51st rifle division were in the piercing cold, drowning in the swamps of Sivash, shot by artillery and machine-gun fire, dragging carrying machine guns and guns, moved to attack the Lithuanian Peninsula. Early in the morning of November 8, they reached the White trenches and, breaking through the wire, drove out the troops of General Fostikov with bayonets (this was a detachment of Kuban soldiers with two machine guns).

There was silence at the artillery positions under the Turkish Wall. Thick fog covered the Turkish Wall. The tension was growing. From the Lithuanian Peninsula there are continuous requests: “What’s the matter?”

At nine o'clock the fog slowly cleared and all our 65 guns opened rapid fire. From the Turkish Wall the Whites bombarded us with fire. The seven-kilometer space under the shaft and on the shaft turned into a continuous sea of ​​craters. At about 12 o'clock the regiments of the shock and 152nd brigades with the 453rd regiment rushed to the assault. Suffering huge losses, they approached the Turkish Wall faster and closer. On the Lithuanian Peninsula, the Whites attack the 13th and 34th divisions (I remind you that the divisions of the Russian Army had three regiments, while the Reds had nine regiments, with one cavalry regiment per division. By this time, these two of our divisions were no more than two battalions ). At about 18 o'clock we attack the Turkish Wall again. Armored cars are in the first rows. At the very ditch, unexpectedly encountering wire, the infantry stopped again. The whole day of unprecedented battle had not yet brought victory, but the goal was already close. About 200 white guns and up to 400 machine guns hit our units.”

(The number of guns in our sector is exaggerated ten times, and the number of machine guns - four times. The Perekop Wall was occupied by only two Kornilov Shock Regiments, and the third regiment stood facing east, towards Sivashi, to protect against an attack from there).

During the battle on October 26/November 8, the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment lost 8 people killed and 40 people wounded. 35 horses were killed. All injuries were from artillery fire.

October 27/November 9. The Kornilov Shock Division left the Perekop Wall by one hour and retreated to the Yushun positions. The night was dark and starless. The battalion of Colonel Troshin was left in the rearguard of the division, which by one hour also left the Perekop Wall. This is written about this in the book “Kornilov Shock Regiment”: “On the evening of October 26th art. Art. Colonel Levitov summoned Colonel Troshin and told him that with the onset of darkness, the entire Kornilov Shock Division had received orders to retreat to the Yushun positions, and his 2nd battalion was assigned to the rearguard. In order not to reveal your retreat to the enemy, it is necessary to shoot from rifles until the last moment. The impregnable Perekop Wall began to empty. The machine guns are taken away, the companies leave one after another. Colonel Troshin stretched his battalion along the trenches. The ominous silence was occasionally broken by a single shot. Finally the 2nd battalion withdrew. Without a single light, the Kornilovites passed through the Armenian Bazaar and, in the dead of night, were drawn into the first line of the Yushun fortifications.”

The combat logs of all three regiments of the Kornilov Shock Division noted that these fortifications were poorly equipped for defense.

Let's see how this assault on the Perekop positions is illuminated by Blucher's headquarters: “At night, about 24 hours (October 26/November 8), Frunze orders the attack to be resumed and demands to capture the rampart at any cost. We again threw the exhausted units into the assault and at about 3 o’clock on October 27/November 9, the impregnable Perekop fell.”

In fact, Perekop was abandoned by the Kornilovites without a fight and even before the Reds approached, according to the order of October 26, November, at 24 hours.

It’s interesting what Blucher wrote in his reports to the commander of the 6th Soviet army about the reasons for the failure of the assault on the Perekop fortifications: “It was not possible to take the Perekop fortified position by raid. The enemy provided himself with a small garrison, but it was equipped with colossal material. Positions are adapted to the tactical conditions of the terrain. This makes the isthmus almost impregnable."

In one gorgeously published history of the USSR, I read the same fabrication about the assault on the Perekop fortifications, where the Reds allegedly smoked out officers with bombs and flamethrowers from concrete fortifications, which in fact were not on the Perekop shaft, just as there was no “LEGENDARY STORM OF PEREKOPSKY” SHAFT IN RED" at 3 o'clock on October 27/November 9.

October 28. At dawn, the enemy in large forces, supported by strong artillery fire, went on the offensive on the division's front. Despite the small number of the regiment and the fatigue of the people from long and difficult marches, accompanied by continuous and overwhelming battles, the regiment with courage held back the onslaught. However, the right-flank 1st Regiment was driven out of the first line by a Red attack from the Drozdovskaya Rifle Division, and the 3rd Regiment was under threat of attack from the rear. At this time, the temporary division commander, General Peshnya, took an armored car from the 2nd regiment and ordered the 3rd and 2nd regiments to launch a counterattack by telephone. I, the commander of the 2nd regiment, dared to point out the danger of the weak 3rd regiment being forfeited, and then the 2nd regiment would be pressed against the bay, but at that time I was informed that the 3rd regiment was already going beyond the wire to attack.

