Despite the artistic exaggerations associated with Prokhorovka, the Battle of Kursk was indeed the last attempt by the Germans to win back the situation. Taking advantage of the negligence of the Soviet command and inflicting a major defeat on the Red Army near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943, the Germans received another “chance” to play the summer offensive card according to the models of 1941 and 1942.

But by 1943, the Red Army was already different, just like the Wehrmacht, it was worse than itself two years ago. Two years of bloody meat grinder were not in vain for him, plus the delay in starting the offensive on Kursk made the very fact of the offensive obvious to the Soviet command, which quite reasonably decided not to repeat the mistakes of the spring-summer of 1942 and voluntarily conceded to the Germans the right to launch offensive actions in order to wear down them on the defensive, and then destroy the weakened strike forces.

In general, the implementation of this plan once again showed how much the level of strategic planning Soviet leadership since the start of the war. And at the same time, the inglorious end of the “Citadel” once again showed the subsidence of this level among the Germans, who tried to reverse the difficult strategic situation with obviously insufficient means.

Actually, even Manstein, the most intelligent German strategist, had no special illusions about this decisive battle for Germany, reasoning in his memoirs that if everything had turned out differently, then it would have been possible to somehow jump from the USSR to a draw, that is, in fact admitted that after Stalingrad there was no talk of victory for Germany at all.

In theory, the Germans, of course, could push through our defenses and reach Kursk, encircling a couple of dozen divisions, but even in this wonderful scenario for the Germans, their success did not lead them to solving the problem of the Eastern Front, but only led to a delay before the inevitable end, because Germany's military production by 1943 was already clearly inferior to the Soviet one, and the need to plug the “Italian hole” did not make it possible to assemble any large forces to conduct further offensive actions on the Eastern Front.

But our army did not allow the Germans to amuse themselves with the illusion of even such a victory. The strike groups were bled dry during a week of heavy defensive battles, and then the roller coaster of our offensive began, which, starting in the summer of 1943, was practically unstoppable, no matter how much the Germans resisted in the future.

In this regard, the Battle of Kursk is truly one of the iconic battles of the Second World War, and not only due to the scale of the battle and the millions of soldiers and tens of thousands of military equipment involved. It finally demonstrated to the whole world and, above all, to the Soviet people, that Germany was doomed.

Remember today all those who died in this epoch-making battle and those who survived it, reaching from Kursk to Berlin.

Below is a selection of photographs of the Battle of Kursk.

Commander of the Central Front, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky and member of the Front Military Council, Major General K.F. Telegin at the forefront before the start of the battle on Kursk Bulge. 1943

Soviet sappers install TM-42 anti-tank mines in front of the front line of defense. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943

Transfer of "Tigers" for Operation Citadel.

Manstein and his generals are at work.

German traffic controller. Behind is an RSO crawler tractor.

Construction of defensive structures on the Kursk Bulge. June 1943.

At a rest stop.

On the eve of the Battle of Kursk. Testing infantry with tanks. Red Army soldiers in a trench and a T-34 tank that overcomes the trench, passing over them. 1943

German machine gunner with MG-42.

Panthers are preparing for Operation Citadel.

Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment " Greater Germany"on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

German Pz.Kpfw.III tanks before the start of Operation Citadel in a Soviet village.

The crew of the Soviet tank T-34-76 "Marshal Choibalsan" (from the "Revolutionary Mongolia" tank column) and the attached troops on vacation. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Smoke break in German trenches.

A peasant woman tells Soviet intelligence officers about the location of enemy units. North of the city of Orel, 1943.

Sergeant Major V. Sokolova, medical instructor of anti-tank artillery units of the Red Army. Oryol direction. Kursk Bulge, summer 1943.

The German 105-mm self-propelled gun "Wespe" (Sd.Kfz.124 Wespe) from the 74th self-propelled artillery regiment of the 2nd tank division of the Wehrmacht, passes next to an abandoned Soviet 76-mm ZIS-3 gun in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel. German offensive Operation Citadel. Oryol region, July 1943.

The Tigers are on the attack.

