There is only one answer to this question: In the summer of 1943, the time of retreat and defense was over, the time had come to win.

Military situation

By this period German troops they didn't attack anymore. Their plans to capture Moscow were thwarted, and great victory near Stalingrad showed that the Red Army is strong and ready to beat the enemy. But Hitler did not believe in the power of the Soviet troops, he was not going to change plans, much less give up, and gave the order to prepare a large offensive operation.

The fascist command carefully prepared the offensive operation “Citadel”. For this purpose, total mobilization was carried out in Germany. A huge amount of enemy equipment and manpower was pulled into the area of ​​the operation. The plan was drawn up in detail, in it, like in a good script, literally hour by hour and square meters the actions of each platoon were described. An offensive and only an offensive - no other actions were planned. Next, it was necessary to deliver another powerful blow, transferring part of the troops to the southwest. After this, according to Hitler, the Soviet army would be demoralized and completely defeated. The Wehrmacht could easily cope with “finishing off individual units.”

The headquarters also developed a plan for the defeat of Nazi units and an offensive. But in order to mislead the German generals, it was decided to begin protracted defensive battles. The goal is to exhaust the enemy and make it possible to build the positions necessary for decisive battles on the Kursk ledge. The sappers worked without rest, mining the front-line zone. The reports showed a figure of one and a half thousand mines for every kilometer marked on the map.

Balance of power

The Germans concentrated 50 divisions in the Kursk salient area, the number of soldiers reached a gigantic figure - almost 900,000. Technical support was powerful - three tank divisions, which included 324 of the latest Tiger and Panther tanks. 50 Ferdinand anti-tank guns (RT-SAU or Elephant), 10,000 anti-tank guns and mortars were delivered to the Kursk Bulge. The Luftwaffe provided air support with 1,106 aircraft.

By all numerical indicators Soviet troops superior to the enemy. There were 1 million 300 thousand soldiers and officers on eight defensive lines. There were also much more tanks, self-propelled guns and airplanes. But the command was aware that almost the entire technical part of the army was outdated, there were few new tanks, 80% were after repairs. There was an advantage, but it was not the decisive factor in this multi-day battle.

How did the Battle of Kursk take place?

The operation took place in three directions:

The first direction is a strategic defensive operation. It began on July 5 with a massive offensive by fascist troops. The defensive battles were difficult, the Germans managed to break through several fortifications and advance almost 12 deep into the northern positions of the Soviet troops. The first stage lasted until July 23.

The second direction and the third direction were offensive: The Oryol operation began on July 12 and ended on August 18; Belgorod-Kharkov - began on August 3 and lasted until August 23.

The Germans made their first strikes along the entire line of contact between the troops, starting a powerful artillery shelling, after which they went on the offensive. The attacks in the center were a diversionary maneuver; the main forces were directed to the north and south. The task of these units is to split the defenses of the Soviet troops and surround the central parts. Five days of stubborn fighting did not produce any results. The Germans had to go on the defensive.

Battle of Prokhorovka

The Germans concentrated five tank armies and 14 tank corps on a small bridgehead near Prokhorovka. Separate tank regiments took part in the battle. Total number tanks and self-propelled guns amounted to five thousand. The tankers were supported by seven infantry divisions. (Data from the memoirs of Chief of Staff General F.W. von Mellenthin)

The direction of the attack was changed. The German command decided to attack in the Prokhorovka area. Soviet tanks also pulled up to Prokhorovka. The first big clashes took place on July 11, and on July 12 the famous battle of tanks began - a terrible battle between the giants and their crews. Tanks, assault guns and crews of wrecked vehicles fought to the death. No one won an unambiguously assessed victory in this battle. German losses amounted to 80 tanks, that is, the tank divisions escaped with little loss of life and could continue to participate in hostilities. The Soviet army lost almost 70% of its tanks, including those that could still be repaired. But the tankers managed to stop the enemy and forced him to lose time to regroup, thereby giving him the opportunity to strengthen positions, bring up reserves and prepare for an attack.

Further developments

Started on June 17 offensive operations. Soviet troops attacked in several directions at once.

Mius operation began on July 17 and ended on August 2. Having crossed the Northern Donets, the soldiers blocked the Germans' ability to transfer fresh units to the Kursk Bulge.

Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation– On July 17, the encirclement of the Donbass group of Germans began

The result Oryol operation was the liberation of a large territory occupied by the Nazis. After the liberation of Belgorod, the first fireworks display was held in Moscow on August 5, 1943.

Operation "Rumyantsev" started on August 3. The result was the liberation of several settlements, including the liberation of Kharkov on August 23.

Operation Kutuzov lasted almost two months - began on August 7 and ended on October 2. The result was the defeat of the left flank of the Center group and the liberation of Smolensk.

Donbass operation was held from August 13 to September 22. The result is the complete liberation of the Donetsk basin.

Chernigovsko-Poltava The operation ended with the liberation of the entire Left Bank of Ukraine. Dates: the operation began on August 26 and ended on September 30.

As can be seen from a simple listing of facts, the significance of the Kursk operation cannot be overestimated. It broke the backbone of the German army and showed that the Germans would never be able to regain their lost advantage.

Losses

Here the numbers differ. According to Soviet headquarters, the Germans lost at least four hundred thousand killed; they object, calling two hundred thousand the limit. The total number of losses is approximately equal to five hundred thousand killed on both sides. Terrible damage was also caused to equipment - tanks, self-propelled guns, trucks, guns and aircraft.