I then considered the attack unnecessary and risky, but the inappropriate haste of the commander of the 3rd regiment was forced to expose his regiment to the bullets of the Reds, and not to push them back again with the force of his fire. When the 2nd Regiment went beyond the wire, the 3rd Regiment, in a thin chain, led by its regimental commander, Colonel Shcheglov, on horseback, was already moving towards the Red trenches under the howl of enemy machine guns. The futility of a counterattack in the conditions created for us weighed heavily on me. Shells and bullets rained down on the 2nd Regiment, which calmly and unitedly went on a counterattack. Busy with the fate of my regiment, I did not pay attention to the actions of the 3rd regiment, but when I looked at its sector, I saw a sad picture of its retreat, now without the regiment commander, who was wounded in this sortie. Here I ordered them to retreat to their trenches under the cover of machine guns.

Passing through the wire fence, I stopped to take another look at the situation in the 3rd Regiment's sector, but here came the end of my command of the valiant 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment. The bullet hit me in the left groin, piercing a thick bag of maps, and stopped in the spine of the spine. She knocked me off my horse, almost instantly paralyzing both legs. Eight years later, in Bulgaria, Dr. Berzin performed an operation on me and presented me with a Russian sharp-pointed bullet with a bent end, which inflicted my thirteenth wound in the struggle for the honor and dignity of national RUSSIA, as a souvenir of the Motherland. At the same time as me, my assistant, Colonel Lysan, Anton Evtikhievich, was also wounded in the groin, but right through. Colonel Troshin took command of the regiment, and Captain Vozovik became his assistant.

In this battle, the following officers were wounded: the temporary commander of the division, General Peshnya, and the commander of the Kornilov artillery brigade, General Erogin, took temporary command of the division; the commander of the 1st Kornilov Shock Regiment, Colonel Gordeenko, and the regiment was received by Lieutenant Colonel Shirkovsky; the commander of the 3rd Kornilov Shock Regiment, Colonel Shcheglov, and his assistant Colonel Pooh, and the regiment was received by Colonel Minervin.

Despite the failure, the division still held on to its sector.

In the book: “Markovites in battles and campaigns for RUSSIA,” page 345, they paint a picture of their approach to the right flank of our division to relieve us and incorrectly indicate the distribution of regiments that actually occupied sectors like this: on the right flank of the division, to Lake Salt, there was the 1st regiment, to the left - the 3rd regiment, and on the very left flank stood the 2nd regiment, all the way to the Perekop Bay.

On October 28, General Wrangel gathered representatives of the Russian and foreign press and informed them of the current situation, saying: “An army that fought not only for the honor and freedom of the Motherland, but also for the common cause of world culture and civilization, an army that had just stopped the bloody war that had spread over Europe. the hand of the Moscow executioners, abandoned by the whole world, bled to death. A handful of naked, hungry, exhausted heroes continue to defend the last inch native land. Their strength is coming to an end, and if not today, then tomorrow they may be thrown into the sea. They will hold out to the end, saving those who sought protection behind their bayonets. I have taken all measures to take out everyone who is in danger of bloody reprisals in case of misfortune. I have the right to hope that those states for whose common cause my Army fought will show hospitality to the unfortunate exiles.”

October 29 at dawn, under strong enemy pressure, the Kornilov Shock Division, according to orders, began to retreat to Yushun. From there, due to the complicated situation, the division retreats further south, along the Yushun - Simferopol - Sevastopol road.

* * *

After describing the last battles for Perekop and our abandonment of Crimea, according to our data, we should also be interested in our enemy’s view of this, which I take from the newspaper “Russkaya Mysl” dated December 7, 1965, set out in an article by D. Prokopenko.

TAKING THE DIGGING

For the forty-fifth anniversary.

The 6th Soviet Army, which stormed the Perekop-Yushun positions of the Whites in November 1920, was commanded by Kork (1887-1937). Estonian by birth, he graduated from Chuguevskoe in 1908 military school, and in 1914 - the Academy of the General Staff. In the old Army he had the rank of lieutenant colonel (I insert: in 1937 he was shot for his service in the Red Army. Now, probably, he is recorded in the synod of the Red Commanders-in-Chief: “repressed”, “rehabilitated”). Kork made a report on the capture of Perekop and the Yushun positions at the Yekaterinoslav garrison military-scientific audience on November 1, 1921 (“Stages of the Great Path”, military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow 1963),

“The troops of the 6th Army approached Perekop on the evening of October 29. The 1st and 2nd cavalry, the 4th and the 13th armies merged into the 4th arrived in the area of ​​the Chongar Peninsula a few days later. The white positions were divided into three groups: the Turkish Wall (the main fortifications), then a number of Yushun positions (their strength lies in depth), and to the east - the Sivash positions, along the southern shore of the Sivash (Rotten Sea), these fortifications were weak. The white command did not mean that the northwestern part of Sivash was dry. The summer and autumn of 1920 were dry, there were almost no winds from the east, and therefore the water went to the southeast. Information about this state of the sea began to reach the red headquarters only after October 29.

