Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and writer, author of more than 40 published works on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov, Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth Region.

The article is based on material from the program “The Price of Victory” of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”. The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full at this link.

After the encirclement of the Paulus group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, Kharkov offensive, as a result of which Soviet troops captured significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk area, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich - launched a crushing counterattack by the Germans. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that this battle came at a high price.

After German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk ledge was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization occurred due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and the 3rd "Stalingrad", as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and the 64th Army of General Shumilov (later referred to as 6 -I and 7th Guards Armies). In addition, by the end of March there was a muddy road, which, of course, helped our troops hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very bogged down and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, then from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were made for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact a certain balance, equilibrium was maintained, without sudden, as they say, movements on both sides.

The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such stunning defeat, so the political leadership was faced with an important task - to consolidate its bloc, because Germany’s allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; What will happen if suddenly there is another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed, after a fairly victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

Although no, not small. If Operation Citadel had been successful, which the German command naturally counted on, then two fronts would have been encircled - Central and Voronezh.

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they would pass there, and then with a blow from above, from the north, press them, throw them into the sea (in the lower part were the Azov and Black Seas).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. Firstly, he said that Germany cannot make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from a psychological point of view, but from a raw material point of view, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on developing Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that it was convenient for our troops to launch flank attacks from the Kursk ledge, so the area for the start of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the process of forming tasks and the preparation process took a lot of time because there were disputes. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation due to understaffing both in manpower and technical strength. And, by the way, the second date of “Citadel” was set for June 10 (the first was May 3-5). And already from June 10 it was postponed even further - to July 5.

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only “Tigers” and “Panthers” were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these vehicles began to be produced in a relatively large series in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 Tigers and 200 Panthers be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-machine group was not involved, because like any new technology both tanks suffered from “childhood diseases.” As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers' carburetors caught fire quite often, the Panthers had problems with the transmission, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in combat during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each type would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more dire.

Here it is important to understand that the German command initially planned the Belgorod group, that is, Army Group South, which was led by Manstein, as the main one - it had to decide main task. The attack by Model's 9th Army was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to go 147 kilometers before joining Model’s troops, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (there were reconnaissance reports, photographs) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening its positions, and understood that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he first came to Bogodukhov, to the CP of the 4th Tank Army, to Hoth. For what? The fact is that Hoth wrote a letter - there was also an attempt to develop Operation Panther (as a continuation if Citadel was successful). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 mechanized tank corps that the Russians had already prepared. That is, destroy mobile reserves.

If this whole colossus moves towards Army Group South, then, as they say, it will not seem like much. This is precisely why it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the Citadel. On May 9–11, Hoth and Manstein discussed this plan. And it was at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorovsky battle was developed here.

It was near Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when the condition of the German troops is assessed, it will be possible to talk about an offensive.

In the area of ​​the Kursk salient, both in the north and in the south, for Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles at their disposal on the Eastern Front. It was assumed that these forces would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After this, under a favorable set of circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

For the battles near Prokhorovka, the SS Corps, part of the 48th Corps and part of the forces of the 3rd tank corps. These three corps were supposed to grind down the mobile reserves that were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why to the Prokhorovka area? Because the terrain there was favorable. It was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks in other places. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that they didn’t calculate the strength of our defense.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that the situation in Africa was already in turmoil. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British would establish complete control over the Mediterranean Sea. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was ultimately carried out. That is, for the Germans in other areas, everything was not going well either, thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania, and other allies...

Planning for the summer military operations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began approximately simultaneously: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the containment of the enemy, who was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of defense were controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov. And after the front line was stabilized, he was here, in the Belgorod region; Together with Vasilevsky, they discussed future plans. After this, he prepared a note in which he outlined his point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before which he commanded the Southwestern Front. He replaced Golikov, who, by decision of Headquarters, was removed from this post).

So, at the beginning of April, a note was placed on Stalin’s desk, which outlined the basic principles of conducting military operations in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with the participation of Stalin, in which a proposal was approved to switch to a deliberate defense, to prepare troops and defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the Kursk salient area suggested a high probability of such a transition.