What's the result?

Going on an offensive that was unstoppable all the way to Berlin. A radical turning point in the war took place thanks to the Battle of Kursk.

Why did you win?

We won because we couldn't help but win. Also because they had gained military experience and such a conscious, sober anger that did not allow them to rush headlong into an attack. She taught us to correctly calculate our strengths and protect (if possible, of course) our own and other people’s lives.

These fifty terrible days are a great feat of our fathers and grandfathers.

Introduction

War. People. Victory.

These three words succinctly and accurately express the essence of a harsh and heroic time, dated in the history of our country from 1941-1945.

It was the time of WARRIOR.

It was a time of greatest tension of the people, reflecting the most violent aggression in the history of mankind - the aggression of Hitler's fascism.

This was the time of our great VICTORY, which meant the end of both the war and Hitler's fascism.

The myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled.

The Battle of Kursk ranks in the Great Patriotic War special place. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943. This battle has no equal in its ferocity and tenacity of struggle. Special attention The study of this topic aroused great interest in the story of an eyewitness, a participant in this battle, a resident of the village of Bagaevskaya Orekhova Zoya Nilovna. She was born on December 2, 1919 in the city of Rzhev, Tver (from 1931 - Kalinin) region. She successfully graduated from school, then entered and graduated from paramedic and midwifery school. In 1940 she got a job in hometown nurse in the surgical department. Everything was going well, but on June 22, 1941, terrible news spread throughout our entire nation: “The war has begun.” Zoya Nilovna, being a person liable for military service, was drafted into the Red Army on the fourth day after the start of the war, in whose ranks she went through the entire war. The events on the Kursk Bulge left a particularly clear mark. It was her story that aroused deep interest in me and forced me to delve deeper into the thick of the events of those times.

The purpose of the abstract is coverage of events taking place on the Kursk Bulge.

Reasons for the battle

Hitler's command wanted to take revenge for Stalingrad and change the course of the war in their favor. Germany still had great military power. She carried out a total (universal) mobilization of human reserves, equipped the army with new military equipment - heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", new aircraft. To carry out a major offensive operation, codenamed "Citadel", the Nazis chose Kursk direction. It seemed to them that the Kursk bulge extended to the west created favorable opportunities for encircling and defeating Soviet troops and intercepting the strategic initiative. The main emphasis was on surprise tank attacks. narrow areas front.

The main reasons for the battle are as follows:

the struggle of competing systems claiming global dominance, National Socialism and Communism;

Germany's desire to conquer "living space" and seize the resource base of the USSR.

Strengths and plans of the parties

Both sides began developing plans for the summer of 1943 even before the end of the winter campaign of 1942/43. Even before the end of the fighting for Kharkov, on March 13, 1943, Hitler issued operational order No. 5, in which he defined the general goals of military operations in Eastern Front for the spring and summer of 1943 “It should be expected,” the order stated, “that the Russians, after the end of winter and the spring thaw, having created reserves of material resources and partially replenishing their formations with people, will resume the offensive. Therefore, our task is to, if possible, forestall them in an offensive in certain places in order to impose their will, at least on one of the sectors of the front, as is currently the case on the front of Army Group South. In other sectors, the task comes down to bleeding the enemy’s offensive. Here we must advance. create a strong defense."

Army groups "Center" and "South" were tasked with defeating the Soviet troops operating in the Kursk salient by delivering counter strikes. The area of ​​Orel, Kursk and Belgorod became the focus of the main attention of the fascist German command. The protrusion of the Soviet front, which penetrated deeply into the enemy’s position here, caused him great concern. Using this ledge, Soviet troops could strike at the junction of Army Groups Center and South and make a deep breakthrough into the central regions of Ukraine, to the Dnieper. At the same time, Hitler’s strategists could not resist the temptation to encircle and destroy the large group of Soviet troops located on it by launching counter strikes from the north and south under the base of the Kursk ledge. In the future, it was planned to launch an offensive to the northeast or south. Thus, Hitler's commanders intended to take revenge for Stalingrad. This operation was considered the main one at Hitler's headquarters. To carry it out, troops were withdrawn from other sectors of the Eastern Front (from Rzhev, Demyansk, the Taman Peninsula, etc.). In total, in this way it was planned to strengthen the Kursk direction with 32 divisions, including 3 tank and 2 motorized.

The fascist German command, after receiving Hitler's directive, intensified the development of a plan for an offensive operation in the Kursk area. Its plan was based on the proposals of Colonel General V. Model (commander of the 9th Army). The essence of his proposals was to strike 2 army groups from the north and south in general direction to Kursk to encircle and destroy large forces of Soviet troops in the Kursk salient. On April 12, the operation plan was presented to Hitler. After 3 days, the Fuhrer signed an order, according to which Army Groups "Center" and "South" were to complete preparations for the offensive on Kursk by May 3. The developers of the plan for the offensive operation, codenamed "Citadel", assumed that the exit of the attack tank groups of Army Groups "South" and "Center" to the Kursk area would take no more than 4 days.

The creation of strike forces in army groups in accordance with Hitler's orders began back in March. In Army Group South (Field Marshal E. von Manstein), the strike force consisted of the 4th Panzer Army (Colonel General G. Hoth) and Task Force Kempf. In Army Group Center, the main blow was delivered by the 9th Army of General V. Model.