Strengths of the parties. In total, Wrangel had on the Perekop Isthmus up to 13 and a half thousand infantry soldiers, up to 6 thousand cavalry soldiers, about 750 machine guns, 160 guns and 43 armored cars (I ask the reader to pay attention to the fact that Perekop was occupied at that time by only two regiments of the Kornilov The shock division, the 3rd regiment was in reserve, with a retreat back, to the south, and a front to Sivashi, to protect our rear, and plus, all three regiments, when retreating from the Dnieper, suffered enormous losses and were reduced by 2/3 of their small strength , that is, in total the division had no more than 1,200 bayonets. There could have been no more than STA machine guns in three regiments, and as for our Kornilov artillery brigade, from its composition in three divisions in the last battle for Perekop, some of them were taken to repel attacks. There were no Reds on the Sivash side. There was no cavalry on Perekop, not even our regimental cavalry squadrons. In general, the commander of the 6th Red Army greatly exaggerated our forces on Perekop with the express purpose of increasing the merits of his army, when in fact our fate was then decided by Pilsudski with his support. France with the conclusion of peace, as during the Battle of Orel, when Pilsudski concluded a truce with Lenin, and the Red Army crushed us with its colossal superiority. Colonel Levitov).

Red forces: 34,833 infantry soldiers, 4,352 cavalry, 965 machine guns, 165 guns, 3 tanks, 14 armored cars and 7 aircraft.

If we compare the forces of the parties, - Kork reports, - then our numerical superiority over Wrangel is immediately striking: in infantry we outnumbered him by more than twice, while Wrangel had more cavalry, but here we need to take into account the presence of the 1st and 2nd th cavalry armies, which could be transferred at any moment to the Perekop Isthmus with the aim of crossing it and advancing to the Crimea. As for artillery, in general the enemy seemed to have superiority, but his artillery was extremely scattered. If we compare the number of artillery in attack directions, then superiority in artillery was on our side.

So, comparing the number of sides, it should be admitted that enormous superiority was on our side.”

The Red High Command believed that the fight for Perekop would be positional, as in the “imperialist” war. But, having learned that the northwestern part of Sivash was passable, the commander of the 6th decided to deliver the main blow through Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula to Armyansk. Preparation for the operation was as follows; 2 brigades of the 51st Infantry Division were to strike at the Turkish Wall, and the other two brigades from the 1st Cavalry were to advance around the right flank of the Whites occupying the Perekop Isthmus. The 52nd and 15th divisions were supposed to go behind enemy lines through Sivash and the Lithuanian Peninsula. The Latvian division was left in the army reserve.

Military operations began on the night of November 7–8. The 51st Division, due to fog, began artillery preparation on the Turkish Wall at 10 a.m., and at 2 a.m. the attackers began cutting the wire, but were repulsed by concentrated white fire. In the attack resumed at 6 p.m., the Reds suffered heavy losses and retreated. The Whites counterattacked the Red Brigade (153rd), which was going around their right flank.

On the night of November 7–8, other red units begin an attack on the Lithuanian peninsula and advance deeper into it, despite vigorous counterattacks by white infantry with armored vehicles.

So, by 18:00 on November 8, the Reds had no success either in front of the Turkish cash or on the Lithuanian Peninsula, since the Whites were constantly launching counterattacks. But the entry of two rifle divisions into the flank and rear of the Whites occupying the Turkish Wall created a critical situation for them. The Red Command gives the order to storm the rampart with two brigades, and the remaining units to strike in the direction of Armyansk. The assault on the rampart began at 2 a.m. (152nd Rifle and Fire Brigade), but only the rearguards of the Whites remained on it, who had already begun their retreat... The Turkish rampart was taken without great losses (no losses at all).

On the morning of November 9, stubborn fighting began everywhere, but the White reserves (with Barbovich’s cavalry) could not delay the Reds’ advance. The 51st Division on the evening of November 9 approached the first line of the Yushun positions... Breakthrough of the Yushun positions on November 10 and 11. Here begins a series of decisive battles on which the fate of Crimea depends. In his order, General Barbovich says: “There cannot be a single step back, this is unacceptable in the general situation, we must die, but not retreat.” The following take part in the breakthrough: the 51st, 52nd and 15th rifle divisions, and then the Latvian one. Cork, due to severe frosts and lack of fresh water in this zone, orders all Yushun police to pass through in one day, regardless of losses. The task was not completed completely, but nevertheless on November 10, the 51st division broke through three lines, here the white defenders were supported by artillery from ships (as the commander of the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment, which occupied the very left flank of the white positions, all the way to the Perekop Bay, I testify, that Colonel Levitov did not see or hear about the firing of our ships in these battles).

