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Reform Armed Forces Russian Federation(Russian Armed Forces) 2008-2020 - a set of measures to change the structure, composition and strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, announced on October 14, 2008 at a closed meeting of the military board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Russian Ministry of Defense). The reform is divided into 3 stages.

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Stage I This stage includes organizational and staffing measures: optimization of numbers, optimization of management, reform of military education. Optimization of strength An essential part of the reform was the reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, which in 2008 was about 1.2 million people. Most of the reductions occurred among officers: from more than 300 thousand to 150 thousand people. As a result, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev set the task of returning about 70 thousand officers to the Armed Forces. In 2014, the number of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was 845 thousand: ground forces - 250 thousand, airborne forces - 35 thousand, navy - 130 thousand, air force - 150 thousand, strategic nuclear forces - 80 thousand, command and service - 200 thousand.

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Management optimization One of the main directions of the reform is the transition from a four-tier management system “military district” - “army” - “division” - “regiment” to a three-tier “military district” - “operational command” - “brigade”. After the military-administrative reform, all troops in the military district are subordinate to one commander, who is personally responsible for security in the region. The unification of combined arms armies, navies, air force and air defense commands under the unified leadership of the military district commander made it possible to qualitatively increase the combat capabilities of the new military districts by reducing reaction time in crisis situations and increasing their total strike power. In strategic directions, self-sufficient inter-service groupings of troops (forces) have been created, united under a single command, the basis of which are formations and military units of constant readiness, capable of bringing themselves to the highest degree of combat readiness in the shortest possible time and performing tasks as intended.

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Stage II This stage includes the decision social issues: Increase in salary, provision of housing, professional retraining and advanced training of military personnel. Increase in pay Since January 1, 2012, pay for military personnel has been increased by 2.5-3 times, and military pensions have increased. On November 7, 2011, President Dmitry Medvedev signed the Law “On monetary allowances for military personnel and providing them with individual payments.” In accordance with the law, the system for calculating monetary allowances was changed, the previously existing additional payments and allowances were canceled and new ones were introduced. The monetary allowance of a soldier undergoing military service upon conscription consists of a salary for a military position and additional payments.

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Professional retraining and advanced training of military personnel Since January 2012, all contract servicemen are required to undergo intensive combined arms training courses in specially created training centers, the so-called “survival courses.” In the first six months of 2012, more than 5.5 thousand military personnel underwent training in the Southern Military District alone, of which about a thousand military personnel failed the test. Since 2013, all those entering military service under a contract from among the citizens in the reserve must undergo training in an intensive combined arms training program within four weeks. Retraining of officers takes place in specialized centers upon appointment to a position.

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Stage III On November 19, 2008, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Nikolai Makarov, told reporters that in Russian army in the next 3-5 years, weapons and equipment will be updated by a third, and by 2020 this will be done by 100%. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded that by the end of 2015 the armed forces be equipped with modern weapons by at least 30%, and the result of the year - 47%. By the end of 2020, this figure should be at least 70%. This means that in the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF), which are a priority in development, there will already be 100%, as well as in the Aerospace Forces and the Navy. Slightly less in Ground forces and Airborne Forces, but they will also have high performance.

Main directions of reform

Structural changes

One of the main directions of the reform is the transition from a four-tier command system “military district” - “army” - “division” - “regiment” to a three-tier “military district” - “Operational command” - “brigade”. The number of military units is planned to be reduced according to the following table: Type of Armed Forces
and types of troops* 2008 2012 Degree of reduction
Ground forces 1890 172 -90%
Air Force 340 180 -48%
Navy 240 123 -49%
Strategic Missile Forces* 12 8 -33%
Space Force* 7 6 -15%
Airborne troops* 6 5 -17%

During the transformation, it was planned to disband the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Taman Division, the 4th Guards Tank Kantemirovskaya Division, the 106th Guards Airborne Division and the 98th Guards Airborne Svirskaya Division. However, the decision regarding the 106th Guards Airborne Division was later reversed.

Reduction

An essential part of the reform will be a reduction in the size of the armed forces, which currently amounts to about 1.2 million people. Most of the reductions will be among officers: from more than 300 thousand to 150 thousand people.

Reduction degree:

General 1107 780 866 −22%
Colonel 15365 3114 −80%
Lieutenant Colonel 19300 7500 −61%
Major 99550 30000 −70%
Captain 90000 40000 −56%
Senior Lieutenant 30000 35000 +17%
Lieutenant 20000 26000 +30%
Total officers 365,000 142,000 −61%
Ensign 90000 0 0 −100%
Midshipman 50000 0 0 −100%

According to Russian law, dismissed military personnel must be provided with housing. There are now more than 130 thousand people in the armed forces who need housing.

Reductions in the Russian Armed Forces are proceeding faster than planned. According to Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolai Pankov: in next year no more than 127 thousand officers will remain in the Russian Armed Forces - 23 thousand less than previously announced.

By 2016, the size of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be 1,884,829 units, including 1,000,000 military personnel.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, there are more than 5,000 officers in sergeant positions. (REN News, April 30, 2010)

Military medicine

Planned to reduce State Institute advanced training for doctors of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 66 military hospitals, 83 military clinics, 17 infirmaries, five military sanatoriums and rest homes, 64 storage bases military equipment and property. In 2010-2011, the military medical faculties at the Samara, Saratov and Tomsk medical institutes will be disbanded.

The number of medical officers is planned to be reduced from 7967 to 2200 people.