Despite local successes, the Nazi Operation Citadel failed

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army did not create such powerful defensive lines. After all, the depth of these three defense lines was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans needed to plow, ram, and drill through 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just full-height trenches dug and reinforced with planks, these are anti-tank ditches, gouges, this is the most powerful system of minefields made for the first time during the war; and, in fact, every settlement on this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the Germans nor our side had ever built such a strong defensive line, filled with engineering barriers and fortifications, on the Eastern Front. The first three lines were the most fortified: the main army line, the second army line and the third rear army line - to a depth of approximately 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groups were unable to break through them within two weeks, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German attack.

The fact is that in May, fairly accurate data was received about the enemy’s plans for the summer: periodically they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would deliver the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally given significant artillery forces, an entire artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting developed in the south. Vatutin was forced to repel the attacks of the enemy’s main tank group with tanks, not having sufficient artillery to fight; in the north there were also tank divisions that participated directly in the attack on the Central Front, but they had to deal with Soviet artillery, and numerous ones at that.

But let's move smoothly to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov’s film “Liberation”: the defector says that the Germans have concentrated there and there, a colossal artillery attack is carried out, almost all the Germans are killed, it is not clear who else has been fighting there for a whole month. How was it really?

There really was a defector, and not just one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on July 4, a reconnaissance battalion soldier from the 168th Infantry Division came over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy, who was preparing to attack, it was planned to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike an air strike from the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies at the base airfield. Let's talk about the air raid - it was a failure. And moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the timing was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, in the zone of the 6th Guards Army it was partially successful: mainly telephone communication lines were disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but they were insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which occupied the defense along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, accordingly, are on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they needed to cross the river. They pulled up significant forces and watercraft to certain settlements and sections of the front, and previously established several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineering reconnaissance, by the way, worked very well), and the artillery strike was carried out precisely on these areas: on crossings and on settlements, where these assault groups of the 3rd Panzer Corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the 7th Guards Army zone was significantly higher. The losses from it both in manpower and equipment, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the advance and in some places paralyzed it.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy’s strike force, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempff’s Army Group, to cover the right flank of Hausser’s 2nd Panzer Corps. That is, the main strike group and the auxiliary group launched an offensive along diverging lines. This forced the enemy to attract additional forces from the spearhead of the attack to cover their flanks. This tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and was perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky are famous people, but the latter has a reputation as, perhaps, a greater commander. Why? Some say it was better to fight in Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, since he still fought with smaller forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, we can say with confidence that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very intelligently and skillfully planned his defensive operation, taking into account that the main group, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusive, when the situation practically turned around, when the Germans had already sent strike groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and control, of course, went very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of the front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander-in-chief.

Everyone remembers that great victory Rotmistrov's tankers won on the tank field. However, before this, at the line of the German attack, at the forefront, was the well-known Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did this happen? The fact is that the defense was structured as follows: ahead, on the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans would most likely strike along the Oboyanskoye Highway. And then they had to be stopped by the tankmen of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th they advanced to the second army line and took the main attack almost in the morning. By mid-day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was cut into several parts, three divisions were scattered, and we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and perseverance of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held until the 9th inclusive.

The commander of the Voronezh Front, Army General N. F. Vatutin, accepts a report from one of the formation commanders, 1943

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were replenished in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin took over the Voronezh Front in a very poor condition. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. Replenishment was due to the conscription of the local population that left the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as due to the arrival of reinforcements from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in 1942 in the spring was made up for by officers from academies, from rear units, and so on. And after the battles at Stalingrad, the situation with the tactical command staff, especially battalion and regiment commanders, was catastrophic. As a result, on October 9, there was a well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that was possible was done.