On the left flank they were able to capture only the first fortified line. On the morning of November 11, the Latvian and 51st rifle divisions attacked the last line and broke through it. A series of White attacks could not stop the movement, and the Reds occupied railway station Yushun around 9 am. On the left flank of the Reds, the Whites were preparing a decisive blow to eliminate the offensive. Fierce attacks alternated from both sides. At about 11 o'clock, the white units, with the support of the officer (which then no longer existed) Kornilov and Drozdov divisions, resumed counterattacks and pushed back the Reds. Then Cork orders two brigades to strike in the rear. The white resistance was broken and they began a gradual retreat...” “The operation to capture the Perekop-Yushun positions was completed by the evening of November 11,” says Kork, “and with this the fate of Wrangel’s army was decided.” Further movement deeper into Crimea took place without fighting.

In Cork, Red losses were 45 command personnel and 605 Red Army soldiers. He explains such small losses by the combination of maneuver with attack and the speed of the offensive, which did not allow the enemy to put his units in order. The overall goal - the destruction of the enemy - was not achieved, since the cavalry did not break forward in a timely manner (here Kork, in order to raise his authority, recalled the definition of the value of battle in the opinion of the authorities of the Imperial Army: “Success with small losses is the joy of the chief,” but in fact The crust couldn't have happened, and soviet marshal Blucher seemed to have a different opinion about the same battles. In the book “Marshal Blucher”, page 199, in the order for the 51st Moscow Division dated November 9, 1920 No. 0140/ops, Chaplinka village, § 4, the losses during the capture of Perekop are stated as follows: “The brigade commanders must act decisively, the main obstacles are in our hands. Remember that energy is in pursuit WILL REWARD FOR HEAVY LOSSES, suffered in battles for the impregnable positions of the Turkish Wall. Signed: Chief of the 51st Blucher, Head of the General Staff Dadyak.” So, according to the Reds, they stormed the Perekop shaft in THREE hours November 9, knocking us out of concrete fortifications, when we didn’t have any of those at all, and there was no one to knock out, since Colonel Troshin's last battalion left the rampart by order at 24 hours on November 8. I also dare, at least in my humble position as commander of the 2nd Kornilov Shock Regiment, which was then defending the left part of the Perekop Wall, to assure Comrade Kork that the losses just in front of the rampart should be ten times greater. Cork should not especially regret that they did not exterminate us, but they saved the prepared gas cylinders in case General Wrangel had not appreciated the hopelessness of our situation and had not prepared ships for the patriots of RUSSIA who wished to leave their Homeland. And yet we have to believe that retribution exists: the famous Soviet heroes of these battles, Kork and Blucher, deservedly received a bullet in the back of the head from their leader for betraying their Motherland. Colonel Levitov).

Crimean campaign

Minikh, having left the Don Army near Azov, reached Tsaritsynka by April 7 (18), 1736, where he discovered that the troops were not yet ready to march on the Crimea. However, war had not yet been declared, and the battles near Azov were formally started by powers that were not at war with each other. Even when news of the siege of the Azov fortress reached Constantinople in early April, the Russian envoy Veshnyakov continued to be treated politely and, contrary to custom, was not thrown into the Seven Tower Castle. The reason for this “politeness” was the extremely unpleasant situation for the Ottomans on the Persian front. There, Turkey continued to suffer defeats and the warlike and energetic Kuli Khan became the official head of Persia, who finally removed both Shah Tahmasp and his young son Abbas from power, and began to rule under the name of Nadir Shah.

Veshnyakov, seeing the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, continued to encourage St. Petersburg to act decisively. “I will boldly and truly convey,” he wrote to the capital, “that in Turkey there are neither political leaders nor military leaders... Everything is in terrible disorder and at the slightest disaster it will be on the edge of the abyss. The fear of the Turks is based on one legend, for now the Turks are completely different than they were before: how much before they were inspired by the spirit of glory and ferocity, they are now so cowardly and fearful, everyone seems to be anticipating the end of their illegal power.... The Tatars, knowing everything it is now, as they say here, that loyalty to the Porte is beginning to waver. Regarding Christian subjects, the Turks fear that everyone will rebel as soon as Russian troops approach the borders. The local Greeks of Constantinople are mostly slackers, having neither faith nor law, their main interest is money, and they hate us more than the Turks themselves, but the regional Greeks and even more the Bulgarians, Volokhs, Moldavians and others are so concerned about their deliverance from Turkish tyranny and are so strongly devoted to Russia that at the first opportunity they will not spare their lives for your Imperial Majesty, as a trusted deliverer. The Turks know all this.”