Photojournalist of the newspaper "Red Star" O. Knorring and cameraman I. Malov are filming the interrogation of the captured chief corporal A. Bauschof, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Red Army. The interrogation is conducted by Captain S.A. Mironov (right) and translator Iones (center). Oryol-Kursk direction, July 7, 1943.

German soldiers on the Kursk Bulge. Part of the body of the radio-controlled B-IV tank is visible from above.

German B-IV robot tanks and Pz.Kpfw control tanks destroyed by Soviet artillery. III (one of the tanks has the number F 23). Northern face of the Kursk Bulge (near the village of Glazunovka). July 5, 1943

Tank landing of sapper demolitions (sturmpionieren) from the SS division "Das Reich" on the armor of the StuG III Ausf F assault gun. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Destroyed Soviet T-60 tank.

The Ferdinand self-propelled gun is on fire. July 1943, village of Ponyri.

Two damaged Ferdinands from the headquarters company of the 654th battalion. Ponyri station area, July 15-16, 1943. On the left is the headquarters "Ferdinand" No. II-03. The car was burned with bottles of kerosene mixture after its undercarriage was damaged by a shell.

The Ferdinand heavy assault gun, destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb from a Soviet Pe-2 dive bomber. Tactical number unknown. Area of ​​Ponyri station and state farm "May 1".

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "723" from the 654th division (battalion), knocked out in the area of ​​the "1 May" state farm. The track was destroyed by projectile hits and the gun was jammed. The vehicle was part of the "Major Kahl's strike group" as part of the 505th heavy tank battalion of the 654th division.

A tank column is moving towards the front.

Tigers" from the 503rd heavy tank battalion.

Katyushas are firing.

Tiger tanks of the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".

A company of American M3s General Lee tanks, supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, is moving to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. July 1943.

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "731", chassis number 150090 from the 653rd division, blown up by a mine in the defense zone of the 70th army. Later, this car was sent to an exhibition of captured equipment in Moscow.

Self-propelled gun Su-152 Major Sankovsky. His crew destroyed 10 enemy tanks in the first battle during the Battle of Kursk.

T-34-76 tanks support the infantry attack in the Kursk direction.

Soviet infantry in front of a destroyed Tiger tank.

Attack of T-34-76 near Belgorod. July 1943.

Abandoned near Prokhorovka, faulty "Panthers" of the 10th "Panther Brigade" of the von Lauchert tank regiment.

German observers are monitoring the progress of the battle.

Soviet infantrymen hide behind the hull of a destroyed Panther.

The Soviet mortar crew changes its firing position. Bryansk Front, Oryol direction. July 1943.

An SS grenadier looks at a T-34 that has just been shot down. It was probably destroyed by one of the first modifications of the Panzerfaust, which were first widely used at the Kursk Bulge.

Destroyed German Pz.Kpfw tank. V modification D2, shot down during Operation Citadel (Kursk Bulge). This photograph is interesting because it contains the signature “Ilyin” and the date “26/7”. This is probably the name of the gun commander who knocked out the tank.

Leading units of the 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division engage the enemy in captured German trenches. In the foreground is the body of a killed German soldier. Battle of Kursk, July 10, 1943.

Sappers of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" near a damaged T-34-76 tank. July 7, area of ​​the village of Pselets.

Soviet tanks on the attack line.

Destroyed Pz IV and Pz VI tanks near Kursk.

Pilots of the Normandie-Niemen squadron.

Reflecting a tank attack. Ponyri village area. July 1943.

Shot down "Ferdinand". The corpses of his crew lie nearby.

Artillerymen are fighting.

Damaged German equipment during the battles in the Kursk direction.

A German tankman examines the mark left by a hit in the Tiger's frontal projection. July, 1943.

Red Army soldiers next to a downed Ju-87 dive bomber.

Damaged "Panther". I made it to Kursk as a trophy.

Machine gunners on the Kursk Bulge. July 1943.

Self-propelled gun Marder III and panzergrenadiers at the starting line before the attack. July 1943.

Broken Panther. The tower was torn down by an explosion of ammunition.