The Battle of Kursk is considered by many to be the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is this true? At the first stage - undoubtedly. No matter how we now evaluate the battle in the Black Earth Region, it was after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, the German army, was no longer able to conduct a single major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He simply had nothing to do with it. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was tasked with exhausting the enemy’s forces and knocking out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they were unable to do this completely. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a repair base for the 10th Tank Brigade. There, the Germans blew up some of the Panthers, up to forty units, and we captured some. And at the end of August, Germany was no longer able to replenish all the tank divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

Preparation of the Kursk strategic defensive operation (April - June 1943)

6.4. Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters on the creation of a Reserve Front (from 15.4 - Stepnoy Military District) consisting of 5 combined arms, 1 tank and 1 air armies and several rifle, cavalry, tank (mechanized) corps.

8.4. Report of Marshal G.K. Zhukov to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on possible actions of the Germans and Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1943 and on the advisability of switching to deliberate defense in the Kursk region.

10.4. Request from the General Staff to the commanders of the front forces about their thoughts on assessing the situation and possible actions of the enemy.

12–13.4. The Supreme Command Headquarters, based on the report of Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, General A.I. Antonov, as well as taking into account the considerations of the front commanders, made a preliminary decision to switch to deliberate defense in the Kursk region.

15.4. Order No. 6 of the Wehrmacht headquarters on preparations for the offensive operation near Kursk (code name “Citadel”)

6–8.5. Soviet Air Force operations to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air on the central sector of the Soviet-German front.

8.5. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command advises the commanders of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and South-Western fronts on the timing of a possible enemy offensive.

10.5. Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the commander of the troops of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts on improving defense.

May - June. Organization of defense in the zones of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, creation of deeply echeloned defensive lines, replenishment of troops, accumulation of reserves and materiel. Continuation of Soviet Air Force operations to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air.

2.7. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commanders of the front troops indicating the deadlines possible start enemy offensive (3–6.7).

4.7. The Germans conducted reconnaissance in force in the defense zones of the 6th and 7th Guards. armies of the Voronezh Front. The offensive of several reinforced enemy battalions was repulsed.

5.7. At 02:20 Based on reconnaissance data about the time of the start of the German offensive (scheduled for 03:00 minutes 5.7), artillery counter-preparation was carried out and air strikes were carried out on enemy troops concentrated in the initial areas.

5.7. The Germans, with the main forces of Army Groups "Center" and "South", went on the offensive on the northern (05:30 a.m.) and southern (06:00 a.m.) fronts of the Kursk bulge, delivering massive attacks in general direction to Kursk.

Troops took part in the operation Central Front(commander General K.K. Rokossovsky) - 48, 13, 70, 65, 60th, 2nd Tank, 16th Air Armies, 9th and 19th Tank Armies - in the Oryol direction; Voronezh Front (commander General N.F. Vatutin) - 38th, 40th, 6th Guards, 7th Guards, 69th, 1st Guards. Tank, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards. sk, 5th guards tk - in the Belgorod direction. In their rear, strategic reserves were deployed, united in the Steppe Military District (since July 9, Steppe Front, commander General I.S. Konev) - 4th Guards, 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd, 5th Guards. tank, 5th air army, one sk, three tk, three mk and three kk - with the task of preventing a deep breakthrough of the enemy, and when going on a counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike.

5.7. At 05:30 the strike force of the 9th German Army (9 divisions, including 2 tank divisions; 500 tanks, 280 assault guns), with aviation support, attacked positions at the junction of the 13th (General N.P. Pukhov) and 70th (General I. V. Galanin) armies in a sector of 45 km, concentrating the main efforts in the Olkhovat direction. By the end of the day, the enemy managed to wedge 6–8 km into the army’s defenses and reach the second defensive line.

6.7. By the decision of the front commander, a counterattack was launched against the wedged enemy in the Olkhovatka area by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank army. The enemy's advance here was stopped.

7.7. The Germans transferred the main efforts to the 13th Army zone in the direction of Ponyri. Counterattacks of the 15th and 18th Guards. sk and 3 tk.

7-11.7. Repeated attempts by the German 9th Army to break through the defenses of the Central Front were unsuccessful. During the seven days of the offensive, the enemy advanced only 10–12 km.