At the beginning of April, Minikh sent a small detachment of infantry led by Second Lieutenant Bolotov from Tsarichanka to the Samara River to reconnoiter the area. The cavalry detachment of Colonel Lesevitsky received the same order. Reconnaissance detachments also had to establish “flying mail posts” and constantly report to Tsarichanka about possible enemy movements. In a hurry to start the campaign, the field marshal decided to lead the troops to Samara in five columns, sending them as soon as they were ready. The time factor played big role, it was impossible to allow the enemy to strengthen their positions and transfer reinforcements to Crimea.

On April 11 (22), the first column under the command of Major General Spiegel set out from Tsarichanka; it included four infantry and two dragoon regiments. The next day, April 12 (23), 1736, Osterman sent a letter to the Turkish vizier that read: “...Russia’s desire to find satisfaction for the insult and damage caused to this Porte by peace-breaking enterprises, and to establish peace on terms that can guarantee a more lasting security of the state and its subjects, are forced to move their troops against the Turks.” War was finally declared.

On April 13, the Devitsa column began moving with one infantry and three dragoon regiments. On April 14, a column of Lieutenant General Leontyev set out on a campaign: six regular regiments and 10 thousand land militia. On April 17, the column of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg began an offensive: one infantry, three dragoon regiments, field artillery, Chuguev and Little Russian Cossacks. On April 19, Major General Repnin's column set out: four infantry and one dragoon regiments. All other regiments of the Dnieper Army were also supposed to be drawn to Tsarichanka, they were entrusted with the protection of communications and transport with food and other supplies. The regiments stationed on the Don and Donets were ordered to go independently to the Samara River. Four thousand Don Cossacks going on a campaign also walked from the Don separately from other troops, with whom they were supposed to meet already at Kamenny Zaton.

On April 14 (25), Spiegel's vanguard went to the Samara River and built two wooden and two pontoon bridges across it. Having crossed the river, two days later, the detachment stopped, and the soldiers began building two strong points. One of them was erected at the confluence of Samara and the Dnieper, and the other - on Samara itself, on the site of the ancient Bogoroditskaya fortress. For the construction of the first, Ust-Samara fortification, an older fortress located here was used. It was surrounded by an extensive earthen fence, under the protection of which barracks, officer quarters and an infirmary were located. There are two more fortifications on the heights east of the fortress. This entire defensive system, with the side open to enemy cavalry from the Samara River to the Dnieper, had additional protection in the form of a line of slingshots and a palisade. Colonel Chicherin was appointed commandant of the Ust-Samara fortification. The Mother of God fortress was surrounded on all sides by a high earthen rampart, and rows of slingshots were placed on the old rampart itself.

On April 19, Spiegel's column moved on, and in its place, the columns of Leontyev and, a day later, the Prince of Hesse-Homburg arrived in Samara. On April 22, Repnin’s column approached the river. So the columns replaced each other and moved forward harmoniously, creating strongholds and warehouse stores along the way. With the passage through Samara, the Dnieper army entered enemy territory, so Minich strengthened precautions. Each column had the opportunity to support the neighboring one; at rest stops, slingshots were always displayed or Wagenburgs were built from carts. However, initially there was no news of the enemy. The soldiers' main concern was marching and building fortifications. Major General Spiegel reported on April 20: “And both in long marches and in work and crossings, it is very difficult for people, because they march during the day, and work at night and have such work that people can barely walk even in infantry regiments.”

On April 26, 1736, Minich personally arrived at the vanguard of Spiegel, which was three days’ journey from Kamenny Zaton. Gradually other units joined in. By May 4, under the command of the field marshal, 10 dragoon and 15 infantry regiments (more than 28 thousand people), 10 thousand land militia, 3 thousand Zaporozhye Cossacks, 13 thousand Little Russian Cossacks, hussars, Sloboda and Chuguev Cossacks gathered on the right bank of the Belozerka River . In total over 58 thousand people. A military council was held in Kamenny Zaton, which had to decide which way to go to Crimea: directly through the steppe or along the bank of the Dnieper through Kyzy-Kermen. We chose the second option.

On May 4 (15), the vanguard of the Russian army set out from the Belozerka River on a further campaign. General Spiegel still commanded the vanguard. The next day the main forces moved forward under the command of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. Field Marshal Minich also rode with them. In addition, a rearguard under the command of Major General Hein was assigned to protect the rear. A convoy was formed to deliver supplies to the army, and a large detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Frint was assigned to protect it.