Military universities

It is planned to form 10 scientific centers from 15 military academies, 46 military institutes and schools and four military universities. In particular, it is planned to disband the Academy of Aerospace Defense named after G. K. Zhukov

In an interview with journalists, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said:

Scientific centers will be created on the basis of 65 universities, where the educational process and scientific activities will be collected into a single unit. A completely new technical base will be created in new scientific centers

Armament

According to an unnamed source in the Russian Ministry of Defense, the number of tanks in the Ground Forces and coastal units of the Navy is planned to be reduced from 23,000 to 2,000 units.

Military educators

According to the directive of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces of November 22 No. 314/3382, the number of military personnel educational work should be reduced from 17,490 people to 4,916, that is, by 71%.

Rearmament

In the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper dated October 2, 2008, the head of armaments of the Russian Armed Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin, noted that the Russian Armed Forces had completely exhausted the stock of weapons and military equipment left over from the USSR, and therefore it is necessary accelerate the equipping of the Armed Forces with new, modern types of weapons.

On November 19, 2008, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Nikolai Makarov, told reporters that in the next 3-5 years, weapons and equipment will be updated by a third in the Russian army, and by 2020 this will be done 100%.

At the beginning of 2010, in terms of the “new look”, hardware communications, in most cases, are of the 2nd category, but produced in 1986-1989, as a result of which it is not combat-ready, requires overhaul both the hardware rooms themselves and the mobile base. Or it remains old, but plundered in the 90-98s, which the command of the units hides from the top leadership. This article lacks links to sources of information.
Information must be verifiable, otherwise it may be questioned and deleted.
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Military secret

On November 11, 2008, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Army General Nikolai Makarov, signed a directive “On preventing the disclosure of information about the reform of the Russian Armed Forces.” The document prohibits the dissemination of information about the progress of reforms, emerging problems and sentiments in the troops. Chairman of the Commission of the Public Council under the Russian Ministry of Defense Vitaly Shlykov believes that military reform is long overdue and the current Russian army is not effective. Events in Georgia have shown: Russia needs a capable army now, and it cannot delay this.

Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov supports army reform

...By 2016, the size of the Armed Forces should be no more than 1 million military personnel. This is the decision of the country's top political leadership. The task of the Ministry of Defense is to create, within the framework of this number and economic capabilities of the state, the most combat-ready army. All other proposals that ignore the dependence of the future appearance of the Armed Forces on economic realities are demagoguery and political populism... ...an alternative to reducing the officer corps, which will create truly attractive conditions of service for the remaining officers, simply does not exist... ...forms and methods that have radically changed since the Second World War armed struggle will allow, without compromising the defense capability of the state, to abandon the armada of personnel units and formations... we need to create the core of a relatively compact, numbering no more than 200 thousand, but with the highest combat potential of a rapid reaction group. That is, mobile, superbly trained and constantly ready for combat use in any theater of military operations.

November 1 deputies State Duma from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation signed an open letter to the President of Russia demanding that he abandon the concept of reform and bring the issue of further military development to public discussion. In particular, Viktor Ilyukhin stated:

We believe that the decision was made hastily, without taking into account the vast territory of the country and the fact that we are surrounded by NATO military bases.

Vice-President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems Konstantin Sivkov:

I believe that this set of reforms, in the context of modern threats to Russia, is simply criminal.

On May 27, 2009, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation held hearings on the problems of medical care for military personnel, persons discharged from military service and members of their families. Chairman of the Public Chamber Commission on Veterans, Military Personnel and Members of Their Families A. N. Kanshin and Chairman of the Public Chamber Commission on Health L. M. Roshal, as well as participants in the hearings, express doubts “about the thoughtfulness of the ongoing reform of the medical service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” and believe:
about 2 million Russian citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right to receive medical care in military medical institutions;
101 military hospitals and 75 military clinics will lose their status legal entity, which will lead to termination of contracts with compulsory health insurance and voluntary health insurance and entail financial losses;
one gets the impression of a systematic destruction of the army's medical service.

Honorary Professor of the Military Academy of the East Kazakhstan region named after G. K. Zhukov I. V. Erokhin believes that the training of military space defense specialists outside the Military Academy of the East Kazakhstan region is a deep misconception and contradicts the “Concept of the East Kazakhstan region of the Russian Federation” approved by the president

...after this reform we will find ourselves in the position of people who actually found themselves in the position of the two pigs Nif-Nif and Nuf-Nuf, when one hid in a straw house, and the second hid in a house made of branches. That is, if the wind blows, there will be nothing left of it. The current reform amazes experts with its ill-conceivedness, its total destructiveness, and so far it only leads to the degradation of the army.

...according to the new reform, the entire mobilization readiness of the state, the entire mobilization system will actually be destroyed, and we will have to fight exclusively with the army that we have. Although any big war shows that not a single state has finished a serious, big war with the army that it had before the war.

Former Defense Minister P. Grachev believes:

...there is no need to turn to the experience of those countries that have not fought seriously for a long time, just as there is no need to learn from those states that want to conquer us!

Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis Alexander Khramchikhin believes that the Ground Forces formed during the reform process are not enough to repel serious military threats. Distinctive feature The process of preparing and implementing the reform is an almost complete lack of information about its goals and objectives. With the exception of a single publication on October 15, 2008 in the Rossiyskaya Gazeta containing preliminary information about the reform, no articles about the upcoming reforms appeared in any of the official publications of the Ministry of Defense. On the official website of the Ministry of Defense in the section “On the new look of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” no detailed information regarding the reform process.