12.7. The transition of the 9th German Army to defense in the Central Front. Completion of the defensive operation.

13.7. At a meeting at Hitler's headquarters, a decision was made to switch to the defense of the troops of the 9th Army in the north and to continue the offensive by the troops of the 4th Panzer Army in the south of the Kursk ledge.

5.7. At 06:00 After artillery preparation and massive air raids, the strike force of Army Group South, consisting of the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf (1,500 tanks), went on the offensive.

The enemy sent the main forces (2 SS tanks, 48 ​​tanks, 52 ak) against the 6th Guards. the army of General I.M. Chistyakov in the Oboyan direction.

Against the 7th Guards. In the army of General M.S. Shumilov, three tank and three infantry divisions of 3 Tank Corps, 42 AK and AK "Raus" were advancing in the Korochan direction.

The intense battles that unfolded continued throughout the day and were fierce.

The counterattack launched by part of the forces of the 1st Guards. the tank army of General M.E. Katukov did not give a positive result.

By the end of the first day of the battle, the enemy managed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. army at 8-10 km.

On the night of July 6, by decision of the front commander of the 1st Guards. Tank Army, 5th and 2nd Guards. TK were deployed on the second defensive line of the 6th Guards. army on a 52-kilometer front.

6.7. The enemy in the Oboyan direction broke through the main defense line of the 6th Guards. army, and by the end of the day, having advanced 10–18 km, he broke through the second line of defense of this army in a narrow area.

In the Korochan direction, the enemy's 3rd Tank Tank reached the second line of defense of the 7th Guards. army.

7.7. At night, J.V. Stalin gave personal instructions to General N.F. Vatutin to wear down the enemy on prepared lines and not allow him to break through before the start of our active operations on the Western, Bryansk and other fronts.

7-10.7. There were fierce tank battles in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The German tank group managed to break through to the army defensive zone of the 6th Guards. army, and in the Korochan direction the enemy broke into the second line of defense of the 7th Guards. army. However, the further advance of the Germans was delayed, but not stopped. The Germans, having advanced to a depth of 35 km and unable to overcome the resistance of the front tank forces on the Oboyan highway, decided to break through to Kursk from the south through Prokhorovka.

9.7. In the created alarming situation on the Voronezh Front, the Supreme High Command Headquarters ordered the commander of the Steppe Front to advance the 4th Guards, 27th, 53rd Armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer the 5th Guards to the subordination of N.F. Vatutin. army of General A.S. Zhadov, 5th Guards. the tank army of General P. A. Rotmistrov and a number of separate tank corps. The commander of the Voronezh Front and Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, who was on this front, decided to launch a powerful counterattack against the German group advancing on Kursk from the south.

11.7. The enemy unexpectedly launched a strong tank and air attack and pushed back formations and units of the 1st Guards. tank, 5th, 6th, 7th Guards. armies and captured the line planned for the deployment of the 5th Guards. tank army. After this, the 1st Guards. tank and 6th Guards. the armies were unable to participate in the counterattack.

12.7. One of the largest oncoming tank battles took place, which received the name “Prokhorovskoe” in history. About 1,500 tanks took part in it on both sides. The battle took place simultaneously in two areas: the main forces of the parties fought on the Prokhorovsky field - 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. TK 5th Guards tank army and division of the 5th Guards. army, they were opposed by the SS divisions “Adolf Hitler” and “Reich” of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps; In the Korochan direction, brigades of the 5th Guards operated against the 3rd German Tank Corps. MK 5th Guards tank army.

23.7. The defensive operation of the Voronezh Front was completed.

12.7. A turning point in the Battle of Kursk in favor of the Red Army. On this day, simultaneously with the Battle of Prokhorov, the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts began in the Oryol direction. The plans outlined by the German command suffered a complete collapse.

It should be noted that as a result of intense air battles during the Kursk defensive operation, Soviet aviation firmly gained air supremacy.

Includes the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operations.