On May 7 (18), the Russian vanguard reached Kyzy-Kermen. A strong stronghold was also erected here. The soldiers built a powerful retracement, reinforced on the steppe side with six redoubts, which stretched for 33 km. Ten more redoubts were built between the Belozersky and Kyzy-Kermen strongholds. Each redoubt housed a small garrison of 40-50 people from sick and weakened soldiers and Cossacks who were unable to march. On the way to Kyzy-Kermen, small Tatar detachments began to appear, but still did not engage in battle. To reconnaissance the area, Spiegel allocated from his forces a cavalry detachment under the command of Colonel Krechetnikov (400 dragoons, 150 hussars, one hundred Cossacks of the Izyum Slobodsky Regiment, 500 Little Russians and “all good-willed” Zaporozhye Cossacks). Another detachment, Colonels Witten (1200 people) and Tyutchev (1400 people), were sent for reconnaissance by Leontyev and the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. For communication between the reconnaissance detachments, two separate, small detachments were allocated under the overall command of Lieutenant Colonel Fermor.

Crimean Tatar archer

Witten's scouts defeated a detachment of Nogai Tatars. The prisoners reported that twenty miles away, near the Black Valley tract, there was a 100,000-strong Tatar army led by the khan himself. Notifying the commander, Witten brought all the reconnaissance units together and continued moving forward to check the words of the "tongues". In total, he had at his disposal 3,800 cavalrymen and Cossacks.

On the morning of May 8 (19), Witten's cavalry detachment reached the large Tatar camp. These were the advanced forces of the Crimean army under the command of the heir to the khan's throne, Kalgi-Sultan. Seeing the Russians, the Tatar cavalry immediately rushed to the attack. Russian commanders began to quickly build dragoons in a square, and the Zaporozhye and Little Russian Cossacks were ordered to cover the flanks. However, at the first onslaught of the enemy, the Cossacks fled. The Tatars attacked the unfinished square. The dragoons had a hard time: in their haste, they managed to place only one line of soldiers on the rear front of the square. Spiegel, who was moving to help Witten with a detachment of cavalry, was stopped by a 15,000-strong Tatar army and almost fell into encirclement.

Seeing that a big battle was beginning, Minich rushed to Spiegel with a small convoy. He made his way to the column, which stood in a square. Then, having studied the situation, he, accompanied by only eighty dragoons and hundreds of Cossacks, rode back to the main forces. On the way, Minich's convoy was attacked by a Tatar detachment, and barely escaped death. The Tatar cavalry pressed all day, trying to overthrow the Russians. In the evening, Leontyev’s detachment approached and opened artillery fire. The Tatars, hearing the roar of the cannonade, immediately retreated, leaving more than two hundred people killed on the battlefield. Russian losses amounted to about 50 people killed and wounded, General Spiegel and Colonel Weisbach were wounded.

The first clash with the Crimean horde showed the effectiveness of the dragoon regiments, their stamina and good preparation. For the whole day they held back the onslaught of superior forces of the Tatar cavalry. Minich showed personal courage, but showed a lack of faith in the abilities of his commanders, preferring to do everything himself. The Little Russian Cossacks who fled from the battlefield were brought to justice.

The captured Tatars told the commander that the main forces of the Crimean horde were standing eighty miles from the battle site. In addition, the Cossacks captured several Turkish messengers and found letters from them, from which they learned that the Turks would not send troops to help the khan. Therefore, the army continued its march. On May 11 (22), the army continued its journey, and, in view of the proximity of the Tatar cavalry, all detachments formed into one common square. The sides (faces) of the giant rectangle formed regular regiments arranged in four ranks. The dragoons marched on foot, giving their horses to the Cossacks, who formed the fifth (inner) rank. The artillery was placed in front and at the corners of the square, and the irregular troops were in the center. The movement of the square required clear coordination of the actions of all military units, and was very tiring for soldiers and officers, but this did not bother Minich.

On May 14 (25), Minich's army approached the Kalanchik River, where they again built a fortification. Here 4 thousand people joined the army. a detachment of Don Cossacks. The next day the Russian army was attacked by the Tatars. The square met the enemy with heavy artillery and rifle fire. Minich ordered the carts to be brought inside the square and the Cossacks placed on them, who fired rifles over the heads of the soldiers standing in the ranks. A. Bayov wrote: “The Tatars, with wild shouts and drawn sabers, attacked the army from all sides. As soon as they approached, they were met with heavy rifle and grapeshot fire. The repulsed attack was repeated several more times over the course of two hours. To put an end to these attacks, Minikh moved his army forward, after which the Tatars retreated, leaving a significant number of dead in place. The Russians had no losses.” Thus, the Russian army broke the enemy’s resistance. The Tatar cavalry retreated behind the fortifications of Perekop.