Former Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force Pyotr Deinekin in his interview with the Izvestia newspaper said:

I don’t understand the meaning and goals of the current army reform. What is happening in the army is happening secretly, without explanation to the public or military experts. And this can have very unpleasant consequences.

Military observer Viktor Litovkin believes:

Until the leadership of the Ministry of Defense begins an open and honest dialogue with civil society, scandals like Saturday’s, unfortunately, will continue.

Notes

Show compactly
RIA Novosti
Russian newspaper Federal issue No. 4772 dated October 15, 2008
“The banners go to the museum, the standard bearers go to civilian life,” Independent Military Review dated October 31, 2008
Lenta.ru
Victor Baranets What awaits the Russian army after military reform (Russian). KP (02.12.2008). Retrieved December 21, 2009.
Five thousand general positions have been cut in the Russian army (Russian). Interfax (December 21, 2009). Retrieved December 21, 2009.
1 2 Roman Osharov Army of Lieutenants (Russian). Business newspaper "Vzglyad". "VIEW.RU" (12/21/2009). Retrieved December 21, 2009.
Andrey Fedorov Then we’ll fight (Russian). Lenta.Ru (01/21/2009). Retrieved December 21, 2009.
Denis Telmanov The Ministry of Defense exceeds the plan for reducing officers (Russian). GZT.RU (11/25/2009). Retrieved December 21, 2009.
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 29, 2008 N 1878ss “On some issues of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”
“They will pay for the reduction of the army with command personnel,” Independent Military Review, October 17, 2008
Lenta.ru
RIA Novosti
“The General Staff is changing its views on modern and future wars,” Independent Military Review, July 10, 2009
1 2 News of December 1, 2008
There will be new weapons! "Red Star" October 2, 2008.
The war showed: the Russian army is deteriorating, the supply of Soviet weapons is completely exhausted NEWSru October 2, 2008.
General Staff: in the next 3-5 years, the Russian army will be rearmed by a third, and by 2020 - by 100% NEWSru November 19, 2008.
Ivan Konovalov The restructuring of the army will be carried out without glasnost (Russian). Newspaper "Kommersant" (29.11.2008). Retrieved December 21, 2009.
Red Star from 02/11/2009
Website NEWSru.com
Website of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation

“Recommendations for hearings on the problems of medical care for military personnel, persons discharged from military service, and members of their families” on the website of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation
HBO dated November 21, 2008.
Lenta.Ru: Press conferences: Reform of the Russian army.
HBO dated March 30, 2009
"NVO" from October 16, 2009
1 2 Nezavisimaya Gazeta dated December 1, 2008
Links
Russian newspaper Federal issue No. 4772 dated October 15, 2008
“Military reform 2009-2012” NVO dated December 12, 2008
Independent military review from October 17, 2008, October 24, 2008 and October 31, 2008
Interview with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General N. E. Makarov
Vladimir Voronov The army is on the hook. "The New Times" (October 27, 2008). “There is also a political component, which people in uniform talk about sparingly, although they admit: the army is also shaking because the Kremlin elite feels a threat emanating from there. For in a system where there are no real parties and parliament, only the army remains the only organized structure that can, if not seize power, then try.” Retrieved November 19, 2008.
Then we will fight. A. Fedorov. Lenta.Ru, 01/21/2009.

Every year the modernization of the Russian Armed Forces is gaining momentum. New types of weapons are being approved, the infrastructure of the army is being improved, and the professional skills of military personnel are significantly increasing. So today's question is Rearmament reforms of the Russian Armed Forces 2018 still remains open.

In certain circles, doubts arise that the military reform program of 2008-2020 will be completed on time. In view of the economic crisis and rapidly changing conditions in the country, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the reform.

The problem of the need for such a reform was voiced shortly before 2008 and was presented only as one of the possible directions for future reformation. A set of measures, divided into several stages, is designed to change and improve the structure, strength and composition of a strategically important military organization for the country - the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Stages of rearmament:

• Stage I – took place from 2008 to 2011 inclusive.
• Stage II - began in 2012 and ended in 2015.
• Stage III – planned for the period from 2016 to 2020 inclusive.

Organizational and staffing maneuvers

At the first stage, organizational and staffing measures were carried out aimed at improving management, optimizing numbers and carrying out military education reform.

One of the main directions of the first stage of the reformation was the transition from a system consisting of four links (that is, “military district - army - division - regiment”) to a system including only three links: “military district - operational command - brigade”.

The number of military districts was reduced, each of which established its own reserve command. During the rearmament reform, the number of military units was also reduced.

Reduction degree:

• Ground forces - 90%;
• Navy - by 49%;
• Air Force - by 48%;
• Strategic Missile Forces - by 33%;
• Airborne troops - by 17%;
• Space Forces - by 15%.

A significant part of the rearmament was the reduction in the number of military personnel. Officers were the most affected by the reformation: from approximately 300 thousand people, the number of officers was reduced by almost half.

It must be said that the optimization of numbers was determined to be unsuccessful. The actions of the military department led to complex problems: the professional part of the junior army command was completely destroyed. Experts, by the way, recognized the program to replace warrant officers with sergeants as a failure.

It is expected that the warrant officers will return to their units in the required composition. By the beginning of 2018, the military department plans to increase the size of the Russian army. So, the total number of officers will be 220 thousand people, warrant officers and midshipmen - approximately 50 thousand people, contract soldiers - 425 thousand people, conscripts - 300 thousand people. A significant number of conscripts testify to.