Burning German self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" from the 656th regiment on the Oryol front of the Kursk Bulge, July 1943. The photo was taken through the driver's hatch of the Pz.Kpfw control tank. III robotic tanks B-4.

Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. A huge hole from a 152-mm St. John's wort is visible in the turret.

Burnt tanks of the column "For Soviet Ukraine". On the tower torn down by the explosion one can see the inscription “For Radianska Ukraine” (For Soviet Ukraine).

Killed German tankman. In the background is a Soviet T-70 tank.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy self-propelled artillery installation of the Ferdinand tank destroyer class, which was knocked out during the Battle of Kursk. The photo is also interesting because of the SSH-36 steel helmet, rare for 1943, on the soldier on the left.

Soviet soldiers near a disabled Stug III assault gun.

A German robot tank B-IV and a German motorcycle with a sidecar BMW R-75 destroyed on the Kursk Bulge. 1943

Self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" after the detonation of ammunition.

The crew of an anti-tank gun fires at enemy tanks. July 1943.

The picture shows a damaged German medium tank PzKpfw IV (modifications H or G). July 1943.

The commander of the Pz.kpfw VI "Tiger" tank No. 323 of the 3rd company of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks, non-commissioned officer Futermeister, shows the mark of a Soviet shell on the armor of his tank to Sergeant Major Heiden. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Statement of combat mission. July 1943.

Pe-2 front-line dive bombers on a combat course. Oryol-Belgorod direction. July 1943.

Towing a faulty Tiger. On the Kursk Bulge, the Germans suffered significant losses due to non-combat breakdowns of their equipment.

T-34 goes on the attack.

The British Churchill tank, captured by the "Der Fuhrer" regiment of the "Das Reich" division, was supplied under Lend-Lease.

Tank destroyer Marder III on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

and in the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34 tank, further on the left edge of the photo is a German Pz.Kpfw. VI "Tiger", another T-34 in the distance.

Soviet soldiers inspect an exploded German tank Pz IV ausf G.

Soldiers from the unit of Senior Lieutenant A. Burak, with the support of artillery, are conducting an offensive. July 1943.

A German prisoner of war on the Kursk Bulge near a broken 150-mm infantry gun sIG.33. On the right lies a dead German soldier. July 1943.

Oryol direction. Soldiers under the cover of tanks go on the attack. July 1943.

German units, which include captured Soviet T-34-76 tanks, are preparing for an attack during the Battle of Kursk. July 28, 1943.

RONA (Russian People's Liberation Army) soldiers among captured Red Army soldiers. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

Soviet tank T-34-76 destroyed in a village on the Kursk Bulge. August, 1943.

Under enemy fire, tankers pull a damaged T-34 from the battlefield.

Soviet soldiers rise to attack.

An officer of the Grossdeutschland division in a trench. Late July-early August.

Participant in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, reconnaissance officer, guard senior sergeant A.G. Frolchenko (1905 - 1967), awarded the Order of the Red Star (according to another version, the photo shows Lieutenant Nikolai Alekseevich Simonov). Belgorod direction, August 1943.

A column of German prisoners captured in the Oryol direction. August 1943.

German SS soldiers in a trench with an MG-42 machine gun during Operation Citadel. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

On the left is an Sd.Kfz anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. 10/4 based on a half-track tractor with a 20-mm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun. Kursk Bulge, August 3, 1943.

The priest blesses Soviet soldiers. Oryol direction, 1943.

A Soviet T-34-76 tank knocked out in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed.

A column of captured Germans in the Kursk area.

German PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns captured on the Kursk Bulge. In the background is a Soviet ZiS-5 truck towing a 37 mm 61-k anti-aircraft gun. July 1943.

Soldiers of the 3rd SS Division "Totenkopf" ("Death's Head") discuss a defensive plan with the Tiger commander from the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

German prisoners in the Kursk region.

Tank commander, Lieutenant B.V. Smelov shows a hole in the turret of a German Tiger tank, knocked out by Smelov’s crew, to Lieutenant Likhnyakevich (who knocked out 2 fascist tanks in the last battle). This hole was made by an ordinary armor-piercing shell from a 76-mm tank gun.