The left wing of the Western Front (commander General V.D. Sokolovsky) took part - the 11th Guards, 50th, 11th and 4th Tank Armies; Bryansk Front (commander General M. M. Popov) - 61, 3, 63rd, 3rd Guards. tank and 15th air armies; the right wing of the Central Front - the 48th, 13th, 70th and 2nd Tank Armies.

12–19.7. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Western Front. Advance of the 11th Guards. the army of General I. Kh. Bagramyan, 1, 5, 25 Tank Tank to a depth of 70 km and expanding the breakthrough to 150 km.

15.7. The Central Front is included in the operation.

12–16.7. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Bryansk Front - 61st (General P. A. Belov), 63rd (General V. Ya. Kolpakchi), 3rd (General A. V. Gorbatov) armies, 1st Guards, 20th Tank Army to a depth of 17–22 km.

19.7. The commander of the Bryansk Front, at the direction of the Supreme Command Headquarters, introduces the 3rd Guards into the battle. tank army of General P. S. Rybalko (800 tanks). The army, together with combined arms formations, breaking through numerous defensive lines, suffered heavy losses. In addition, it was repeatedly regrouped from one direction to another and was eventually transferred to the Central Front.

19.7. Fierce fighting in all directions. Slowdown in the rate of advance of Soviet troops.

20.7. The entry into battle by the commander of the troops of the Western Front of the 11th Army of General I. I. Fedyuninsky, who arrived from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, which advanced 15 km in 5 days.

26.7. The entry into battle of the 4th Tank Army of General V.M. Badanov, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the Western Front (650 tanks). She broke through along with the 11th Guards. the army defended the enemy’s defensive lines and advanced 25–30 km in 10 days. In just 30 days, the army fought 150 km and at the end of August was withdrawn for replenishment.

29.7. The troops of the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front captured a large enemy defense center in the city of Bolkhov.

3–5.8. Departure of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the active army. He visited the headquarters of the Western and Kalinin fronts.

5.8. Liberation of Orel by troops of the 3rd and 69th armies of the Bryansk Front. By order of I.V. Stalin, who was in the active army, the first artillery salute was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of the city by Soviet troops. Belgorod and Orel.

7.8. The armies of the Western Front went on the offensive north of the Oryol bridgehead, which forced the Germans to weaken resistance in the Bryansk direction, and Soviet troops began to pursue the enemy.

12.8. Troops of the 65th and 70th armies of the Central Front liberated the city of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky.

13.8. The commander of the Central Front received a directive from the General Staff, which noted serious shortcomings in the use of tanks.

15.8. Troops of the Bryansk Front liberated the city of Karachev.

18.8. Soviet troops reached the approaches to Bryansk and created the conditions for a new operation. During the 37 days of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops advanced 150 km to the west and eliminated the enemy bridgehead from which the Germans had been threatening Moscow for two years.

Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation “Commander Rumyantsev” (August 3-23)

To carry out the operation, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were involved (38, 47, 40, 27, 6th Guards, 5th Guards, 52nd, 69th, 7th Guards Armies, 5th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies , 5th separate TK and 1st MK).

3–4.8. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Voronezh Front, introduction of tank armies and corps into the breakthrough and their entry into operational depth.

5.8. Liberation of Belgorod by units of the 69th and 7th Guards. armies.

6.8. Advancement of tank formations to a depth of 55 km.

7.8. Advancement of tank formations to a depth of 100 km. Capturing important enemy strongholds. Bogodukhov and Grayvoron.

11.8. The exit of tank troops to the Akhtyrka - Trostyanets area.

11–16.8. Enemy counterattack on the troops of the 1st Guards. tank army.

17.8. The troops of the Steppe Front began fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov.

18.8. Enemy counterattack from the Akhtyrka area against the 27th Army. Directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters to the commander of the Voronezh Front on shortcomings in the conduct of the operation.

23.8. By introducing new forces, the Voronezh Front managed to complete the task and liberate Akhtyrka again by August 25.

23.8. The troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts (53rd, 69th, 7th Guards, 57th Army and 5th Guards Tank Army) liberated Kharkov after stubborn battles. During the operation, the troops advanced 140 km in 20 days.