The reform of military education implies the reduction of some military institutes and universities, and instead of them, scientific centers were formed under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

Optimization of social security for military personnel

The second stage of the reformation, which includes resolving issues social nature, was aimed at the following activities: providing housing, increasing material allowances, advanced training and professional retraining.

At the moment, the number of military personnel without housing has decreased significantly compared to 2009. Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly. In the first years of the second stage, this issue was successfully resolved, but since 2012, the number of people who do not have their own apartment has grown inexorably.

The elimination of the queue for housing, according to the plan of the Ministry of Defense, was to be completed by 2013. However this process was not implemented in a number of ways serious reasons. In such conditions, the department made the only right decision to give those on the waiting list a one-time cash payment instead of housing.

The increase in material allowances for military personnel occurred in 2012. Salaries were increased almost 3 times, and military pensions also increased. All allowances and additional payments in force before the reformation were abolished, and completely new additional payments were introduced instead.

All contract servicemen, according to the professional retraining reform, were required to undergo special “survival courses” aimed at improving their skills. Retraining of officers is carried out when a serviceman is appointed to a position.

Rearmament reform at present

Currently, the third stage of the reform of the rearmament of the Russian Armed Forces is underway. As of 2016, the total share of new weapons in the Russian Military Forces was 47%, while, according to the plan, this figure should have been only 30%. For the army, this means receiving an additional number of modern tanks, small arms and other types of weapons.

The ultimate goal of the reform is to increase the number of modern weapons to 70% by 2020. Thus, the modernization of the army of the Russian Federation must be completed on time and in full.

In addition to technical improvements, the rearmament reform contributed to increasing the level of combat training of military personnel, conducting large-scale exercises, forming new military institutions and units, optimizing the structure of the Military Forces, etc.

The best assessment of the current state of affairs can be the opinion of our sworn “friends” from the West, who emphasize the ever-increasing military power of our country.

As part of the military reform carried out in the Russian Federation, measures for deep transformations in the Armed Forces of the state themselves, in the army and navy, were objectively necessary, bringing them to a new look in accordance with the nature and characteristics of the military-political situation, modern technological requirements and economic capabilities of the country.

“The main task of strengthening national defense in the medium term is the transition to a qualitative appearance of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation while maintaining the potential of strategic nuclear forces by improving the organizational structure and the system of territorial basing of troops and forces, increasing the number of units of constant readiness, as well as improving operational and combat training, organization of interspecific interaction of troops and forces,” noted in the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020.” In accordance with the requirements of the “Strategy,” on October 14, 2008, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced the procedure for the Ministry of Defense to form a new look for the Armed Forces, the configuration of which was approved by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on September 11, 2008. The transformation of the Russian army and navy is planned to be carried out in three stages and completed by 2020.

The goal of the ongoing reforms is to bring the Armed Forces into compliance with the requirements that allow them to carry out tasks with the necessary reliability to deter a potential aggressor, prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts and repel aggression, taking into account the economic capabilities of the state.

The new look of the Russian Armed Forces, like military reform in the Russian Federation as a whole, is a requirement of the time and is due to a number of objective reasons, the main of which are:

Changing the range of threats to the military security of the Russian Federation;

Achievements of scientific and technological progress, the emergence in the world of qualitatively new types of weapons and military equipment;

Changing nature of armed struggle in the 21st century.

The new look army and navy should be compact, highly mobile, equipped with modern weapons and staffed with professional personnel. They must be able to conduct both classic wars and use innovative forms and methods of warfare in local wars, including in the fight against international terrorism and piracy.

As part of the formation of a new image of the Armed Forces, five main tasks are being solved:

1. Transfer of all formations of the Armed Forces to the category of permanent readiness with 100 percent staffing;

2. Re-equipping the Armed Forces with modern weapons, military and special equipment;

3. Training of highly professional officers and sergeants, development of new programs for their training, creation of a modern network of military educational institutions;

4. Reprocessing of program and statutory documents for the organization of education, training of troops, their daily life activities and combat operations;

5. Ensuring social security for military personnel, including decent pay and housing.

In 2010, the first, most difficult stage of creating a new image of the Armed Forces was completed - a transition was made to the optimal three-level management principle: joint strategic command - operational command - brigade. This increased efficiency in training troops and controllability in carrying out assigned tasks.

In order to bring the military organization of the state into line with the needs of defense and security, as well as the economic capabilities of the country, measures were taken to radically optimize government bodies, including the central apparatus, to reduce the number of military personnel.

A new combat composition of the Armed Forces has been formed: in military districts and fleets, the transfer of all formations and military units to the category of permanent combat readiness has been completed. They are fully equipped with personnel, weapons and military equipment. For example, in the Baltic Fleet, as Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Viktor Chirkov told Krasnaya Zvezda on May 24, 2011, “the organizational structure has been optimized, and the combat readiness of formations and units is being increased based on qualitatively new principles. Today, all of them are parts of constant combat readiness, capable of performing their intended tasks in the shortest possible time.”

Conducted great job to improve the system of military-administrative division of the Russian Federation. On September 20, 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree according to which, instead of the previous six military districts, four qualitatively new strategic associations were formed - Western, Southern, Central and Eastern military districts. Their leadership is entrusted to the joint strategic commands. The military districts included combined arms armies, navies, air force and air defense commands. Taking into account the tasks performed by the troops, their deployment in strategic directions has been clarified.