On May 17 (28), Minich's army approached Perekop and set up camp on the shore of the Rotten Sea (Sivash). For the first time since the time of Vasily Golitsyn, Russian regiments came close to the gates of the Crimean Khanate. The Perekop Isthmus, connecting the Crimean peninsula with the mainland, has been of strategic importance for centuries, and therefore was equipped with a powerful system of defensive structures. It consisted of an 8-kilometer shaft about 20 meters high, stretching from the Black Sea to Lake Sivash. In front of the rampart there was a wide ditch. Along the entire rampart there were seven stone towers armed with artillery. They served as additional defense units and were capable of conducting flanking fire along the ditch. The only passage beyond the line was protected by a stone gate located three kilometers from Sivash and seven kilometers from the Black Sea coast. These gates were armed with artillery, and immediately behind them stood the Op-Kap fortress. It looked like an oblong quadrangle with stone walls and loopholes at the outgoing corners of the bastions. The garrison of the fortress consisted of four thousand Janissaries and Sipahis. In front of the gate there was a small village, covered by another, low rampart. 84 guns were placed along the fortified line, concentrated mainly in the towers and fortress. The Turkish garrison was supported by numerous Tatar cavalry.

Approaching Perekop, Minikh demanded that the Crimean leadership capitulate and recognize the rule of the empress. Khan, in response, began to play for time, referring to peace with Russia and assuring that all the raids were carried out not by the Crimean, but by the Nogai Tatars. Not wanting to hesitate, the Russian field marshal began to prepare for the attack. Already on the day the army arrived, a redoubt with five cannons and one mortar was erected opposite the Op-Cap fortress, which at dawn on May 18 opened fire on the gates and the fortress itself.

The assault was scheduled for May 20. To implement it, Minich divided the troops into three large columns (each of five plutong columns) under the command of generals Leontyev, Shpigel and Izmailov. They were supposed to strike the gap between the Op-Kap fortress and the Black Sea. At the same time, the Cossacks were supposed to launch a diversionary attack on the fortress itself. The dragoons dismounted and joined the infantry regiments. In each attacking column, the soldiers of the third plutong carried axes and slingshot spears. All soldiers were given 30 rounds of ammunition, and the grenadiers, in addition, were given two hand grenades. Minich also ordered that some of the fusiliers be supplied with grenades (one grenade per person). The artillery, both regimental and field, was ordered to follow the columns, and the guns mounted on the redoubts were ordered to cover the advance with their fire. In total, 15 infantry and 11 dragoon regiments with a total number of about 30 thousand people were allocated for the assault.

On May 19, General Shtofeln made a reconnaissance of the section of the fortifications that was to be attacked. In the evening of the same day, Russian troops began to move to their original positions. On May 20 (June 1), 1736, the assault began. At the signal, the field artillery opened fire. Then the front column fired a rifle salvo and quickly rushed forward. The soldiers descended into the ditch and then began to climb the rampart. At the same time, slingshots were very useful to them, which the soldiers stuck into the slope and climbed up along them. Bayonets were also used. Soon the infantrymen not only climbed to the crest of the rampart, but also pulled several cannons behind them on ropes. The Tatars, who did not at all expect the Russians to appear in this sector of defense, panicked and ran. The steppe inhabitants did not expect that such a deep and wide ditch could be crossed so quickly and at night. Already half an hour after the start of the assault, the Russian flag fluttered over Perekop.

After this, Russian troops began to storm the towers in which the Turkish garrisons were located. The tower closest to the Russian army opened artillery fire. Minich ordered a team of sixty infantrymen led by Captain Manstein of the St. Petersburg Infantry Regiment to attack the tower. After a fierce battle, part of the garrison was killed, and some surrendered. After this, the defenders of all other towers hastily capitulated.

But two next year the civil war did nothing to nominate the first holder of the Order of the Red Banner. While the Red Marshals became famous - Tukhachevsky in the Urals with the “Soviet Marne”, Voroshilov on the Don with the defense of the “Red Verdun”, Kotovsky in the battles of St. Petersburg and Odessa, Budyonny at the head of the legendary 1st Cavalry thundered through the Asian quarry into Poland - to Blucher glory did not come.

Commanding the 30th division, he fought against the Czechs on the Volga, at the head of the 51st against Kolchak in Siberia; These are minor roles, in which Blucher revealed himself to be a decisive commander. But only towards the end of the civil war, when the Kremlin had the only internal front left - Crimea - did Blucher make a splash, linking his name with the epic assault on the Perekop positions.

This was the last battle of the enemies. The main masses of whites have already been thrown into the Black Sea; the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the South of Russia, General Denikin, sailed across the Mediterranean Sea to England; in Constantinople, the monarchists shot and killed his chief of staff, General Romanovsky. All of devastated Russia stood in red fire. And only General Baron Wrangel settled in Crimea.

All for Wrangel! All to Crimea! - and 100 thousand red bayonets and sabers moved across the steppes of Tavria.