However, all the calculations of the headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command turned out to be very far from reality and immediately began to show major failures. Thus, the troops did not have time to carry out the necessary regroupings by the specified date. The actions of partisans on enemy communications and attacks by Soviet aviation seriously hampered the work of transport, the transportation of troops, military equipment, ammunition and other materiel. In addition, the arrival of new tanks to the troops was very slow. In addition, their production was not yet properly debugged. Due to a number of significant technical shortcomings, imperfections and shortcomings, the new tanks and assault guns, simply put, were not ready for combat use. Hitler was convinced that a miracle could only happen through the massive use of new types of tanks and assault guns. By the way, the imperfection of the new German armored vehicles became evident immediately with the Nazi troops going on the offensive: already on the first day, out of 200 “Panthers” of the 4th Tank Army, 80% of the vehicles were out of action due to technical problems. As a result of a number of inconsistencies during the preparation of the offensive operation and miscalculations that emerged, the timing of the transition to the offensive was repeatedly postponed. Finally, on June 21, Hitler set the final date for the start of Operation Citadel - July 5. The creation of two powerful strike groups on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, the basis of which were tank and motorized formations, was completed by the beginning of July. The necessary adjustments were made to the original plan of the offensive operation. Main idea The revised plan was to create a significant superiority over the Soviet troops in the directions of the main attacks and, using massive tank formations, quickly break through the defenses before large Soviet reserves arrived. The enemy was well aware of the strength of our defense, but he believed that surprise and speed of action, coupled with the high penetrating ability of tank divisions equipped new technology, will bring the desired success. But the confidence of the fascist German command was based on ephemeral calculations and was in flagrant contradiction with reality. He did not take into account in a timely manner many factors that could have had the most direct, and, moreover, negative, impact on the course and outcome of the offensive operation. These include, for example, a gross miscalculation of German intelligence, which failed to detect as many as 10 Soviet armies, which then took part in Battle of Kursk. Another such factor was the enemy’s underestimation of the power Soviet defense and reassessment of its own offensive capabilities. And this list can be continued for a long time.

In accordance with the plan for Operation Citadel, Army Group South launched two strikes: one with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, the other with Army Group Kempf, which had a total of 19 divisions (including 9 tank divisions), 6 separate divisions of assault guns and 3 battalions of heavy tanks. In total, by the time they went on the offensive, they had 1,493 tanks, including 337 Panthers and Tigers, as well as 253 assault guns. The offensive of ground forces was supported by aviation of the 4th Air Fleet (1,100 aircraft) Best connections Army Group South - 6 tank (motorized) and 4 infantry divisions - were part of the 4th Tank Army. Among them was the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, whose 4 motorized divisions received almost all the new tanks allocated to Army Group South. Field Marshal E. Manstein, who was considered the “best operational mind” of the German General Staff, was primarily counting on the striking power of this corps. The corps acted in the direction of the main attack of Army Group South.

The strike group of Army Group Center (Field Marshal G. von Kluge) included 8 tank and 14 infantry divisions, 9 separate divisions of assault guns, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks and 3 separate companies of remote-controlled tanks intended for detonating mines. fields. All of them were part of the 9th Field Army. It consisted of about 750 tanks, including 45 Tigers, and 280 assault guns. The army was supported from the air by the 6th Air Fleet (up to 700 aircraft).

The concept of Operation Citadel final version was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending on the Kursk ledge with powerful counter strikes from the areas of Orel and Belgorod in the general direction of Kursk, and then strike at the rear of the Southwestern Front. After this, it was planned to develop an offensive in the northeast direction with the aim of reaching deep behind the central group of Soviet troops and creating a threat to Moscow. In order to divert the attention and reserves of the Soviet command, simultaneously with the strike on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazi command planned an attack on Leningrad. Thus, the Wehrmacht leadership developed a plan to defeat the entire southern wing of the Red Army's strategic front. If this plan were successfully implemented, this would radically change the military-political situation on the Soviet-German front and would open up new prospects for the enemy to continue the struggle.

By the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Central Front (Army General K.K. Rokossovsky) had the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk ledge, repelling the enemy’s offensive, and then, launching a counteroffensive, together with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, defeat his group in the Orel region. The Voronezh Front (Army General N.F. Vatutin) received the task of defending the southern part of the Kursk ledge, exhausting and bleeding the enemy in defensive battles, and then launching a counteroffensive to complete its defeat in the areas of Belgorod and Kharkov. The troops of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western Front were supposed to assist the Central Front in disrupting the enemy offensive and be ready to launch a counteroffensive.

The balance of forces at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk was as follows. The fascist German command used over 900 thousand personnel, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, over 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and more than 2 thousand aircraft to carry out the offensive Operation Citadel. They were opposed by the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, numbering more than 1.3 million people, 19.1 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft. Consequently, the Soviet troops (excluding the Steppe Front) outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, in artillery (excluding rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns) - by 1.9 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns - by 1.2 times, and in aircraft - 1.4 times.