What is fundamentally new in the structure of military districts is that, within the boundaries of responsibility, they are entrusted with the functions of operational leadership of all military formations, regardless of their inclusion in various federal departments. This means that border, internal troops, civil defense units and other military formations are operationally subordinate to the operational-strategic command.

The structure of the Navy as a whole has been preserved, but all fleets - the Baltic, Northern, Pacific, Black Sea and Caspian Flotilla - are now subordinate to the commanders of the corresponding military districts: Western, Eastern and Southern.

The main task of the next stage in the formation of a new image of the Armed Forces is to increase the combat capabilities of troop groups in strategic directions. To this end, in the near future it is planned to complete the formation of new formations and military units, create an aerospace defense system, implement a set of measures to improve the combat readiness of formed units to carry out combat missions, continue to re-equip troops with modern weapons and equipment, and build military camps in a new deployment geography troops, create a fund of official housing, improve the system social security military personnel and members of their families.

The process of withdrawing from the Armed Forces the so-called supporting structures, enterprises and organizations, facilities and structures, without which their combat ability would be practically unaffected. Some of them are being reorganized and corporatized, which will reduce the number of military personnel and civilian personnel and at the same time receive additional funds to replenish the defense budget and ensure social protection military.

In this context, there is a reorganization of the military construction complex, agricultural enterprises, reorganization of military trade, transfer of social infrastructure facilities to local authorities (including parts of housing and communal services, kindergartens and nurseries, schools, household enterprises, etc.), on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense. Expenses for maintaining social infrastructure sometimes reached 30% of expenses (about 2-3 trillion rubles) for maintaining troops, which in the new look of the Armed Forces will be used to provide social guarantees for military personnel.

In general, bringing the Armed Forces to a new look is a large-scale undertaking that requires popular support and, first of all, soldiers of the army and navy. The level of organization of personnel is very important so that reorganization, significant reduction of officer corps, withdrawal of supporting structures from the Armed Forces, etc. did not affect the level of combat readiness of troops and naval forces.

Under these conditions, the requirements for officers who organize the training and education of subordinates and the main guides of public policy in the army and navy. The level of the educational process and the quality of combat training primarily depend on their high morale and discipline, professionalism, responsibility and initiative.

The most important condition for successfully bringing the Armed Forces to a new look is maintaining patriotic feelings and a healthy moral and psychological climate in military teams. It is important to ensure that every military personnel understands the national significance of the changes in the Armed Forces and their personal responsibility for maintaining high vigilance and combat readiness. Military personnel must deeply understand that the reduction of the army and navy should not weaken their combat power. It must be made up for by the growth of each warrior's combat skill, skillful use of military equipment and weapons, and strengthening of military discipline and organization.

Thus, as a result of profound transformations, our Armed Forces in a new look will meet all the parameters of a modern army, will be able to carry out the entire range of tasks assigned to them to deter and prevent military conflicts, and will also be ready for direct armed defense of the Russian Federation and its allies.

Browser -Observer 2003 № 6 (1 6 1 )

MILITARY REFORM IN RUSSIA

Oleg Lisov,

head of the VIMI sector

The first attempts at serious and systematic reform of the Armed Forces of our state in recent decades were made in the 70s, when, at the direction of the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov, new organizational and personnel staffs and new technology an entire army was transferred (the 28th, stationed in Belarus). After being assembled and fully equipped with new equipment, it took part in the Zapad-81 maneuvers, showing excellent results for those times. Unfortunately, this experience was not used, and the subsequent period of stagnation and the so-called “perestroika” did not allow the country’s leadership to further engage in reforming the army.

In the last 10 years in all layers Russian society and first of all, among Russian politicians, debates about the need to reduce the army and reform the Russian Armed Forces do not subside. The country's leadership is hesitantly (either out of ignorance or out of fear?) making attempts to do something in this direction, but there are still no significant and, most importantly, positive results from these attempts. At the same time, the Armed Forces are finally losing their combat readiness and combat effectiveness, the best, young and promising officers are leaving the army, equipment is aging, the number of accidents is growing sharply, and the prestige of the Armed Forces has fallen to its lowest level. Military service has become not an honorable duty and duty (as it is written in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and as it should be), but almost a shame.

The military reform carried out in Russia since mid-1997 was designed to adapt the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the new military needs of the state and its changed economic capabilities. However, the financial and economic collapse of August 1998 interrupted the program of civilized military reform and delayed its implementation for many years.

Regulatory framework for reform

Until 1998, the guiding document for determining the strategy for reforming the Armed Forces was the “Plan for the Reform and Construction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” approved by the President, which was then replaced by the “Fundamentals (Concept) of State Policy for the Military Development of Russia for the Period until 2005,” approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation in July 1998. In accordance with this document, unfortunately, each law enforcement department developed its own internal plans for reforming the forces, which then had to be coordinated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces and combined into a common document in order to ensure a systematic process of reform, construction and strengthening according to a single plan military security of Russia. In accordance with this plan, some organizational and staffing measures were carried out, but over time it turned out that the measures taken did not achieve the objectives, and many transformations did not improve, but on the contrary, worsened the country’s security organization system and required cancellation or replacement with new ones (Table 1). 1).

The main measures of the military reform of the Russian Federation, carried out until 2005.