Senior Lieutenant Ivan Shevtsov next to the German Tiger tank he destroyed.

Trophies of the Battle of Kursk.

German heavy assault gun "Ferdinand" of the 653rd battalion (division), captured in good condition along with its crew by soldiers of the Soviet 129th Oryol Rifle Division. August 1943.

The eagle is taken.

The 89th Rifle Division enters liberated Belgorod.

We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material about the losses of equipment in our and German units. Ours were significantly higher, especially in the Battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov, was dealt with by a special commission created by Stalin's decision, chaired by Malenkov. In the commission's report, August 1943, fighting Soviet troops July 12 near Prokhorovka is called an example of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact that is not at all victorious. In this regard, I would like to provide you with several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov’s report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although it sins in places against the truth, it still deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the Battle of Prokhorovsk won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of Soviet forces? The answer is given by combat documents, links to full texts which are given at the end of the article.

29th tank corps :

“The attack began without artillery bombardment of the occupied line by pr-kom and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this in turn made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from the spot . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness; the presence of hollows impassable for tanks to the north-west and south-east of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to press against the road and open their flanks, without being able to cover them.

Individual units that took the lead, even approaching the storage facility. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 13.00. From 13.00 cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 vehicles.

With the tanks coming out to the front line of the defense from the forest in the north. STORZHEVOYE and eastern. env. STORDOZHEVOYE pr. opened hurricane fire from ambushes of Tiger tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Units of the brigade, supported by a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and units of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

During the attack on the front line of the pr-ka, self-propelled guns, operating in the first echelon of tank battle formations and even breaking out ahead of the tanks, suffered losses from the pr-ka's anti-tank fire (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action)."

18th Tank Corps :

“Enemy artillery fired intensely at the corps’ battle formations.
The corps, without adequate support from fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense air bombardment (by 12.00, enemy aircraft had carried out up to 1,500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the corps' zone of action is crossed by three deep ravines running from the left bank of the river. PSEL to railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the 181st, 170th tank brigades advancing in the first echelon were forced to operate on the left flank of the corps line near a strong enemy stronghold. OCTOBER. The 170th Tank Brigade, operating on the left flank, had lost up to 60% of its combat equipment by 12.00.

By the end of the day, the enemy launched a frontal attack of tanks from the area of ​​KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.

Carrying out the assigned task, the 18th Tank Tank met a well-organized, strong enemy anti-tank defense with pre-buried tanks and assault guns at the line of heights 217.9, 241.6.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.""

"The car is on fire"

Battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34

T-34 shot down in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed

T-34 and T-70, shot down during the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 “For Soviet Ukraine” in the Belgorod area. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70 and BA-64 from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL SECRET
Instance No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR UNION - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield was T-V tanks(“Panther”), a significant number of T-VI (“Tiger”) tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.

Having commanded tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the effective range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach from our aimed tank fire .

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by fire from German tanks.

We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that occurred on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to this day.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately the same cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks conducted by the Germans.

As a result of these tests, the instructions read approximately the following: German tanks cannot engage in tank combat with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank combat. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to hide behind artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more improved T-V "Panther" tank, which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, in its own way its qualities are significantly higher than the T-34 tank and especially in terms of the quality of its weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I provide the following table:

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a significantly higher initial velocity.

I, as an ardent patriot of the tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and raise with all urgency the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and design registration now existing types German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his damaged tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of tank recovery time. At the same time, in those cases when the tank battlefield remains with the enemy for some period, our repairmen find shapeless piles of metal instead of their damaged tanks, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our damaged tanks.

TROOPER COMMANDER
5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARDS LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK FORCES -
(ROMISTROV) Signature.