Thus, during the period of relative calm on the Soviet-German front, which lasted from late March to early July 1943, the warring parties made great efforts to fully prepare for the upcoming battles. In this competition, the Soviet state and its Armed Forces were ahead. All that remained was to skillfully use the forces and means at the command’s disposal. Considering the unfavorable balance of forces for the enemy, we can conclude that Hitler’s decision to attack at all costs from a military point of view was a gamble. But the Nazi leadership agreed to it, giving priority to political considerations. The German Fuhrer directly stated this in his speech in East Prussia on July 1. According to him, Operation Citadel will have not only military but also political significance, will help Germany retain its allies and thwart the plans of the Western powers to open a second front, and will also have a beneficial effect on the internal situation in Germany. However, the position of the fascist German troops was further aggravated by the fact that surprise, due to which they were able to largely achieve success in the summer operations of 1941 and 1942, was lost. This was facilitated, not least by the repeated postponements of the offensive near Kursk and good job Soviet intelligence. By the beginning of July, all decisions had been made, tasks were assigned to the troops, the huge masses of troops of the parties opposing the Kursk Bulge froze in tense anticipation...

and its meaning

1) Tell us about the battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge, describe it historical significance. What was the difference between this battle and other major USSR operations against Nazi invaders?

2) What explains the successes of the Red Army in 1943-1944?

3) What were the most important operations carried out by the Red Army in the first half of 1944? How did they affect the success of the Allied landings in Normandy?

4) Describe the results of the conference of heads of state of allied countries in Tehran?

Option #1.

A1. The Battle of Moscow has begun
A) December 6, 1941; B) November 19, 1942; B) July 6, 1941; D) April 16, 1942.

A2. Citizens of the USSR, for the first time in 1941. heard the words addressed to them: “The enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours!” in a speech
A) M.I. Kalinina December 31; B) I.V. Stalin on November 7;
B) G.K. Zhukov December 6; D) V.M. Molotov June 22.

A3. December 5-6, 1941 The counter-offensive of the Red Army began under
A) Kyiv; B) Moscow; B) Leningrad; D) Stalingrad.

A4. In February 1945 a meeting of the heads of government of the three allied powers took place in
A) Moscow; B) Tehran; B) Yalta; D) Potsdam.

A5. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief during the Great Patriotic War was
A) G.K. Zhukov; B) I.V. Stalin; B) K.E. Voroshilov; D) S.M. Budyonny.

A6. I. Stalin issued order No. 227 “Not a step back!” dated July 28, 1942 was caused by a threat
A) the seizure of Crimea by the Germans; B) a new German breakthrough near Moscow;
B) the Germans reaching the Urals from the south; D) the surrender of Stalingrad and the exit of the German armies to the Volga.

A7. The most important reason for the failure of the German offensive plan in the Battle of Kursk was (o)
A) a preemptive strike by Soviet artillery;
B) entry into battle of Siberian reserve divisions;
B) encirclement of the bulk of German troops on the Kursk Bulge into a “cauldron”;
D) a strike by partisan formations in the rear of the Germans.

A8. The consequence of the Moscow Battle was that
A) the Second Front was opened in Europe;
B) the German plan was thwarted " lightning war»;
C) there was a radical turning point in the war;
D) Germany began to lose its allies in the war.

A9. When was the Second Front opened?
A) May 1, 1944; B) August 20, 1944; B) June 6, 1944; D) January 1944

A11. Name of the operation of Soviet troops near Stalingrad:
A) "Barbarossa"; B) "Citadel"; B) “Uranus”; D) "Typhoon".

A12. The anti-Hitler coalition has finally taken shape:
A) the signing of an agreement on the alliance between the USSR and Great Britain;
B) the signing of an agreement on the alliance between the USSR and France;
C) the signing of an agreement between the USSR and the USA;
D) recognition of the USSR by Western countries.

A13. In honor of what event was a victorious salute given for the first time in Moscow?
A) the surrender of German troops in Stalingrad;
B) the failure of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the liberation of Orel and Belgorod;
B) liberation of Kyiv;
D) the surrender of the Germans in Berlin.

A14. The following decisions were made at the Potsdam Conference:
A) about the date of entry of the USSR into the war with Japan,
B) about the transfer of the city of Koenigsberg and the surrounding area to the USSR,
B) about the management of post-war Germany,
D) about reparations from Germany.

A15. The following front commanders took part in Operation Bagration:
A) Bagramyan, B) Chernyakhovsky, C) Rokossovsky, D) Konev.

A16. The front commanders in the Berlin operation were:
A) Vasilevsky, B) Zhukov, C) Konev, D) Rokossovsky.

B1. Match the battles with the years in which they occurred:
1) near Smolensk A) 1944
2) near Kharkov B) 1943
3) for crossing the Dnieper B) 1942
4) for the liberation of Minsk D) 1941
D) 1945

B2. Match the names and facts:
1) I.V. Panfilov A) commander of the 62nd Army;
2) V.V. Talalikhin B) air ram;
3) I.V. Stalin B) commander of the division on the Volokolamsk highway;
4) V.I. Chuikov G) Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops.

C1. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal V.I. Chuikov and indicate what battle we are talking about.
“...Despite the enormous losses, the invaders pushed ahead. Columns of infantry in vehicles and tanks burst into the city. Apparently, the Nazis believed that his fate was decided, and each of them sought to reach the Volga, the city center as quickly as possible and profit from trophies there... our fighters... crawled out from under the German tanks... to the next line, where they were received and united to the units, supplied them, mainly with ammunition, and again threw them into battle.”

The Battle of Kursk (July 5-August 23, 1943) is a historical event that is often given ambiguous characteristics. There is an opinion that only at the cost of huge losses Soviet army managed to stop the enemy. However, this is a simplified view. The turning point at the Kursk Bulge became possible due to a number of factors.

Decisive moment

For the German government, the offensive Operation Citadel was of extreme importance. Total mobilization was carried out throughout the country; a huge amount of manpower and equipment was pulled into the area of ​​the operation.