Stages and main activities on reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation	Goals and tasks to be solved and possible consequences
Stage 1 - until 2000
(Significant reductions in troop personnel, reduction (enlargement) of military districts, changes in the structure of troops and the organization of military command).
Reduction in the number of personnel of the Russian Ground Forces from 420 thousand people. up to 348 thousand people	Increasing the efficiency of troop control
Reform of the Main Command of the Ground Forces.	Significant reduction in numbers.
Inclusion of the military space forces (VKS) and missile and space defense forces (RKO) into the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces).	Reduction in the number of administrative staff.
The formation of a new independent branch of the military from the Aerospace Forces and the Russian Defense Forces - the space one - and its transfer to the Russian Air Force.	Reducing the cost of maintaining management staff.
Strategic Missile Forces - reorganization from a type of troops into a branch of troops.	Reducing costs for R&D and scientific development.
Completion of the formation of the structure of the Russian Armed Forces, consisting of four services - the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force and Strategic Forces.	Elimination of parallelism in the work of military headquarters and leadership.
Merger of the country's Air Force and Air Defense into one branch of the Russian Armed Forces - the Air Force.
Establishment of a unified system of military-administrative division of the territory of the Russian Federation into strategic directions: North-Western - within the borders of the Leningrad Military District; Western - within the boundaries of the Moscow Military District; Southwestern - within the borders of the North Caucasus Military District; Siberian Military District and Far Eastern Military District - within the borders of the Far Eastern Military District (5 military districts).
Stage 2 - until 2002
(Reducing numbers, increasing funding, increasing combat readiness, transferring some units to contract service).
Reconstruction of the High Command of the Ground Forces (2001).	Increasing the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of units and formations.
Increasing combat readiness, modernization and development of new types and types of weapons.	Reforming and strengthening the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation.
Creation of parts and connections of “constant readiness”:	Preservation of the officer corps.
three divisions and four brigades of “constant readiness” have been formed in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military districts, which are at least 80% staffed with l/s, 100% armed, trained and constantly subject to increased requirements).	Raising the social and moral status of military personnel.
Steps to increase the number of contract soldiers in the Armed Forces.
Promotion social status and the rights of military personnel.
Experimental transfer of an airborne division to a contract basis, with subsequent study of experience and its implementation in other troops.
Development and adoption of the Law “On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (AGS)”.
Stage 3 - until 2005
(Increase in units and formations of “constant readiness”, increase in purchases of military equipment. Transfer of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the entire state defense system to the principle of “effective sufficiency”).
Concentration of efforts and funds to gradually increase the number of formations and units of “constant readiness” (such units and formations should be created in all types of the Armed Forces. It was planned to have up to 10 full-blooded divisions in the Ground Forces).	Increasing the efficiency of troops and military equipment.
Improving the structure of command and control of troops.	Strengthening the role and place of the military-industrial complex in the country's defense system.
Transfer of the Armed Forces proper to a three-service organizational structure (land, air-space, sea).
Modernization and improvement of weapons and military equipment.	Increasing the combat power of the Armed Forces, strengthening the process of re-equipping the army, introducing new types and models of weapons and military equipment.
Increased purchases of weapons and military equipment, enhanced and effective implementation of them among the troops.	Implementation of the constitutional right of a citizen to alternative service.
Preparation of a regulatory, legal, organizational, staffing and socio-economic justification for the introduction of an alternative civil service (ACS) in the Russian Federation, along with compulsory military service (the ACS law has been put into effect in the Russian Federation only since 2004).	Fulfillment of assumed international obligations.
Creation of a unified rear of the Armed Forces for the army, navy, aviation, troops of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, border, internal and railway troops.	Reducing the number of conscripts.
Reaching 100% provision of the Armed Forces with all resources (combat, financial, etc.).	Scientific and technical development of new types of equipment and mastery of this technology.

In addition, over time, it became clear that reforms in the law enforcement agencies were and are being carried out by certain groups of certain officials who were not interested in them, and their actions are often based not on scientifically developed and well-verified calculations, but on their purely personal feelings and accumulated experience and knowledge. The results of this work are annual reduction strength, merger and division of branches and branches of the armed forces, consolidation of districts, reorganization of the administrative apparatus, reform of combat formations, liquidation of scientific schools and the entire system of training scientific personnel, reduction of military schools and academies. But where is the expected result - a positive effect? Such implementation of organizational and staffing measures does not solve the main task - strengthening the military security of the state, but, on the contrary, weakens it and aggravates the situation of the Russian Armed Forces. The results of each reform are extremely painful not only on personnel, their moral and psychological state and financial situation, but on the most important thing - the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of forces and means to protect the state. An analysis of the measures taken as part of the reform of the Russian military machine shows that the effectiveness (effectiveness) of many of the measures carried out until recently, frankly speaking, does not correspond to the initial calculations - no extra financial resources appear, numbers are not reduced, and expenses are not reduced. As a result, combat readiness does not increase, and some activities remain experiments and previously made decisions are canceled or replaced by others (for example, the liquidation and re-establishment of the Main Command of the Ground Forces). This kind of event first sharply reduces the efficiency of the functioning of the entire military body, then there is a loss of the best, experienced part of the troop personnel and, finally, a partial or complete loss of combat readiness of units and formations. So, if by the beginning of the 90s the ground forces had 80 combat-ready formations, then in 2002 - 20 formations of the ground forces and 15 in other types of armed forces eke out a miserable existence, of which only one 42nd division in Chechnya is responsible these increased requirements.

The composition of the contingent of conscripts called up for military service is also interesting - 89% of young men of conscription age either evade service or are released from it in various ways - they get sick, give birth to more than 2 children, go on the run, go abroad, etc.