Active Army.
=========================
RCHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, building 9027с, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the staggering losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that approximately a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm 20K cannon, model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks had nothing to catch at all on the field near Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up point-blank and working in “woodpecker” mode... if you persuade the German tankers to look the other way; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you’re lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, which is, in fact, what they were created for.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received reinforcements literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, both ordinary tank crews and junior/middle-level commanders are untrained. Even in this suicidal attack, it was possible to achieve better results by observing proper formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a heap. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrous ineffective work of repair and evacuation teams. This was generally very bad until 1944, but in this case the 5th TA simply failed on a massive scale. I don’t know how many were on the BREM staff by that time (and whether they were even in its combat formations in those days - they might have forgotten in the rear), but they couldn’t cope with the job. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front), in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka, writes: “When the enemy retreats, specially created teams evacuate their damaged tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including ours tanks and our materiel, burns and explodes. As a result, the damaged materiel captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future" (RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control of troops.

The point is also that German reconnaissance aircraft discovered in advance the approach to Prokhorovka of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A formations, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank missile defense on the left flank of the division." Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the advance of the Soviet troops, go on a counteroffensive and encircle the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, the 18th and 29th Tank Tank had to attack the most powerful German anti-tank tanks head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tank crews repelled the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from the spot.

In my opinion, the best that Rotmistrov could have done in such a situation was to try to insist on canceling the counterattack on July 12 near Prokhorovka, but no traces were found that he even tried to do this. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly evident when comparing the actions of two commanders of tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, let me clarify - Katukov’s 1st Tank Army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives the order to launch a counterattack with the 1st Tank Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that, given the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way combat is maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, allowing you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

“Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing the wrong thing at all. As one would expect, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours burn and smoke.

It was necessary, at any cost, to achieve the cancellation of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my thoughts. But he had barely crossed the threshold of the hut when the communications chief reported in a particularly significant tone:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without some excitement I picked up the phone.

Hello, Katukov! - a well-known voice rang out. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

“In my opinion,” I said, “we were too hasty with the counterattack.” The enemy has large unspent reserves, including tank reserves.

What do you offer?

For now, it is advisable to use tanks to fire from a spot, burying them in the ground or placing them in ambushes. Then we could bring enemy vehicles to a distance of three to four hundred meters and destroy them with targeted fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

“Okay,” he said, “you won’t launch a counterattack.” Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and July 6 became the darkest day for the 4th German Tank Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were destroyed (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out tank and a destroyed one). Thus, Katukov’s tactics completely justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 issued a new order to carry out a counterattack; only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) was tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 Tank Corps, 2 Guards Tank Corps, 5 Tank Corps and separate tank brigades and regiments. Result of the battle: losses of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, losses German troops- 125 tanks, of which 17 are irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, July 8th is becoming the darkest day for the Soviet tank forces; in terms of its losses, it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but it was at least worth a try!

It should be noted that limiting the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA is unlawful. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and 3rd Tank Tank were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, southwest of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the resulting pocket in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to give up technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and for some time depriving the 69 A of combat effectiveness. After July 12, the German side actually attempted to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops (in order to calmly begin withdraw your forces to the previous front line). After which the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines they occupied until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to a stubborn defense on the occupied lines, when the Germans not only did not intend to attack, but, on the contrary, were gradually withdrawing their forces (in particular, the “Totenkopf” division actually began withdrawing on July 13) becomes completely incomprehensible ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but were retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly catch the Germans’ tail and peck them in the back of the head.

It seems that the command of the Voronezh Front had little idea of ​​what was happening at the front in the period from July 5 to 18, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties; they lack information about the opposing enemy, its composition and intentions, and there is no at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk were given “over the heads” of lower-level commanders, and the latter were not informed about this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were carrying out some incomprehensible actions.

So it is not surprising that the chaos in the units was sometimes indescribable:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps attacked the Soviet 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the soldiers and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the said regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) without accurate information about the location of its own and the Germans and without sending forward reconnaissance (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment immediately opened fire on the battle formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending against the Germans in the area of ​​​​the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having fought through their own, the regiment came across advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, at the same time, crushing and dragging along separate groups his own infantry began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery, which was following the same regiment (53 Guards Tank Regiment) to the front line and had just arrived at the scene of events, mistaking the tanks of the 96 Tank Brigade for German tanks pursuing the 53 Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to serendipity.