The High Command meticulously developed a plan of action for the troops: the movement of each unit was literally planned hourly and square meters. Only the offensive! The operation did not provide any other options. By order of Hitler, it was necessary to defeat the main forces of the Red Army and quickly deal with its scattered and demoralized remnants.

In the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, the Germans concentrated 50 divisions, about 900 thousand soldiers. Technical support was also powerful: three tank divisions (2,758 tanks), about 10 thousand self-propelled artillery units (SPG) and 2,050 aircraft. In addition, about 10 thousand anti-tank guns and mortars were delivered to the Kursk area.

The Soviet army was quantitatively superior to the Germans in all types of weapons and in terms of human resources. At eight defensive lines there were at least 1 million 300 thousand soldiers (about 600 thousand in reserve), 3444 tanks, 19 thousand guns and mortars, 2172 aircraft. However, the General Staff was well aware that the technical equipment of the army was outdated, which practically negated the numerical superiority. The ultimate success in the battle depended on whether it would be possible to “cut off” the tank pincers of the German army, which was advancing from two sides.

They didn’t lose, but retreated

German General Erich von Manstein never ceased to boast that the Wehrmacht under his command destroyed 1,800 Soviet tanks, while German losses were several times less. German historians went even further, calculating that the German army left no more than 10% of its personnel on the fields of the Kursk Bulge, and irrecoverable losses in tanks and self-propelled guns did not exceed 300 units.

A reasonable question arises: why, in this situation, did the Wehrmacht not only not surround the Soviet troops, but also take flight? German historiography has an answer to this. Recently, the German magazine Welt published an article that “irrefutably proved” that the Wehrmacht won at Kursk, since the losses of personnel and equipment of the Red Army were several times greater. And if not for the Allied landing in Sicily, which forced Hitler to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front, Germany would have completely defeated the Russians.

Likewise, Manstein, one of the main characters in the Battle of Kursk, while admitting defeat, nevertheless emphasized in his justification that the Russians managed to crush the German army only thanks to their mass and at the cost of monstrous losses.

Intelligence

No matter how much the Germans overestimated their achievements, the Soviet leadership approached the events on the Kursk Bulge fully armed. Since the beginning of 1943, our intelligence regularly reported on the upcoming Operation Citadel and in general outline revealed Hitler's plans. On April 12, Stalin was familiarized with the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel,” which Hitler signed only three days later.

There are several versions regarding the sources of information. One of them is called John Cairncross, an English codebreaker, a member of the “Cambridge Five”, who collaborated with Soviet intelligence.

Former intelligence officer Lieutenant General Vadim Kirpichenko writes that “John Cairncross at the end of April, more than two months before the start of the Battle of Kursk, transmitted information to Moscow that the German offensive would begin in early July. This was the decipherment of a telegram to Berlin from German Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, who was preparing a German offensive south of Kursk, in the Belgorod region.”

According to Kirpichenko, the telegram indicated exactly what forces the Germans would use in the offensive, which units would move from Orel and which from Belgorod, and what equipment would be deployed. The location of German field airfields was also reflected there.

In his memoirs, Georgy Zhukov claimed that he predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge as early as April 8, relying on intelligence data.

Defense in depth

On the eve of the German offensive operation, Soviet troops created a powerful defense system in depth in the Kursk direction. The command decided to conduct a defensive battle with counterattacks against enemy forces at critical moments.

The sappers had to work hard to mine almost the entire front-line zone. The reports stated that average density mining in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

Tanks

Without a doubt, tanks played one of the decisive roles in the Battle of Kursk. Soviet losses in technology are recognized as greater than the German ones, however, German military leaders, unlike historians, cite impressive figures for their own losses. Thus, according to General Walter Wenck, by July 7, 1943, the German 3rd Panzer Division alone had lost over 67% of its tanks. Total losses in various military units reached 70-80%. It was for these reasons, according to reports from the German command, that the Wehrmacht was forced to slow down its advance.

After the defeat at the Kursk Bulge, where tanks from the Ural factories and the German concern Krupp met, the head of the German company, Alfred Krupp, was called to headquarters. Hitler shouted in rage: “Your tanks are worse than the Russians, we lost the battle of Kursk because of you! You are the main culprit of our failures!”

The Fuhrer was wrong. Ruhr steel was not inferior in quality to Ural steel, and in some ways it was better. Moreover, even in the third year of the war, German tank forces were superior to the Soviet ones in their tactical and technical training. A particularly noticeable advantage was expected with the release of the Tigers and Panthers.

But in reality everything turned out differently. 144 Tigers (or 7.6% of the total number of German tanks) took part in the battles near Kursk, but in a month and a half of fighting the Germans irretrievably lost 73 such vehicles. Soviet tank crews found holes in the seemingly invulnerable latest technology. In addition, they made full use of the speed and maneuverability of the T-34, and also used ambush tactics, which neutralized the qualitative superiority of the German tank forces.

In the largest tank battle in history - the Battle of Prokhorovka - about 5 thousand units of equipment were involved on both sides. The Germans' losses, according to Soviet data, amounted to 80 tanks, ours - up to 180 vehicles. No one managed to win a clear victory at Prokhorovka. But the Soviet tankers were able to stop the enemy, albeit at the cost of great blood. This made it possible for the Soviet command to strengthen its positions, raise reserves and prepare for an offensive.