Of the 11% of conscripts, mainly from remote areas and remote areas, 7% have primary education, 30% have secondary education, and 40% have never studied or worked, and only about 20% meet the requirements.

An analysis of the first stage of military reform in Russia allowed "attentive" researchers from the London Institute for Strategic Studies in their report "Military Balance 1999-2000." draw very pessimistic and rather amateurish conclusions. Their meaning is as follows: “the general state of combat readiness of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, with the exception of nuclear ones, remains low due to the lack of funds for training, maintenance and procurement of weapons. However, despite the difficulties in 1999, the Russian Armed Forces demonstrated higher than seemingly the ability to deploy large combined forces." At what expense and with what efforts?

Main directions of reform implementation

As experience and practice show, the main thing in solving the most complex and enormous problem of our state - reforming its Armed Forces - should be systematic approach. This primarily includes:

Correct formulation of political tasks facing the state and the Armed Forces;

Scientific determination of the future appearance of the Armed Forces (what the Armed Forces should be);

Optimal reform of those parts and formations that exist at the time of reform;

The gradual construction and creation of new units and formations for the successful defense of the country and the possible conduct of war for the next 10, 20, 30 or more years.

Reforms in the Armed Forces, as a rule, are carried out in four main directions - changing the command and control system of the Armed Forces, changing the recruitment system, changing the training and education system, changing the system of equipping troops with weapons and military equipment, various types allowance and maintenance. This has not been implemented in our Armed Forces until recently. Military science claims that there are three states of the level of combat readiness of any military unit or formation - combat-ready, partially combat-ready and not combat-ready. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces introduced the fourth category - a supercritical level of combat readiness of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - this is the current state of our Armed Forces.

It is well known that all the above tasks must be determined and formulated in the main government documents- “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” - a political document that defines the main directions of state policy in the field of ensuring the security of the individual, society, state and the country’s security from external and internal threats; "The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation" is a political document that defines the military-political, military-strategic and military-economic foundations for ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and a number of other fundamental legal planning and executive acts. Unfortunately, these legal documents began to appear only in 2000. It can be considered that from that moment, on the basis of a whole package of such normative and legal acts, systematic work began to continue in our country to reform its Armed Forces.

Economic aspects of military reform

With the collapse Soviet Union, with the formation of the Russian Federation and its entry into the perestroika era, military expenditures of the state began to decline sharply, and if in 1992 they amounted to 5.56% of GDP, then in 2002 - approximately 2.5% of gross domestic product, and in 2003 - 2.65%. Moreover, the reduction in expenses occurred simultaneously and was accompanied by an indiscriminate reduction in the size of the Russian Armed Forces, the squandering and destruction of weapons and military equipment (Table 2). In practice, real spending on national defense, taking into account inflation, the war in Chechnya and a number of other economic and environmental consequences and others negative aspects our history, according to experts, in recent years decreased by 70-75%.

Recognizing the importance and need for a clear and mandatory implementation of military reforms in the security forces of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation has finally designated the allocations for its implementation as a separate line in the budget. Moreover, if in 2001 only 4.5 billion rubles were allocated for these purposes, then in 2002 it was already 16.544 billion rubles, i.e., practically, the amount increased almost 4 times, and in 2003 - 15.8 billion rubles. Next year this amount should be more significant, and the country's leadership stipulates that it is possible to increase allocations for these purposes.

Allocations for the national defense of the Russian Federation in 1992-2003.

Indicators
GDP, billion rubles
Actual expenditures on national defense, billion rubles.
Actual allocations, % of GDP

The main element of reforming the Armed Forces, unfortunately, in accordance with decisions taken there was and remains a radical reduction in the number of troops. From total number personnel of law enforcement agencies 2 million 360 thousand people. military and 960 thousand people. About 600 thousand civilian personnel should be fired. From the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation proper, whose number is 1 million 200 thousand people. (Table 3), 365 thousand people should be dismissed, and about 140 thousand people from other law enforcement agencies. In fact, during 2001, the staffing level of the RF Armed Forces was reduced by 91 thousand people. and 14.5 thousand people. civilian personnel. As of January 1, 2002, the strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was 1.274 million military personnel. Subsequently, some politicians propose to increase the strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 600-800 thousand people, however, it is scientifically justified that for the reliable organization of military security of the state, the strength of the Armed Forces of any country should be 1% of the population. According to estimates of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Russia should have an Armed Forces of 1 million 200 thousand people, which will reliably ensure border protection and military security of the state and be well within its financial capabilities.

According to the adopted “Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation,” the level of spending on national security (this includes defense) should be approximately 5.1% of GDP, and in the opinion of our President, this figure should not exceed 3.5% of gross domestic product. The main task for the Armed Forces in at this stage- creation of units and formations of “constant readiness” in all types and branches of troops. This task was set by the President of the Russian Federation at a meeting with the high military command in July 2002. In the near future, the Ground Forces will have 10 full-blooded divisions of “constant readiness”, and in other types of armed forces the number of such formations is planned to be increased

Indicators	Number
Composition of the RF Armed Forces
Total number
Officers and warrant officers (midshipmen)
Soldiers and sergeants (sailors and foremen); (conscription service)
Warrant officers (midshipmen), sergeants and soldiers (foremen and sailors); (contract service)

Another, no less important area of ​​reform is the creation of combat-ready units and formations with the involvement of more contract soldiers. According to many experts, with the current level of technological development, this can only be achieved by transferring the Armed Forces to a contract basis. Such experiments are already being carried out. Such an experiment is being carried out in the Pskov Airborne Division. According to conservative estimates, the transfer of just one division to a contract basis is estimated at 3-3.5 billion rubles, and for the entire Armed Forces at 150-200 billion rubles. This is only a translation.