Well, and so on... In the order of the commander of the 69th Army, all this was described as “these outrages.” Well, that's putting it mildly.

So we can summarize that the Germans won the Battle of Prokhorovka, but this victory was a special case against a generally negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (which Manstein insisted on), but not for defense. But it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began from the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (mistaken by the German command of the OKH ground forces for an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts actually went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became more complicated for the Germans, where the Americans and British landed on July 10. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered the end of Operation Citadel in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the sending of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not directly ordered to withdraw his troops, but was forbidden to use his only reserve, the 24th Panzer Corps. Without the deployment of this corps, a further offensive would lose perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 Tank Corps was already repelling the advance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS Tank Tank was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd Tank Tank with the aim of eliminating the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and a combination of circumstances that were not in Germany’s favor everywhere in July 1943, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but to speak purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "

The Battle of Kursk, according to historians, was a turning point in. More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. This has never happened in world history, and probably never will happen again.

The actions of the Soviet fronts on the Kursk Bulge were led by Marshals Georgy and. The size of the Soviet army was more than 1 million people. The soldiers were supported by more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, and 2 thousand aircraft provided air support to the Soviet infantrymen. The Germans opposed the USSR on the Kursk Bulge with 900 thousand soldiers, 10 thousand guns and more than two thousand aircraft.

The German plan was as follows. They were going to capture the Kursk ledge with a lightning strike and launch a full-scale offensive. Soviet intelligence did not eat its bread in vain, and reported the German plans to the Soviet command. Having learned exactly the time of the offensive and the target of the main attack, our leaders ordered to strengthen the defenses in these places.

The Germans launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. Heavy fire from Soviet artillery fell on the Germans gathered in front of the front line, causing them great damage. The enemy's advance stalled and was delayed by a couple of hours. During the day of fighting, the enemy advanced only 5 kilometers, and during the 6 days of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, 12 km. This state of affairs was unlikely to suit the German command.

During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the largest tank battle in history took place near the village of Prokhorovka. 800 tanks from each side fought in the battle. It was an impressive and terrible sight. Tank models of the Second World War were better on the battlefield. The Soviet T-34 clashed with the German Tiger. Also in that battle, “St. John’s wort” was tested. A 57 mm cannon that penetrated the Tiger's armor.

Another innovation was the use of anti-tank bombs, the weight of which was low, and the damage caused would take the tank out of the battle. The German offensive fizzled out, and the tired enemy began to retreat to their previous positions.

Soon our counter-offensive began. Soviet soldiers took the fortifications and, with the support of aviation, broke through the German defense. The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted approximately 50 days. During this time, the Russian army destroyed 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions, 1.5 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns, 15 thousand tanks. Wehrmacht casualties on the Kursk Bulge amounted to 500 thousand people.

The victory in the Battle of Kursk showed Germany the strength of the Red Army. The specter of defeat in the war hung over the Wehrmacht. More than 100 thousand participants in the battles of Kursk were awarded orders and medals. The chronology of the Battle of Kursk is measured in the following time frame: July 5 - August 23, 1943.

Battle of Kursk

July 5 – August 23, 1943
By the spring of 1943, there was a lull on the battlefields. Both warring sides were preparing for the summer campaign. Germany, having carried out total mobilization, concentrated more than 230 divisions on the Soviet-German front by the summer of 1943. The Wehrmacht received many new T-VI Tiger heavy tanks, T-V Panther medium tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, new Focke-Wulf 190 aircraft and other types of military equipment.

The German command decided to regain the strategic initiative lost after the defeat at Stalingrad. For the offensive, the enemy chose the “Kursk Salient” - a section of the front formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. The plan of the Hitlerite command was to encircle and destroy a group of Red Army troops with converging attacks from the areas of Orel and Belgorod and again develop an offensive against Moscow. The operation was codenamed "Citadel".