Aviation

Historians cite the inability of the Luftwaffe to gain air supremacy as another important reason why the German attack failed. During the defensive operation, Soviet pilots destroyed about 1.5 thousand German aircraft, while they themselves lost about 460 aircraft.

In air battles over the Kursk Bulge, the enemy experienced the full power of Soviet attack and bomber aircraft for almost the first time since the beginning of the war. The air barrier turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle for German aircraft, not only because of the quantitative superiority of equipment, but also due to the dedication that Soviet pilots demonstrated in every combat sortie.

Tactics

The success of the defensive operation near Kursk was due to the fact that the Soviet command had an idea of ​​the Wehrmacht’s plans and was able to accurately determine the time and place of the enemy’s main attacks. The General Staff concentrated its main forces in the areas of proposed military operations, which made it possible not only to successfully defend itself, but also to conduct a counter-offensive as necessary. The Battle of Kursk can be called one of the most successful defensive operations during the Great Patriotic War.

The defensive lines, designed primarily to repel massive tank attacks, were unparalleled in depth, engineering equipment of positions and zones, and density of forces and assets. The German attack literally got bogged down in the echeloned redoubts built along its path.

Not succumbing to the temptation to go on the offensive earlier than the situation required, the Soviet command waited until the extreme point when the defense had already begun to crack. And instead of sending reinforcements to the defensive lines, the General Staff, unexpectedly for the German military, organized two offensive operations (“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev”), which resulted in a breakthrough of the front and the final defeat of the enemy.

Predetermined outcome

Despite the fact that the Battle of Kursk is recognized as a turning point in both the Great Patriotic War and World War II, many historians say that Germany’s defeat was a foregone conclusion earlier - near Moscow and Stalingrad. This point of view is also expressed by some German researchers.

For example, the publicist Berthold Seewald writes that “The Battle of Kursk confirmed what had long determined the course of hostilities: the Third Reich could no longer oppose Soviet productivity. In essence, nothing has changed either since the defeat near Moscow or since the Battle of Stalingrad.”

Historian Karl-Heinz Friser, recognized as the best German expert on the analysis of Operation Citadel, came to the following conclusion: “Although from an objective point of view the failure of the German army was obvious for a long time, now it became clear to ordinary infantrymen in the trenches at the forefront that the war can't win anymore. In this regard, Kursk can still be considered as a kind of milestone, after which the perception of defeat acquired a different character.”

Yesterday sapojnik posted an interview with a German war historian about the Battle of Kursk. It turns out that the Soviet heroic and victorious version of this historical event- not true. A myth constructed in Soviet times specifically to hide unpleasant facts, defeat and losses, through the traditional means of additions, lies and omissions.
The historical truth looks much more unpleasant and worse. That is, more interesting and important.
Naturally, I became interested, and I delved into historical literature. Here are the results of my search.
For starters, here is the interview itself: http://www.istpravda.ru/digest/4517/ More precisely, the most interesting quotes:
“Colonel Karl-Heinz Friser: in this “great tank battle” the German army lost only three tanks!
German historians about the battle of Prokhorovka.
Military historian, retired colonel Karl-Heinz Friser, who worked for many years in the military-historical department of the Bundeswehr, the best specialist on the Eastern Front, studied in detail both German and Russian documents.

Die Welt: - The most famous part of Operation Citadel was the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Did two “steel avalanches” really collide then?
Karl-Heinz Friser- Some people claim that 850 Soviet and 800 German tanks took part in the battle. Prokhorovka, where 400 Wehrmacht tanks were allegedly destroyed, is considered the “graveyard of German tank forces.” However, in reality, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in this battle. The Red Army lost 235 tanks, and German troops lost only three!
DW - How could this be?
Frizer - The Soviet generals did everything wrong that could be done, because Stalin, making mistakes in his calculations, was very pressed for the timing of the operation. Thus, the “kamikaze attack” carried out by the 29th Tank Corps ended in an undetected trap set earlier by Soviet troops, behind which there were German tanks. The Russians lost 172 of 219 tanks. 118 of them were completely destroyed. That evening, German soldiers towed their damaged tanks for repairs and blew up all the damaged Russian tanks.

DW - Did the Battle of Prokhorovka end in victory for Soviet or German forces?
Frizer - It all depends on which side you look at the situation from. From a tactical point of view, the German troops won, but for the Soviets this battle turned into hell. From an operational point of view, this was a success for the Russians because the German offensive was stopped for the time being. But in fact, the Red Army initially planned to destroy two enemy tank corps. Therefore, strategically, this was also a failure of the Russians, since near Prokhorovka it was planned to deploy the Fifth Guards Tank Army, which was subsequently supposed to play main role in the summer offensive.

DW - Was the Battle of Kursk really the turning point of World War II?
Friser - No.
DW - Why not?
Friser - Neither Kursk nor Stalingrad became turning points. Everything was decided in the winter of 1941 in the battle of Moscow, which ended in the collapse of the blitzkrieg. In a protracted war, the Third Reich, which was experiencing, in particular, a shortage of fuel, had no chance against the Soviet Union, which also received support from the United States and Great Britain. Even if Germany had won the Battle of Kursk, it would not have been able to prevent its own defeat in the entire war.