No one has yet calculated how much it will cost to maintain such troops. It is clear, as world experience shows, that it is impossible to solve all the problems of the army with the help of contract soldiers. According to the experience of most European countries The Armed Forces in these countries are recruited in two ways - by contract and by conscription. Foreign experts clearly consider this model of army recruitment to be the best and have long abandoned a completely hired Armed Forces. And this is the right decision.

The third important area of ​​reforming the Armed Forces is the development and adoption of a completely new legal act for our country, allowing young people called up for military service to perform non-military, as well as civilian, alternative service. The adoption of such a document will entail the creation of a whole state system setting up such a service and would likely be costly. On July 24, 2002, the President of the Russian Federation signed a new Federal Law “On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (AGS),” which will come into force in our country in January 2004.

The appearance of such an unusual document for our country is dictated by the provision of Russian citizens with the right to alternative service, which is written down in Article 59 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal laws “On Military Duty and Military Service” and “On Defense”. After the adoption of the Law “On Alternative Civil Service”, it will be necessary to develop and adopt a regulation on alternative civil service (ACS), adapt it to the conditions of individual regions, determine the executive body that will exercise this control and be responsible for the person’s performance of this service. This will certainly require new expenses.

Some calculation data

1998-1999 On behalf of the President of the Russian Federation and the government of the country, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, together with a number of research institutes, conducted a comprehensive scientific study "Forecast of financial and economic support for the construction of the Russian Armed Forces for the period up to 2010." All work was based on the scientifically proven number of armed forces of 1 million 200 thousand people, the existing volumes of monetary allowances, standards for the supply of clothing and food, the established level of medical and other types of allowances, services and support.

In table 3, 4 and 5 show the results of these studies. Despite the considerable time that has passed since the publication of these data, with minor amendments, they could be used for further developments.

The results of the forecast of financial and economic support for the construction of the RF Armed Forces for the period up to 2010 indicate that even if the most successful option for the development of the Russian economy is implemented, the country's Ministry of Defense will be able to receive financial resources in the required volumes only starting from 2005. This circumstance is obvious will require a revision of some deadlines for the implementation of the most important measures of military reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

billion rubles (in 1998 prices)

		Preparation	Procurement of arms and military equipment		Builder-

Table 5

Required distribution of total expenses of the RF Ministry of Defense

for the intended purpose in 1988-2005.

		Preparation	Procurement of arms and military equipment		Builder-

Some conclusions

1. Despite a number of negative points(sometimes weak theoretical justification of the ongoing event, lack of sufficient and real funding, reluctance of some top managers to carry out unpopular reforms, improperly organized and incompletely carried out event, etc.), a number of organizational, staffing, structural, financial and social transformations in line with the military reform of its Armed Forces.

2. The annual increase in funding for military reform (from 4.5 billion rubles in 2001 to 16.5 billion rubles in 2002) gives new impetus to its continuation and expansion.

3. In the course of the ongoing reform in the RF Armed Forces, three new divisions and four new brigades of “permanent readiness” have already been created and are functioning in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military districts. They are at least 80% manned, 100% equipped with equipment and weapons, and are constantly subject to increased demands. It is planned to have such units and formations in all types of aircraft.

4. The President of the Russian Federation assigned to the leadership of the Armed Forces main task- create units and formations of “constant readiness” in all types of aircraft. In particular, it is planned to have 10 such formations in the Ground Forces, and the construction of the Armed Forces and the entire defense of the country should be carried out according to the principle of “effective sufficiency.”

5. Practical steps to create units and formations staffed on a contract basis (transfer of the Pskov Airborne Division) should give practical results in further expanding this experiment to all types and branches of the Armed Forces.

6. When reforming units and formations, it is necessary to use the experience and miscalculations identified during the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya, NATO combat operations in Yugoslavia and the US Armed Forces in Afghanistan, and possibly future battles in Iraq.

7. With the adoption by the leadership of the Russian Federation in 2002 of the Federal Law “On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (ATS)” and its entry into force in January 2004, the process of consolidation in the state continues legislative norms for implementation Russian citizens their rights and responsibilities (only 11% of the conscript contingent is currently serving in the military, 89% of young men of conscription age avoid serving in the Armed Forces).

8. As the experience and practice of building and reforming the Armed Forces of other states shows, such negative decisions and mistakes are always present when implementing such grandiose transformations as military reform. To reduce them you need:

Participation in the transformation process of a large number of disinterested participants (experts);

A competent approach and scientifically based development of the essence, course and final results of any event carried out;

Practical consolidation of the results obtained directly in the troops;

Evaluate and use the experience gained to take further steps in the reform process.

9. The purposeful nature of military construction in new, changed conditions requires a rather complex and well-developed system of planning and implementation of the entire process of this construction. To do this, you need to have a package of specially developed regulatory legal acts that define goals, objectives and functional responsibilities various government agencies in managing military development and generally strengthening the combat power of the state. For further, targeted and legalized work on putting into practical life the planned measures to reform the Armed Forces of Russia, it would be advisable to adopt the Russian Federation Law "On military reform" - defining the basic principles, stages, boundaries, norms and rules of military development.