Thanks to the actions of Soviet intelligence, the enemy's plans became known to the headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was decided to build a long-term defense in the depths of the Kursk salient, wear out the enemy in battles and then go on the offensive. In the north of the Kursk salient there were troops of the Central Front (commanded by Army General K.K. Rokossovsky), in the south by troops of the Voronezh Front (commanded by Army General N.F. Vatutin). In the rear of these fronts there was a powerful reserve - the Steppe Front under the command of Army General I.S. Koneva. Marshals A.M. were assigned to coordinate the actions of the fronts on the Kursk salient. Vasilevsky and G.K. Zhukov.

The number of Red Army troops in defense was 1 million 273 thousand people, 3,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 20,000 guns and mortars, 2,650 combat aircraft.

The German command concentrated more than 900,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 10,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 aircraft around the Kursk salient.

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the enemy launched an offensive. Fierce fighting broke out on the ground and in the air. At the cost of huge losses, the fascist German troops managed to advance 10–15 km north of Kursk. Particularly heavy fighting took place in the Oryol direction in the area of ​​the Ponyri station, which participants in the events called “Stalingrad of the Battle of Kursk.” Here a powerful battle took place between the shock units of three German tank divisions with formations of Soviet troops: the 2nd Tank Army (commanded by Lieutenant General A. Rodin) and the 13th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov). In these battles, junior lieutenant V. Bolshakov performed a feat, covering the embrasure of an enemy firing point with his body. Sniper I.S. Mudretsova replaced the incapacitated commander in battle, but was also seriously wounded. She was rightfully considered one of the best snipers in the army, destroying 140 Nazis.

In the Belgorod direction, south of Kursk, as a result of fierce fighting, the enemy advanced 20–35 km. But then his advance was stopped. On July 12, near Prokhorovka, on a field of approximately 7 by 5 km, the largest counter tank battle of the Second World War took place, in which about 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. The unprecedented battle lasted 18 hours in a row and subsided only long after midnight. In this battle, the Wehrmacht tank columns were defeated and retreated from the battlefield, losing more than 400 tanks and assault guns, including 70 new heavy Tiger tanks. For the next three days, the Nazis rushed to Prokhorovka, but were unable to break through or bypass it. As a result, the Germans were forced to withdraw the elite SS tank division "Totenkopf" from the front line. G. Hoth's tank army lost half of its personnel and vehicles. Success in the battles near Prokhorovka belongs to the troops of the 5th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov, who also suffered heavy losses.

During the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation achieved strategic air supremacy and maintained it until the end of the war. Il-2 attack aircraft, which widely used the new PTAB-2.5 anti-tank bombs, were especially helpful in the fight against German tanks. The French Normandie-Niemen squadron under the command of Major Jean-Louis Tulian fought courageously alongside the Soviet pilots. In heavy battles in the Belgorod direction, the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General I.S., distinguished themselves. Konev.

On July 12, the Red Army counteroffensive began. Troops of the Bryansk, Central and parts of the Western fronts went on the offensive against the enemy’s Oryol grouping (Operation Kutuzov), during which the city of Oryol was liberated on August 5. On August 3, the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation began (Operation Rumyantsev). Belgorod was liberated on August 5, Kharkov was liberated on August 23.

On August 5, 1943, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin in Moscow was given the first artillery salute in the Great Patriotic War. On August 23, Moscow again saluted the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in honor of the liberation of Kharkov. Since then, every major new victory of the Red Army began to be celebrated with fireworks.

Operation Citadel was the last offensive operation German Wehrmacht on eastern front in World War II. From now on, the fascist German troops forever switched to defensive actions in battles against the Red Army. In the Battle of Kursk, 30 enemy divisions were defeated, the Wehrmacht lost more than 500,000 people killed and wounded, 1,500 tanks and assault guns, about 3,100 guns and mortars, and over 3,700 combat aircraft. The losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk amounted to 254,470 people killed and 608,833 people wounded and sick.