DW - With your research you have already dispelled several myths about the Battle of Kursk that dominated the former Soviet Union. Why were there so many legends about this battle?
Frizer - In Soviet historiography of the Battle of Kursk, " greatest battle of all times,” initially played a surprisingly minor role. Because the mistakes made by the Soviet command during it were simply shameful, and the losses were terrifying. For this reason, the truth was subsequently replaced by myths.
DW - How do your Russian colleagues assess the Battle of Kursk today? Do legends about this still dominate in Russia? And has anything changed in the perception of this issue in the Putin era compared to the Yeltsin era?
Freezer - B recent years Several critical publications appeared. The author of one of them, Valery Zamulin, confirmed the huge losses of Soviet forces near Prokhorovka. Another author, Boris Sokolov, pointed out that official casualty figures were greatly underestimated. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded, however, that Russian historians create a positive image of the Red Army. Since then, these colleagues, as sources in Moscow told me, have been forced to “split into two” between “truth and honor.” Sven Felix Kellerhoff for Die Welt.

I was quite surprised by Friser's information. But very quickly I found confirmation for them.
Firstly, here is the book by Zamulin, whom the German military historian mentioned.
Zamulin V.Secret Battle of Kursk. - M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2007 http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/index.html
Naturally, I won’t post the entire book. But here’s the author’s concept, from the preface:
"Based on the analysis of documents open funds The Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense (2) and captured materials of the 4th TA, the book examines four main issues related to this topic. Firstly, the general concept of the counterattack and N.F.’s calculations. Vatutin at the time of its occurrence (July 9-10) and after the situation changed dramatically (on the night of July 12). Secondly, how the army commanders prepared their troops, what problems and inconsistencies they encountered. For the first time, the situation with the transfer of several divisions from the 40th A to the 6th Guards is being considered. And on July 11, 1943, and the friction that arose during this between K.S. Moskalenko and I.M. Chistyakov, who did not allow the entire auxiliary group of the front to launch a counterattack in a timely manner. Thirdly, the course of hostilities in the 69th A zone a day before the start of the counterattack and the process of localizing the breakthrough of its line by the enemy’s 3rd Tank Corps are described in detail, and the influence of these events on the failure of the main front grouping (5th Guards A) is also considered and 5th Guards TA). And finally, fourthly, the course of the famous battle of four tank corps of the 5th Guards is described hour by hour. TA and divisions of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12, 1943 on the “tank field” near Prokhorovka and the reasons were revealed that did not allow several hundred Soviet combat vehicles to crush the line of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler.
A significant problem in preparing for the entry of two guards armies into battle was the choice of the area for deployment of their main forces. In connection with the advance of the enemy, the front command was forced to change the starting lines for their strike groups twice. The book shows for the first time the role of German tactical reconnaissance during the breakthrough of the front edge of the third army line near Prokhorovka on July 10, 1943, traces in detail the progress of the construction of the station's defense system on the night of July 11, 1943, and reveals a number of major problems in the command and control of the 5th Guards troops . And, contributed to the exit of the 2nd SS Tank Tank to its outskirts and the capture of the area planned for the initial positions of two shock tank formations of the 5th Guards. TA - 18th and 29th TC.
One of the important components of the enemy’s success at this moment was the human factor. Miscalculations and shortcomings were made by the Soviet command at almost all levels: front-line, army, and divisional. Superimposed on a chain of objective problems and difficulties among the troops defending the station and arriving from the march, they almost led to the capture of Prokhorovka by the SS men, and perhaps even more tragic consequences. In an effort to convey to the reader the motives for the decisions made by the key figures of that historical drama, to more fully reveal the essence of the circumstances in which they found themselves, I used not only a database of unique documentary sources collected in domestic and foreign archives, but also eyewitness accounts previously unknown to the general reader and direct participants in the battle on both sides.
July 12, 1943 became the most dramatic day of the entire Battle of Kursk. The counterattack, with which the Soviet command tried to finally stop the forward advance of the troops of the GA "South" and defeat its strongest formation, did not bring desired result. General G. Hoth outplayed the leadership of the Voronezh Front. The battle he planned back in May 1943 in order to bleed the mobile reserves accumulated by the Soviet side during the spring operational pause brought the expected results to the enemy. And although the powerful attacks of Soviet tank formations made a significant contribution to the disruption of Operation Citadel, it must be admitted that at Prokhorovka the enemy still managed to achieve a very important result - the losses of our troops in men and armored vehicles turned out to be an order of magnitude higher than in the 2nd Tk SS and 3rd Tk. In less than a day N.F. Vatutin lost a significant part of his trained and fully equipped reserves - the most important lever of influence on the operational situation. The consequences of the dispersal of the forces of the Guards Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov’s failed and not fully prepared frontal counterattack began to be felt the very next day after it began, and a day later he was forced to withdraw the troops of the 69th A from the Donets interfluve under the most difficult conditions.”

Secondly, there was an excellent article about this battle, analyzing and criticizing Soviet mythology in detail. "The Battle of Kursk, Orel and Kharkov. Strategic intentions and results. A critical review of Soviet historiography" ((Published: Gezeitenwechsel im Zweiten Weltkrieg? Hrsg. von Roland G. Foerster. Hamburg—Berlin-Bonn; Verlag Mittler Sohn-Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1996 . Translation from English author).
“In 1943, the advantage the Germans had gained from the surprise attack in 1941 had practically disappeared, and Soviet industry had reached its maximum productivity after a decline in the first year of the war. These facts turned out to be very useful in creating a new myth - about the triumph of Soviet political system and the Soviet people in the Battle of Kursk, the third great battle the war after Moscow and Stalingrad, which involved more men, tanks and aircraft than any other battle on the Eastern Front. But for such a myth it is very important not to clarify the issue of strategic intentions and results.