Deprived of the support of the Entente, Baron Peter Wrangel feverishly strengthened the narrow Perekop Isthmus - the entrance to Crimea - making it impregnable to the enemy. For six months they dug here one line of trenches after another, installed heavy artillery, wove wire, built machine-gun nests so that there were 50 machine guns per thousand soldiers; used everything technical means Sevastopol fortress. And when the Reds approached Crimea, Baron Wrangel already considered Perekop impregnable.

The best troops stood behind the fortification lines - the 1st Army of General Kutepov, the 2nd Army of General Abramov, the Don Cossacks; the best horse masses gathered.

In August 1920, the first battles for the capture of the Kakhovka bridgehead began in the autumn steppes of Tavria.

At the head of the 51st Division, performing the most important task of the offensive, Blucher went on the attack at Chaplinka and Kakhovka. In a wide front, at full height, without dashing, under destructive shrapnel and rifle-machine-gun fire, dressed in red shirts, the Blucherites walked; They quickly captured the heights near the Kulikovsky farm. Stunned by such an attack, the Whites gave up the heights, but, having recovered, rushed into a counterattack. It was a terrible fight. The heights changed several times from the Blucherites to the Whites. Both the red Blucher and the white Kutepov fully appreciated each other - at night both retreated to their original positions.

It was September. It's starting to get cold. It started snowing. In desperate battles, the Whites surrendered position after position to the red forces, and at the end of the month the defense of the Kakhovka bridgehead collapsed. Now the Whites put up their last resistance on the narrow Perekop Isthmus, in terribly fortified positions.

The frosts were unprecedented; in November they were as low as 20 degrees. The half-torn red and white men wrapped themselves in all sorts of rags and warmed themselves by stuffing straw under their shirts. But behind the Reds there was already northern Tavria, and breakdown and despair crept into the Whites.

The Lithuanian Peninsula stood out as a dark stripe of dark waters. Here on Perekop further military glory awaited Blucher. On the 8th, on the approaches to the Lithuanian Peninsula, the battle for the Perekop Isthmus began. Gloomy and steep is the Turkish Wall, rising above the plane of the sea, like a wall blocking the entrance to Crimea. After mastering the approaches, the Reds rushed into a frontal assault on the Turkish Wall. The Reds launched attack after attack, but all attacks ended in failure.

Since dawn there has been a continuous roar of artillery. Verse in the evening. But the end has not yet come. The Whites pulled together everything they could, even the personal convoy of the commander-in-chief went into battle.

Night rolled over the sea, over Sivash, over the fields strewn with corpses, over the fortifications of the isthmus. That night Blucher moved with three divisions, machine guns, and artillery along the bottom of Sivash - to the flank and rear of the enemy.

The Red Army soldiers shivered in the cold wearing only their tunics; There were no orders to light a fire, and the troops marched in the dark on this operation that looked like madness.

Blucher's troops were seven miles away from the shore. In the seven-verst space there was not a fold, nothing that would allow the artillery to hide or take a closed position. You can't even dig trenches on a wet bottom. Common sense said: if the troops are late and do not approach the enemy before dawn, the whites will kill everyone at the bottom of Sivash with machine guns. But Blucher was worried not only about the dawn.

“I’m not afraid of Kutepov,” he told chief of staff Triandafilov. “I’m afraid of Sivash.” When the water starts to rise, what then?..

“Then Wrangel will spend the winter in the Crimea,” answered the chief of staff.

When the last 459th regiment of Blucher's group set out from Vladimirovka, Blucher and his headquarters rode out on horseback in pursuit of the troops. Bogged down, in a hurry, the troops marched quickly along the bottom in order to get behind enemy lines before the matinee.

Sivash dried up and was blown by the winds. There was no water either yesterday or the day before. But not only Blucher, all the hurrying Red Army soldiers, when they were already halfway, noticed that the wind had changed, blowing from the east. On the left flank of the units crossing Sivash, the Sea of ​​Azov tilted and water appeared. The water was rising. The elements were against the Reds. Blucher hurried the units. The water was already filling the ruts up to the wheels of the guns, the wheels were bogged down to the axles. And when the last infantry, having entered the peninsula, rushed to attack, the sea stood behind the Reds.

The white fire raged in fiery explosions ahead. This was the most fierce battle of the entire civil war. Seeing the Blucherites cut off by the sea, the Reds rushed from the front to the groaning Turkish Wall, head-on. And no matter how the whites resisted, Blucher decided the battle.

In the attacks, one after another, the white lines fell. Crimea was opening up. The Whites began a hasty retreat. And the Reds, with the leading units of Blucher, rushed into the open, defeated peninsula.

Blucher received the second Order of the Red Banner. Glory came to Blucher for the second time.