In the battles on the Kursk Bulge, soldiers and officers of the Red Army showed courage, perseverance and mass heroism. 132 formations and units received the guards rank, 26 units were awarded the honorary names “Oryol”, “Belgorod”, “Kharkov”, etc. More than 110 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 180 people received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory in the Battle of Kursk and the advance of the Red Army troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the Second World War in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army began an offensive along the entire front from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. At the end of September 1943, Red Army troops reached the Dnieper and began crossing it without an operational pause. This thwarted the German command’s plan to delay Soviet troops on the Dnieper using the “Eastern Wall” system of defensive fortifications on the right bank of the river.

The defending enemy group consisted of 1 million 240 thousand people, 2,100 tanks and assault guns, 12,600 guns and mortars, 2,100 combat aircraft.

The Red Army troops on the Dnieper amounted to 2 million 633 thousand people, 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 51,200 guns and mortars, 2,850 combat aircraft. Warriors of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, and Southwestern Fronts, using available means - pontoons, boats, boats, rafts, barrels, planks, under artillery fire and enemy bombing, crossed a powerful water barrier. During September–October 1943, Red Army troops, having crossed the river and breaking through the defenses of the Eastern Wall, captured 23 bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper. Fighting fiercely, Soviet troops liberated Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, on November 6, 1943. The entire Left Bank and part of the Right Bank Ukraine were also liberated.

Tens of thousands of soldiers and officers of the Red Army showed examples of courage and bravery these days. For the exploits accomplished during the crossing of the Dnieper, 2,438 soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Dates of the Battle of Kursk: 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943. Great Patriotic War has 3 significant events:

• Liberation of Stalingrad;
• Battle of Kursk;
• Capture of Berlin.

Here we will talk about the greatest tank battle in modern history.

Battle for Kursk. The situation before the battle

Before Battle of Kursk Germany celebrated a small success, managing to recapture the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Hitler, seeing short-term success, decided to develop it. The offensive was planned on the Kursk Bulge. The salient, cut deep into German territory, could be surrounded and captured. The operation, approved on May 10-11, was called “Citadel”.

Strengths of the parties

The advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The number of Soviet troops was 1,200,000 people (against 900 thousand for the enemy), the number of tanks was 3,500 (2,700 for the Germans), guns were 20,000 (10,000), and aircraft were 2,800 (2,500).

The German army was replenished with heavy (medium) Tiger (Panther) tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns (self-propelled guns), and Foke-Wulf 190 aircraft. Innovations on the Soviet side were the St. John's wort cannon (57 mm), capable of penetrating the armor of the Tiger, and anti-tank mines, which caused significant damage to them.

Plans of the parties

The Germans decided to launch a lightning strike, quickly capture the Kursk ledge, and then continue a large-scale offensive. The Soviet side decided to first defend itself, launching counterattacks, and when the enemy was weakened and exhausted, go on the offensive.

Defense

We managed to find out that Battle of Kursk will begin on 06/05/1943. Therefore, at 2:30 and 4:30, the Central Front carried out two half-hour artillery counterattacks. At 5:00 the enemy’s guns responded, and then the enemy went on the offensive, exerting intense pressure (2.5 hours) on the right flank in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka.

When the attack was repulsed, the Germans intensified their attack on the left flank. They even managed to partially encircle two (15, 81) Soviet divisions, but failed to break through the front (advance 6-8 km). Then the Germans attempted to capture the Ponyri station in order to control the Orel-Kursk railway.

170 tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns broke through the first line of defense on July 6, but the second one held out. On July 7, the enemy came close to the station. The 200mm frontal armor became impenetrable to Soviet guns. Ponyri station was held due to anti-tank mines and powerful raids by Soviet aviation.

The tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (Voronezh Front) lasted 6 days (10-16). Almost 800 Soviet tanks faced 450 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. The overall victory was for the Red Army, but more than 300 tanks were lost versus 80 for the enemy. Average tanks The T-34 had difficulty resisting the heavy Tigers, and the light T-70 was generally unsuitable in open areas. This is where the losses come from.

Offensive

While the troops of Voronezh and Central Fronts repelled enemy attacks, units of the Western and Bryansk fronts (July 12) went on the attack. For three days (12-14), fighting heavy battles, the Soviet army was able to advance up to 25 kilometers.