And thirdly, the works of historian Boris Sokolov were discovered. The quotes from them are too extensive, so I will leave only the most suitable ones, about Frizer, the Kursk Bulge and Prokhorovka. Someday I’ll post some excerpts, I really liked his criticism of traditional, mythological Soviet history. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/index.html
Sokolov B.V. The truth about the Great Patriotic War (Collection of articles). - St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 1989.
in 1993, the Military Historical Research Institute of the German Ministry of Defense invited the author to a conference in Ingoldstadt that examined this particular battle. However, in randomness one can also see a pattern. It was the Battle of Kursk that became the largest battle not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the entire Second World War. By that time, two whole years had already passed since the German attack on the USSR, and all the advantages that the Wehrmacht received due to the surprise of the invasion had long lost their significance. The Soviet Union fully developed its military potential, was able to use significant supplies under Lend-Lease and had an army equipped with people and equipment with two years of combat experience, which was seriously superior to the enemy in numbers and weapons. However, as was shown in our report, from the point of view of military art, the Red Army lost the Battle of Kursk, because, despite the enormous superiority that it possessed, the relatively modest results achieved did not justify the monstrous losses it suffered in men and equipment. By the way, in terms of the degree of discrepancy with the real course of events, the Soviet mythology of this battle will give odds to the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad. The reports of the German participants in the mentioned conference leave no stone unturned on this myth. I would especially like to highlight the work of Karl-Heinz Friser, dedicated, in particular, to the analysis of the famous tank battle near Prokhorovka. (2) The German historian was inspired to write it by watching the Soviet film “Arc of Fire” from the epic “Liberation.” He found the picture of the greatest tank battle painted in the film to be completely false. Using material from German archives, Friser proved that Soviet claims that the Germans lost 300 or 400 tanks at Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943 were nothing more than a poetic exaggeration contained in the reports of Soviet tank commanders. In fact, the 2nd German SS Panzer Corps, which confronted the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka, lost only 5 tanks irretrievably, while another 43 tanks and 12 assault guns were damaged, while the irretrievable losses of only 3 corps 5- The th Guards Tank Army consisted, according to Soviet reports, which in this case coincided with the German ones, of at least 334 tanks and self-propelled guns. And this despite the fact that the Soviet side had almost fourfold superiority - together with two corps called up in the army of P. Rotmistrov, tank and mechanized - up to 1000 units of armored vehicles against no more than 273 for the Germans. There is an oral tradition from eyewitnesses that Stalin in Moscow after the Prokhorov battle called Rotmistrov “on the carpet” and said something like this: “Why, you asshole, ruined the entire army in one day and did nothing?” However, the Supreme Commander still abandoned the intention to bring the hapless commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army to trial: after all, the Soviet troops still won the Battle of Kursk. As a result, the legend of Soviet success at Prokhorovka was born. For this purpose, the number of tanks the Germans had was inflated by two and a half times - to 700, and their losses - by 5-7 times, to 300-400 vehicles, in order to make them comparable to the Soviet ones. I had the opportunity to talk with one of the participants in the Prokhorov battle, L.V. Chechkov. Then he was a sergeant major, commander of a T-34 tank. Although the tank was burned, Leonid Vasilyevich was lucky to survive. But out of 50 of his friends formed in Transbaikalia tank corps Only five left the battlefield near Prokhorovka alive. Most Soviet tank crews did not have the necessary combat experience and received a baptism of fire at the Kursk Bulge. This undoubtedly affected the results of the tank battle near Prokhorovka. The real reasons the cessation of the offensive of Army Group South, contrary to the widespread opinion in Soviet historiography that the Germans’ refusal to continue Operation Citadel was caused by the failure at Prokhorovka (which in fact did not happen), lie in the fact that the Soviet attack against the Oryol bridgehead had already begun, and therefore there was no chance of encircling the Red Army group near Kursk. Continuing the attack on Kursk from the south was an unjustified risk and in the future could lead to the encirclement and death of German tank formations. The victory at Prokhorovka still could not change the overall strategic situation, which was unfavorable for the German side.
In general, the Soviet command clearly underestimated the Wehrmacht’s ability to restore and even increase its forces after the disaster at Stalingrad and did not pay due attention to the combat training of troops and headquarters. Meanwhile, there were generals in the Red Army who assessed the situation more realistically and paid the full price for their realism. Thus, the head of the Smolensk Artillery School, Major General of Artillery E. S. Petrov, had the imprudence at one meeting to express the opinion that after Stalingrad the Germans “will make up for their losses, after which they will still be strong, and they must be taken into account.” He was immediately arrested and sentenced to 25 years in the camps.(2a)
The reasons for the large losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk, as in subsequent battles of the final period of the war, seem to be also explained by the following reason. Because of high level losses in the first years of the war, officers with military experience were retained mainly at the regimental level and above. In the platoon-company level and even the battalion, very few commanders who started the war, as well as sergeants and foremen, have survived. Therefore, it was very difficult to transfer experience to new additions. Hundreds of thousands and millions of poorly trained fighters continued to die before they could inflict serious damage on the enemy."

Sokolov has another book, I haven’t had time to read it yet, but it’s probably interesting. About Zhukov: Sokolov B.V. Unknown Zhukov: portrait without retouching in the mirror of the era. - Mn.: Rhodiola-plus, 2000.